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David Lane 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this research was to identify the core components of child-centred 
decision-making in public child law proceedings from the perspectives of 
judges in England and Wales.  In the context of this study, child-centredness 
includes the elements of, transparency, being informative, child-friendly and 
respectful of children, inclusive, safe and sensitive to risk.  This aim was 
achieved through exploring with judges their perceptions of what represents 
a child-centred public child law system, by identifying those factors, such as, 
human, legal, cultural and systemic, which present both enablers and 
barriers to a transparent child-accessible and child-friendly process and 
system.  Judges’ views were also obtained on the principles underpinning 
legislation that may conflict with child-centred decision-making. 
 
This is a qualitative research study and involved carrying out one-to-one 
semi-structured interviews with 30 judges from the high, county and district 
courts (now the Family Court) throughout England and Wales.  The inclusion 
criteria for this study was that the participating judges had experience of and 
were currently involved in presiding over public child law proceedings.  The 
interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder for the purposes of 
accuracy and subsequent analysis.  Underpinning the qualitative approach 
chosen for this study, is the paradigm of interpretative phenomenology, the 
goal of which, in this study, was to describe and interpret accurately the lived 
experiences and perspectives of judges. 
 
Judges in this research were deeply committed to making the right and just 
decision for children in terms of their welfare and development.  The principle 
of paramountcy guided them in their decision-making.  This research found 
that children’s views, wishes and feelings were mainly communicated to the 
court via proxy accounts of the child’s appointed Guardian.  For the most 
part, their direct voice in proceedings was silent, as judges very rarely met 
with the child.  Children’s direct participation in their proceedings was neither 
promoted or encouraged by judges.  On the rare occasions it did occur, it 
was instigated by the child’s Guardian.  Judges felt that Guardians were 
spending less time in working directly with the children they represented due 
to a lack of available time, formal working practices and statutory timescales 
for the completion of proceedings, all of which impacted on the quality and 
analysis of evidence and information presented to the court.   
 
The research indicates that obtaining the child’s perspective of their lived 
experience and circumstances is not a priority.  The centrality of the child’s 
position in their proceedings has been supplanted by legal, procedural and 
administrative requirements.  The system itself has attained the status of 
paramountcy.  The lack of transparency and inclusiveness distances the child 
from their proceedings. 
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Chapter 1 
  
Introduction    
 
 
There are 72,670 look-after children in England1 and 5,662 in Wales,2  most 
of whom have been subject to decisions made in public child law 
proceedings (Care and Adoption).  In the past five years there has been an 
overall increase in the number of children in care due to abuse or neglect in 
England and Wales.3  60% of all looked after children in England are looked 
after as a result of abuse or neglect.  In Wales, this figure is 68%.4   
 
Children who are involved in public child law proceedings are among the 
most vulnerable in our society and, therefore, they need the professionals 
who protect them, those who represent them in proceedings and those who 
make life changing decisions about their lives, to have a real, consistent and 
meaningful presence in their lives.  There is evidence5 that a poor legal 
process and a failure to place children at the heart of that compounds 
significantly children’s vulnerabilities.  Judges could play a key role in 
addressing children’s vulnerabilities and empower their voice in this context 
by endorsing a genuinely child-centred approach.  A core element of such an 
approach is the need to listen to the child’s voice to understand their lived 
experiences.  One young person who took part in a House of Commons Care 
Inquiry stated: 
 
‘I’ve been in care since I was six and one of the things that really 
bugged me and annoyed me about social workers is that they think 
they know how you feel and they say “I know what you’re going 
through” but they don’t know what you’re feeling. I think that everyone 
needs to listen properly to children and not make assumptions’.6  
   
                                            
1 Department for Education, Children Looked After in England (including adoption), year 
  ending 31 March 2017 (National Statistics 2017). 
2 Statswales, Adoptions, outcomes and placements for children looked after by local authorities as of 18 October 
  2016 Accessed on: 11 October 2017 stats.pss@wales.gsi.gov.uk  
3 H Bentley, O O’Hagan, A Brown, N Vasco, C Lynch, J Peppiate, M Webber, R Ball, P Miller, A Byrne, M Hafizi and 
  F Letendrie, How safe are our children? (NSPCC 2017). 
4 ibid 66. 
5 ibid. 
6 J Tunnard and M Ryan, Making not Breaking: Building relationships for our most vulnerable children – Findings  
   and recommendations of the Care Inquiry (House of Commons 2013) 26.    
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Another young person who participated in this inquiry, highlighted the need to 
improve the present system rather than just passing laws in the hope that 
children’s position in the care system will improve: 
 
‘I think what’s important is for the Government to stop making new 
laws and work instead with what we have already and try and develop 
it for the better. What’s important is for them to try and find ways of 
catering for all of us as individuals so that we grow up and become 
successful young people who were in care, not young people who are 
not successful because they were in care’.7 
 
 
Decisions made by judges in public child law proceedings affect profoundly 
the lives of children and their families.  Judges play a pivotal role in the public 
child law system as they are the ultimate decision-makers, and, therefore, it 
is crucial to gain an insight into their perspectives on what they consider 
constitutes child-centred decision-making.  The data obtained in this research 
provides rich and nuanced material that gives an insight into the world of 
judicial decision-making.  This research will show that although we have a 
plethora of legislation and an abundance of accompanying regulations and 
guidance, children continue to remain on the periphery of a system that 
makes far reaching decisions about their lives.  Less time is being spent by 
professionals in getting to know the children they have responsibility for 
protecting and representing.  An enquiry into the role of social workers in 
adoption revealed: ‘Structures within organisations mean it is difficult for one 
person to really get to know the child’.  The enquiry recommended that social 
workers ‘should follow the child rather than being system-led’.8   
 
The child’s true voice is being diluted significantly and at times smothered by 
the requirements of the system, in the name of managerial efficiency.  In the 
reality of practice, the child has become the object of the system, with the 
system occupying a position of paramountcy, rather than the welfare and 
best interests of the child.  Direct participation of children in their proceedings 
                                            
7 Tunnard and Ryan (n 6). 
8 Featherstone B, Gupta A, Mills S, The role of the social worker in adoption – ethics and human rights: An  
  Enquiry (British Association of Social Workers 2018) 20. 
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is neither encouraged or promoted by judges.  Proxy accounts of the child’s 
views through their Guardian and local authority social worker are considered 
by judges to be the most appropriate way of hearing children’s views.  The 
child in effect is virtually invisible in the system.9  
 
There is a lack of research on the perspectives of judges about what 
constitutes child-centred decision-making.  This study interviewed and 
explored with District, County and High Judges (now part of the family court) 
in England and Wales, the core factors and elements of child-centred 
decision-making in public child law proceedings including their perspectives 
on children having a more direct level of participation in these proceedings 
(see copy of Interview Guide / Focus Areas in Appendix 1). 
 
1.1 Research Question and Objectives 
 
The research question underpinning this thesis was: what are the core 
elements of child-centred decision-making in public child law proceedings 
from the perspectives of judges in England and Wales?  To answer this 
question, the research had three objectives.  First, to explore with members 
of the judiciary their perceptions of what represents a child-centred public 
child law system.  Second, to identify the human, legal, cultural and systemic 
factors, which may present barriers to a transparent, child-accessible and 
child-friendly public child law system.  Third, to obtain from judges their views 
on the principles underpinning legislation that may conflict with child-centred 
decision-making. 
 
Whilst children in public child law proceedings in England and Wales, under 
the Children Act 1989, are surrounded by a great variety of professionals and 
experts and have the right to be legally represented via a children’s Guardian 
and lawyer or independently, they rarely have the opportunity to speak 
directly with the judge dealing with their case to express their wishes and 
feelings.  It is, therefore, important to find out from the judges themselves 
                                            
9 J Munby, ‘Unheard voices: the involvement of children and vulnerable people in the family justice system’.  The 
  annual lecture of the Wales Observatory on Human Rights of Children and Young People at the College of Law, 
  Swansea University delivered on 25 June 2015. 
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their views on what constitutes a child-centred approach to their decision-
making in Care and Adoption Proceedings. Whilst there exists some 
research in other jurisdictions, notably, Raitt’s study10 among members of the 
Scottish Judiciary in the area of private law and Birnbaum and Bala,11 where 
they compared the perspectives of American and Canadian Judges in 
relation to custody and access cases, there is a dearth of research on public 
child law proceedings in England and Wales, with a specific focus on child-
centred decision-making from the perspectives of the Judiciary.  Although 
there have been notable contributions to the literature in respect of this area 
of law from experienced members of the Judiciary (Baroness Hale of 
Richmond12 and Crichton13), it remains an area where there exists a real gap 
in research.  This research contributes to filling this gap.     
 
1.2 Methodological approach 
 
This study is located within a broad interpretation of the paradigm of 
phenomenology.  While this research locates itself within the broad principles 
of a phenomenological approach, it departs from Husserl’s principle of ‘pure 
description’14 in that analysis is seen as necessary, given the applied nature 
of the research subject area and the need to inform future development in 
this area in relation to policymaking, professional practice and future 
legislation15.  Underpinning the qualitative approach chosen for this study, is 
the paradigm of interpretative phenomenology,16 the goal of which, in this 
study, is to describe and interpret accurately the lived experiences and 
perspectives of judges presiding over public child law proceedings in relation 
to what they consider to be a child-centred public child law system.  In the 
context of this study, child-centredness includes the elements of, 
                                            
10 F E Raitt, ‘Hearing children in family law proceedings: can judges make a difference?’ (2007) 9 (2) Child and  
   Family Law Quarterly. 
11 R Birnbaum and N Bala, ‘Judicial Interviews with Children in Custody and Access Cases: comparing 
   experiences in Ontario and Ohio’ (2010) 24 (3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 300.  
12 B Hale, ‘Can you hear me Your Honour?’ (2012) Family Law January 2012. 
13 N Crichton, (2006) ‘Listening to children’ (2006) Family Law October 2006 849. 
14 E Husserl, ‘Pure phenomenology, its method and its field of investigation’ in D Moran and T Mooney  
    (eds.),The Phenomenology Reader (Routledge 2002). 
15 J D Crist and C A Tanner, ‘Interpretation / Analysis methods in hermeneutic interpretive phenomenology’ (2003)  
    Nursing Research 52 (3) 202. 
16 J A Smith, P Flowers and M Larkin, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and 
    Research (Sage 2012) 
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transparency, being informative, child-friendly and respectful of children, and 
acting in a manner that is inclusive, safe and sensitive to risk.17 
 
The research sample for this study was a purposive sample of 30 judges in 
England and Wales involved in public child law proceedings (care and 
adoption).  Judges were invited to take part in the study on the basis of their 
expertise, knowledge and experience in presiding over child protection 
cases.  Judges’ experience in and knowledge of the area of public child law 
proceedings were crucial to this research.  The research method chosen for 
this study were one-to-one semi-structured interviews with individual judges 
(see Chapter 3). 
 
1.3 Contribution of this research 
 
Ultimately, it is hoped that obtaining and analysing the perspectives of the 
judiciary in this important area of public child law will inform judicial practice 
and make a contribution to the development of judicial practice, particularly in 
the area of direct communication with children who are subject to care and 
adoption proceedings.  Given the dearth of research in this area, the study 
will make a contribution to the review of current and future guidelines in 
relation to judicial practice in this area, as well as contributing to ongoing 
academic enquiry and debate in this area of law and will inform current and 
future legal and policy reforms. 
 
The research will contribute to current attempts in encouraging a more 
positive18 and transparent19 experience for children who are subject to care 
and adoption proceedings as recommended by the Family Justice Review20 
and the proposals of Ryder L J21 for the modernisation of family justice.  The 
research will provide a basis to develop effective child-friendly and child 
                                            
17 Committee on the Rights of the Child (2009) General Comment No. 12 – The Right of the Child to be heard  
    (United Nations 2009) 
18 J Munby, ‘Unheard voices: the involvement of children and vulnerable people in the family justice system’.  The 
    annual lecture of The Wales Observatory on Human Rights of Children and Young People at the College of Law, 
    Swansea University delivered on 25 June 2015. 
19 A E McFarlane, The Bridget Lindley OBE Memorial Lecture 2017 ‘Holding the risk: The balance between child 
    protection and the right to family life’ (Family Justice Council). 
20 Family Justice Review Panel, Family Justice Review: Final Report (The Ministry of Justice, 
   Department of Education and the Welsh Government 2011). 
21 E Ryder, Judicial Proposals for the Modernisation of Family Justice (HMSO 2012). 
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accessible ways, which facilitate children in exercising their right to be heard 
in public child law proceedings. 
  
The research will make a contribution to facilitating communication between 
all parties involved in public child law proceedings and judges, around the 
core elements of what constitutes a child-centred approach in proceedings. 
This research attempts to map out what a model of child-centred decision-
making would look like.  Potentially, this could reduce undue delay in the 
conduct and completion of proceedings, while at the same time ensuring 
adequate time and space is provided for children to contribute actively their 
perspectives of their lived experience to their proceedings.   
 
The research makes a contribution to the development of current legislation 
by putting forward a number of amendments and additions that will 
strengthen the status and position of children in proceedings, with the aim of 
ensuring that their true voice is heard throughout the course of proceedings 
including directly if children so wish.   
 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters.  Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter 
outlining the research question, locating it in available relevant research.  The 
contribution of this research to public child law is then identified in terms of its 
benefits in relation to the development of current and future legislation, policy 
practice and ongoing academic enquiry and debate, with a particular focus 
on moving to a more child-centred decision-making process and system. 
 
Chapter two outlines and explores the legal and policy context of the current 
public child law system.  Current child care Acts are discussed in relation to 
their stated purpose and contribution to the welfare of children.  Relevant 
policies and formal guidance are explored in relation to how they relate to 
and reflect the spirit of current legislation in England and Wales, with 
particular reference to what is considered child-centred practice.  This 
chapter also provides a brief summary of the main relevant legislative history, 
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which has contributed to the development of current legislation.  
Understanding these historical roots and how important concepts and ideas, 
such as the child’s welfare and development, children’s best interests were 
shaped and developed through both positive and tragic events, gives us a 
greater knowledge and understanding of current legislation.  The spirit of 
legislation can be a useful guide for the application of current principles 
enshrined in legislation in relation to professional practice and decision-
making. 
 
The adopted methodological approach and method for this research is 
discussed in Chapter three.  This chapter explores the rationale for choosing 
a qualitative approach for this study including, the need for accurate 
recording of judges’ views for subsequent analysis.  The need for the 
analysis and discussion of the findings to remain anchored firmly in the raw 
data to ensure an accurate, fair and balanced representation of judges’ 
perspectives, is discussed with reference to the broad principles 
underpinning the paradigm of interpretative phenomenology.   
 
The concept of child-centredness is discussed critically from a theoretical 
perspective in Chapter four.  The origins of this concept are identified and 
located in relevant and related literature and research including, historical 
research22 and current formal national23 and international24 practice 
guidance.  This chapter then focuses on how this concept is perceived and 
represented in current legislation and formal policy.  Discussion highlights 
significant inconsistencies in this area, between theoretical conceptions and 
legal expression, particularly in relation to current legislation and in relation to 
how children who are subject to proceedings are viewed and treated. 
 
Chapter five explores judges’ perspectives on the concept of child-
centredness.  The discussion is supported by data from the research in the 
                                            
22 S Chung and D J Walsh, ‘Unpacking child-centredness: a history of meanings’ (2010) 32 (2) Journal of  
    Curriculum Studies 215. 
23 H M Government, Working Together to Safeguard Children (The Stationery Office 2015). 
24 International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates (IAYFJM), Guidelines on children in 
   contact with the justice system (IAYFJM 2017). 
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form of direct quotes from interviews with judges.  Relevant and related 
literature and research inform discussion. This chapter reveals a wide range 
of judicial perspectives on this concept, from the traditional views that adults 
know best when it comes to making decisions about children’s lives, to more 
reflective and inclusive approaches to children’s participation in the decision-
making process. 
 
Judicial interpretation and application of child-centredness in the reality of 
proceedings is discussed in Chapter six.  The chapter focuses on judges’ 
thinking and reasoning in the process of making decisions about children’s 
lives and the extent to which this process is compatible with a child-centred 
approach.  As in Chapter five, a wide range of perspectives emerge, from 
resignation to the reality of a lack of resources within the system, both in 
terms of a lack of time and personnel, to a perspective that challenges this 
deficit of resources and an unwillingness to compromise in applying what 
they perceive to be the right and just approach in the best interests of 
children. 
 
Chapter seven discusses the potential to move to a more child-centred model 
of decision-making within the current public child law system.  Judges in this 
part of the research were invited, notwithstanding the limitation of resources 
and finance, to propose their ideal public child law system.  Judges engaged 
readily in this process and proposed a range of options, which mainly 
involved retaining the structure of the current system.  The first part of this 
chapter discusses the perceived barriers and enablers in creating a more 
child-centred system.  The second part of this chapter puts forward a model 
for a more child-centred decision-making process and system, supported by 
a number of amendments and additions to current law and policy.   
  
9 
 
The chapter concludes with an adapted version of a commentary on an 
existing case Re P-S25, to illustrate how a child-centred perspective can be 
achieved in public child law cases.  This commentary was part of an 
international children’s rights judgments project.26  
 
Chapter eight reflects on the expectations and the realities of the current 
system and on what could be achieved by a more child-centred model for 
decision-making in public child law proceedings.  The chapter concludes by 
suggesting a number of areas for future research in the area of public child 
law.  
 
  
                                            
25 D Lane, ‘Commentary on P-S (Children) Care Proceedings: Right to give evidence’ (2017) in H Stalford, K 
   Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments from Academic Vision to New Practice 
   (Hart 2017) 159. 
26 ibid. 
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Chapter 2 
  
Making decisions about children’s lives: Legal and Policy Framework 
   
2.1 Introduction 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the legal and policy framework within 
which child care professionals and judges make decisions about children’s 
lives when a child is identified as being at risk of significant harm.  It is 
appropriate and relevant to the subject area of this research to consider 
briefly the path that has led to the current system.  The historical relevance of 
this path contextualises the development of children’s position within the 
welfare and legal systems and informs the basis of current principles upon 
which professional practice and judicial decision-making in the field of child 
protection is based.  The chapter then moves on to outline and discuss 
current public child law and relevant formal policies and guidance, which 
influence professional practice and the spirit of legislation and its application 
in the public child law system. 
 
2.2 Summary of the Pathway to Current Legislation and Policy 
 
2.2.1 Children’s lives and survival 
 
The roots of our children’s services and public child law today can be traced 
back to the Poor Laws of 160127 and 1834.28  The Poor Laws of 1601 and 
1834 were concerned with abandoned, orphaned and destitute children.  At 
the time these laws were introduced, children were the property of their 
parents regardless of the quality of care being provided.  While both parents 
were considered as responsible for the care of their children, it was the 
children’s father who had sole custody of his children.  The property rights of 
parents prevented the State from intervening in the lives of children, save 
that of providing poor families in their homes with some of the basic 
necessities for life, mainly food and clothing, while orphaned and abandoned 
                                            
27 Poor Law Act 1601 Eliz.1 c.2. 
28 Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 4 & 5 Will.4 c.76. 
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children were to be apprenticed out to learn various trades.29  However, a 
very small number of children were apprenticed out, due to very high 
mortality rates caused by a lack of food and clean water.     
 
The practice of ‘baby farming’ gave rise to a large number of infant deaths. 
Children being born out of wedlock or the mother felt she was not in a 
position to rear the child, ‘farmed out’ their child to a ‘nurse’ who was paid to 
take care of the child.  When the limited amount of money ran out, the child 
was left to die or was suffocated by their paid ‘nurse’ and left on a side street 
of London.  This practice came to be known as ‘baby farming’30 and led to 
the Infant Life Protection Act 1872.31  This Act required nurses to formally 
register with the authorities, to ensure their standards of care could be 
monitored.  Very few nurses registered, and as there were very limited 
resources to enforce the Act, its effectiveness was minimal.32 
 
2.2.2 Emergence of State intervention 
 
The New Poor Law (Children) Act 1889 gave power to Poor Law Guardians 
to assume parental responsibility for children in their care, if they considered 
their parents to be irresponsible.33  This Act marks the beginning of State 
intervention into the lives of vulnerable children and to a very limited extent 
introduces the notion of a ‘threshold’ for statutory intervention in the lives of 
children and their families, based on the standard of parental care.    
 
Further and more direct State intervention came with the Protection of 
Children Act 1889, which gave the authorities the power to prosecute parents 
for abusing and neglecting their children.34  Prosecutions under this Act could 
be brought by anyone, whereas previously, only Poor Law Guardians could 
institute such proceedings.  Discussions on the Bill, which led to this Act, in 
both Houses of Parliament indicate that there was the hope that this Act 
                                            
29 G Newman, English Social Services (Collins 1941). 
30 J F B Tinling, Social Reform: What? and by Whom? (The Christian Union for Social Service 1906). 
31 Infant Life Protection Act 1872 35 & 36 Vic. c.38. 
32 Tingling (n 4). 
33 New Poor Law (Children) Act 1889. 
34 An Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to, and Better Protection of Children Act 1889 52 & 53 Vic. c.44.  
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would reduce the necessity of having to remove children from their parents.35  
This appears to be the beginning of a formal recognition of the concept of 
prevention of intervention through a legislative deterrent.  However, this Act 
was primarily about the prosecution of criminal neglect of children and did not 
focus on prevention in the broader sense in terms of the State providing the 
resources needed to support parents.  This focus was intensified in the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1904.36  This Act gave the Local 
Authority the power to remove children from their parents’ care.  When the 
Local Authority had to intervene, parents were seen to have failed morally in 
the basic care of their children.  The concept of a ‘fit person’ was introduced 
and this added to the moralistic tone of this piece of legislation.  The Children 
Act 1908 followed soon after, and while it did nothing to change significantly 
the tone of previous legislation, it did set up for the first time separate 
Juvenile Courts for children under the age of 14 who had committed a crime.  
This Act also abolished the practice of sending children to adult prisons.37  
Children were now sent to industrial schools and reformatories, which were  
established earlier by the Industrial Schools Acts of 185738 and 1861.39  Up 
to this time children were seen and treated as ‘mini adults’ in the criminal 
courts.  While children within the juvenile justice system is outside the scope 
and focus of this thesis, it is nevertheless appropriate and important to 
acknowledge the very real tensions that this area generates between the 
welfare and punishment of children.  Such tensions between child welfare 
and criminal justice where children who commit an offence and are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the criminal court, Goldson sees as complex and ‘finely 
balanced,’ and influenced by both political considerations and ideologies and 
the changing moods of public opinion.40  Writing eight years later, Goldson 
                                            
35 House of Commons, Bills, Public: Bill for the better Prevention of Cruelty to Children (505) Session: 21 
    February 1889 – 30 August 1889 Volume 1(HMSO 1889). 
36 The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1904. 
37 Children Act 1908 Edw.7 c.67. 
38 The Industrial Schools Act 1857 20 & 21 Vic. c.48. This Act gave powers to Magistrates to  
    sentence homeless, poor and neglected children between the ages of 7 and 14 years, who were brought before 
    the courts for juvenile vagrancy, by removing them from their home environment and placing them in a boarding 
    school. 
39 The Industrial Schools Act 1861 24 & 25 Vic. c.113. This Act strengthened and extended the 
    sentencing powers of Magistrates to include children under 14 years who were found begging or receiving alms 
    or found in the company of thieves.  Also included were children under 12 years who committed an offence 
    punishable by imprisonment or less and children under 14 who were beyond parental control.    
40 B Goldson, `Children in need' or `young offenders'? Hardening ideology, organizational change and new 
    challenges for social work with children in trouble’ (2000) 5 (3) Child and Family Social Work 256. 
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was not optimistic about a change of perspective in relation to these tensions 
stating, ‘However, there is little evidence to suggest that the mood of 
‘toughness’, and the punitive and retributive priorities that characterise 
contemporary responses to children in trouble, will be immediately 
surpassed’, highlighting the ambiguous state of children in our society.41  
Such ambiguity continues to the present time, despite the long established 
requirement in legislation of having regard to a child’s welfare in all matters in 
relation to children.42   
 
2.2.3 The child’s welfare and the conception of public child law 
 
With the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 came the beginning of a 
significant break with previous legislation, both in relation to focus and 
language.  The modern conception of public law care proceedings date from 
this Act.  While retaining the ‘Fit Persons Order’, the concept of the welfare of 
the child was introduced, as was a Schedule of offences that may be 
committed against children.43  This Schedule, although it has been amended 
and extended through the years, has remained part of the legal framework to 
this day.  The Act also placed a duty on Local Authorities to board-out 
children in foster care, following removal from their families, where their 
parents are considered unable to care for them.   
 
The Children Act 1948 heralded the first serious attempt to focus legislation 
on prevention of abuse of children, guided by the principle of working in the 
best interests of the child.  The Act itself came about as a result of the 
Monckton Inquiry44 into the death of Dennis O’Neill, a 12 year old child who 
was brutally beaten by his foster carers45 and in response to the reports of 
the Curtis and Clyde46 Committees, which were highly critical of Local 
                                            
41 B Goldson, ‘Children, Crime and the State’ in B Goldson and M Lavalette (eds) Children, Welfare and the State  
   (Sage 2008).  For Goldson, ‘Childhood is conceived as an ambiguous state, and children (at least some children) 
   are variously understood as ‘victims’ who need protection, nurturing and care, or ‘threats who require correction, 
   discipline and control.  Herein lies the ‘welfare justice’ relation which, as we have seen, has applied to juvenile  
   justice policy for the best part of two centuries’. 
42 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 44. 
43 ibid Schedule 1 offences; offences committed in respect of children. 
44 W Monckton, Report on the Circumstances which led to the Boarding Out of Dennis and Terence O’Neill at Bank 
    Farm and the steps taken to supervise their welfare (Home Office 1945). 
45 The National Archives, Protection of Children: Adoption and Foster Care (HMSO 2010).  
46 J Clyde, Report of the Committee on Homeless Children (HMSO 1946). 
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Authorities’ care of children in England and Scotland and highlighted 
significant shortcomings in the areas of communication, supervision of foster 
care placements and administrative procedures.47  Childcare functions, which 
were spread over a number of government ministries, were brought together 
and unified, and separate children’s departments in Local Authorities were 
created for children at risk.   
 
The 1948 Act emphasised the importance of keeping families together and if 
this was not possible, the placement of a child outside of the family was seen 
as both supportive for the child’s parents and as a short-term measure, as 
there was a duty placed on Local Authorities to rehabilitate children with their 
birth families.  This Act was significant in the reform of services for vulnerable 
children including, the tightening up of boarding-out regulations and the 
employment of a trained Children’s Officer in each Local Authority to be 
responsible for children in care.  However, it did not focus on preventative 
work with the family or address the problem of children being abused within 
their own families,48 mainly due to a disbelief on both the public and 
politicians’ part that such actions would take place within the child’s own 
family.  This disbelief along with the respected sacredness of the family 
domain combined to deter State intervention.  New developments in 
psychology in relation to children’s needs, including Bowlby’s holistic 
perspective on children’s needs,49 influenced the provisions of the Act, which 
emphasised the different types of needs of the whole child; physical, 
emotional, psychological, social, and educational.  Bowlby’s holistic 
perspective in relation to children’s needs has had a significant influence on 
the development of statutory child care services including the current 
‘Framework for Assessment of Children in Need and their Families’, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter.  This Act parted company with the 
attitude enshrined in the Poor Law Acts of 1601 and 1834, which prevailed 
up to this time, of just providing minimally for vulnerable children, mainly their 
physical needs.  The importance of children’s growth and development was 
                                            
47 M Curtis, Curtis Report on the Care of Deprived Children (HMSO 1946). 
48 The National Archives (n 45). 
49 J Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (Penguin 1953); J Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health  
   (Schocken Books 1967). 
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now recognised as an important factor in relation to the welfare of children.50  
It signalled a more child-centred approach and children in care were to be 
treated as individuals and have access to the same facilities as other 
children,51 particularly in the areas of health and education. 
 
The main focus of the children’s departments created under the Children Act 
1948 was children in care.  Their role in the provision and development of 
welfare services for families was both specific and quite limited,52 based on 
the patriarchal nuclear family and full male employment.  The assumption 
was that most of the welfare work was undertaken within the family itself 
using the family’s income and the children being cared for by their mother.  
The focus of welfare was to support not replace or enhance this assumed 
family position.53   In the 1950’s there was an increased awareness of the 
need to intervene much earlier in the lives of children and their families to 
prevent children having to come into care.  Waiting until children came into 
care before the State took any action was no longer accepted as being in the 
best interests of children.54   
 
Poverty was still regarded as a major contributory factor in child neglect and 
there were also links made between ‘deprived families’ and juvenile 
delinquency.   This link however had been established in the legislation and 
in the development of the industrial schools since the 1860’s, and which has 
been referred to previously in this chapter.  Such awareness and thinking led 
to two significant Acts, The Children and Young Persons Acts of 1963 and 
1969 had a dual approach to children’s welfare: prevention combined with an 
increased level of State intervention.  This duality of approach was not 
without tensions.  While the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 gave 
legislative support in making provision, both in cash and in kind, to support 
families, with the aim of avoiding the need to take children into care,55 Local 
                                            
50 H Hendrick, Children, Childhood, and English Society 1880-1990 (Cambridge University Press 1997). 
51 J Packman, The Child’s Generation (Blackwell and Robertson 1981).  
52 N Frost and N Parton, Understanding Children’s Social Care: Politics, Policy and Practice (Sage 2009) 9. 
53 ibid. 
54 J Packman, ‘From prevention to partnership: child welfare services across three decades’ (1993) 7 (2) 
   Children and Society 183. 
55 Children and Young Persons Act 1969 s 1. 
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Authorities were more willing to intervene on a statutory basis if parental care 
of children did not improve.  
 
2.2.4 Early intervention in children’s lives 
 
The main emphasis of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 was on the 
care and protection of children.  The powers of Juvenile Courts to make 
orders were reduced, with Care Orders and supervision being preferred to 
orders that were seen as a punishment for crimes committed.  The age of 
criminal responsibility was raised from eight to ten years.56  This is an early 
example in the development of the child welfare paradigm of what Goldson 
termed the duality of the conceptualisation of children, with welfare and 
punishment being both finely and precariously balanced.57   
 
While the Local Authority’s powers to intervene were extended in cases of 
parental neglect, this provision was balanced with a more preventative 
approach to reduce the need to receive children into or keep children in care.  
Throughout the 1950’s the children’s departments created under the Children 
Act 1948 found their role too limited and narrow, the main focus of their 
interventions being on the period following reception into care.  This strategy 
came to be seen as failing children and doing too little too late.58  Intervening 
much earlier in the lives of children and their families to prevent the need to 
take children into care was viewed as being more in the best interests of 
children.  This perspective, which was informed by Kempe’s work, ‘The 
Battered Child Syndrome’,59 began to inform and shape practice, with more 
support and services being channelled into families.  This was given formal 
recognition in this Act under Section 1, which provided Local Authorities with 
the statutory power to provide such services, both financial and in kind, and 
marked the beginning of real resources being ring-fenced for preventative 
action to maintain children in their families. 
                                            
56 Children and Young Persons Act 1963. 
57 Goldson (n 15). 
58 Frost and Parton (n 51). 
59 H C Kempe, F N Silverman, B F Steele, W Droegemueller and H K Silver, ‘The Battered-Child 
   Syndrome’ (1962) 181 (1) Journal of the American Medical Association 17. 
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Under Children and Young Persons Act 1969, the concepts of ‘care’ and 
‘control’ were further brought together.  A child who committed a criminal act 
could be made the subject of a care order.  The Act outlined threshold criteria 
under which a Local Authority could institute care proceedings, the essence 
of which remain in current child protection legislation.60   
 
Leading up to the Act during the 1960’s there was the belief that by 
reorganising and bringing together Local Authority children’s and welfare 
services, a more effective service could be provided to children and families.  
Following the Seebohm Report in 1968,61 Local Authority social services 
departments came into existence in 1971, with the Local Authority Social 
Services Act 1970 providing their statutory basis.62 The focus of these new 
departments was the family and the community, but there was also a specific 
focus on what was termed ‘problem families’, which were seen as the cause 
of much of the crime committed by children.63  While the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969 focused on meeting the needs of children in their families 
and communities, the State itself through this Act and the newly formed 
social services departments, saw itself as a reservoir of knowledge on what 
could be considered good-enough parenting.  Such an attitude was 
reinforced in subsequent legislation, through giving the State more power to 
intervene in the lives of children and their families. 
 
2.2.5 Permanence and the prevention of ‘drift’ in children’s lives 
 
The need for permanence in children’s lives and the prevention of ‘drift’ in 
care were the main drivers of the Children Act 1975,64 followed by the 
Adoption Act 1976,65 which provided a new legislative framework for the 
adoption of children including, much tighter regulations in relation to the 
assessment of perspective adopters and the placement of children in 
adoptive families, than had been the case with previous legislation.  Such 
                                            
60 Children and Young Persons Act 1969. 
61 Seebohm Committee, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Local Authorities and Allied Personal Social 
    Services (HMSO 1968). 
62 Local Authority Social Services Act 1970.  
63 A F Philip and N Timms, The Problem of the Problem Family (Family Service Units 1962). 
64 Children Act 1975. 
65 Adoption Act 1976. 
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assessments became much more detailed and covered a much broader 
range of areas in relation to the lives and capacity of the perspective 
adopters.  While Local Authorities had been given increased powers to 
intervene in the lives of children, there were many children in the care system 
at this time without care plans regarding their future permanent care, within 
or outside of their birth families.66   
 
Both the Children Act 1975 and the Adoption Act 1976 followed the report of 
the inquiry into the death of Maria Colwell, killed by her step-father and who, 
at the time of her death, was the subject of a Supervision Order.  The inquiry 
report highlighted a lack of attention and priority given to Maria’s needs over 
those of her parents.67  Provisions in this Act included that of giving the Local 
Authority the power to assume parental rights on the grounds of the length of 
time a child had been in care on a voluntary basis. This represented an 
attempt albeit a heavy-handed one, in terms of the additional powers given to 
Local Authorities, to redress the balance between the needs of children and 
those of their parents.  The Act was also influenced by a growing questioning 
of the importance of the need to preserve the ‘blood-tie’ between mother and 
child,68 following the death of Maria Colwell.  There was a recognition that 
following serious physical abuse it was not always possible or desirable to re-
unite a child with her or his birth family.  However, the importance of children 
being brought up in a family continued to be emphasised through a policy of 
providing permanent placements in substitute families.   
  
During the late 1970’s there was an increase in the number of children 
removed from their parents’ care amid a growing disquiet about the 
protection of children following the death of Maria Colwell and a public mood 
swing towards doing whatever was needed to protect children from abuse. 
Such developments shaped the focus of the next major piece of child care 
legislation in the Child Care Act 1980. 
                                            
66 J Rowe and L Lambert, Children who wait: A Study of Children needing Substitute Families (Association of  
    British Adoption Agencies 1973). 
67 Secretary of State for Social Services, The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Care and 
   Supervision Provided in relation to Maria Colwell (HMSO 1974). 
68 Bowlby (n 48). 
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2.2.6 Voice of the child in proceedings 
 
While the main focus of the Child Care Act 1980 was on promoting and 
safeguarding the welfare of the child throughout her or his childhood, it also 
continued to reinforce the power of Local Authorities to make quite serious 
and far-reaching decisions about children’s lives including the assumption of 
parental rights after three years in Local Authority care.  However, this Act 
did herald a real move forward in representing the voice of the child in public 
law proceedings, with increased emphasis and focus being put on the need 
to listen and give due consideration to the wishes and feelings of the child.69  
Such representation was given a statutory basis by this Act, through the 
appointment of Guardians-ad-Litem, who were experienced social workers 
appointed by the court to represent children in care and adoption 
proceedings.  Although not implemented until 1984, and even then, not all 
children who were involved in care and adoption proceedings had a 
Guardian-ad-Litem appointed to independently represent their views.  The 
independent representation of children in public law proceedings was driven 
to a significant degree by the findings of the Maria Colwell Inquiry Report, 
which highlighted the need for vulnerable children to have a voice of their 
own.70   
 
Up to this point in terms of the development of the child care legislation 
system, children were the subjects of a system and proceedings within which 
actions were done for and to children, with very superficial attention being 
paid, if any at all, to the child’s perspective of their lived experiences.  It was 
not until the Children Act 1989 that a serious legislative attempt to 
incorporate a child-focused approach to children’s welfare through the 
introduction within this Act of a welfare checklist, which included the duty to 
obtain the wishes and feelings of the child.71 
 
 
 
                                            
69 Child Care Act 1980. 
70 Maria Colwell Inquiry. 
71 s 1(3) The Children Act 1989. 
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2.3 Current Legislation 
 
2.3.1 Paramountcy of the child’s welfare   
 
The main piece of child protection legislation for England and Wales is the 
Children Act 1989.72  This Act became law on 19th October 1991 and was 
accompanied by nine volumes of guidance and regulations, addressing and 
regulating a wide and varied range of areas in the public care and welfare of 
children including, child protection, family support, representation for children 
in care and adoption proceedings, day care, foster care placements, private 
fostering, adoption issues, educational provision for young children, disability 
and independent schools.  
 
A number of these volumes of guidance and regulations have been replaced 
or amended, as new pieces of legislation have been introduced73.  Under the 
Children Act 1989 public law, which relates to family services provided by the 
State and to the protection of children, and private law, with its main focus 
being on resolving disputes between parents in separation and divorce 
proceedings, in relation to their children’s upbringing and welfare, were 
brought together under one piece of legislation. 
 
The Act is based on a number of principles including, the child’s welfare 
being paramount74 when the Court determines any issue in relation to their 
welfare and development.  The principle of no delay75 is to ensure that 
decisions about the welfare of a child are made without unnecessary delay, 
as undue delay is considered detrimental to a child’s welfare and 
development.  Working in partnership with parents is a principle that focuses 
on achieving the best outcomes possible for the child,76 while the no order 
principle says that no order should be granted by the court unless it is shown 
                                            
72 The Children Act 1989 (n 70). 
73 Department for Education, Statutory Guidance on Court Orders and Pre-proceedings for Local Authorities 
   (The Stationery Office 2014).  This guidance replaced the Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations: Volume 
   1- Court Orders and Chapter 8 of the statutory guidance on Adoption July 2013. 
74 Children Act 1989 s 1(1). 
75 Children Act 1989 s 1(2). 
76 Department of Health, The Care of Children: Principles and Practice in Regulations and Guidance  
   (HMSO 1991); Department for Education, Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency 
   working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (The Stationery Office 2015). 
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to be in the child’s best interests.  In addition to these principles that underpin 
court proceedings, the Act placed significant emphasis on the need for 
proceedings to be less adversarial and more inquisitorial,77 an area that will 
be discussed further in Chapter 4.   
 
The welfare checklist contained in the Act78 is a list of criteria the court must 
take into account in contested in care proceedings79 and contested 
applications for section 8 orders.80  The list includes the duty to obtain the 
child’s wishes and feelings.  However, this duty does not take priority over 
nor is it given explicit equal status with the other factors contained in the 
welfare checklist, it is simply one area that needs to be considered in relation 
to the child’s welfare.  This is an area that the thesis will return to both in 
Chapter 4 and in Chapter 7, which advocates moving to a more child-centred 
model of decision-making.  
  
The Act sets out the threshold criteria for formal intervention by the State in 
the lives of children and their families.81  At the core of these criteria is the 
concept of ‘significant harm’.  Formal intervention by the State can only be 
justified if a child is considered to be suffering or likely to suffer significant 
harm or is beyond the control of parents at the time an application for an 
order is made and that such a level of harm is the result of the quality and 
standard of care being provided for the child or is likely to be provided for the 
child were the order not made.  Harm is defined as ill-treatment or the 
impairment of health or development.82  To meet the threshold, the evidence 
has to prove all elements of the threshold on the balance of probabilities.83     
                                            
77 Department of Health (n 75). 
78 Children Act 1989 s 1(3) The Welfare Checklist includes, the wishes and feelings of the child, the child’s 
    physical, emotional and educational needs, likely effect of a change of circumstances, harm suffered or at risk of 
    suffering and the capacity of parents to care for their child.  
79 Children Act 1989 s 25 and s 119 Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014. The one exception within the 
    Act is in relation to a Secure Accommodation Order, which has its own threshold criteria based around the child 
    absconding or the likelihood of absconding and being a danger to themselves or others.  It is acknowledged that 
    this section does not fit comfortably with the principles of the Act and is a measure that is seen as a last resort 
    when all other available services and support have been unable to meet the young person’s needs.  Applications 
    for secure accommodation are outside the scope of this research. 
80  ibid Section 8 Orders include, Child Arrangements Order, (formerly residence and contact 
    orders), introduced by the Children and Families Act 2014, Specific Issue Orders and Prohibitive Steps Orders.  
81 Children Act 1989 (n 44) s 31(2) (a)(b). 
82 ibid s 31(9). 
83 re B (a Child) [2013] UKSC 33 para 51. Baroness Hale dissenting, agrees with the approach of Hedley J in re L.  
    Lady Hale in this case did not agree that the evidence before the court proved all of the elements of the threshold 
    test. 
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The standard of acceptable care is assessed against that which one would 
expect a reasonable parent to provide for their child.  Cobley and Lowe have 
raised the question of how rigorous the threshold test should be, given that 
courts have discretion in this area at the welfare stage of proceedings.  They 
point to the dilemma between protecting the child and protecting the family 
from undue intervention.84  However, they also make the point that having a 
‘rigorously applied threshold’ could potentially fail to protect some children.85   
Hedley J in Re L stated that: ‘… significant harm is fact specific and must 
retain the breadth of meaning that human fallibility may require … It is clear 
that it must be something unusual; at least more than the commonplace 
human failure or inadequacy’.86  In relation to standards of parenting and 
statutory intervention by the State, Hedley J maintains:  
 
‘Society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, 
including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It 
follows too that children will inevitably have both very different 
experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing 
from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and 
harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and 
emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible 
humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all 
the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could 
not be done’.87 
   
In the same vein, His Honour Judge Jack in North East Lincolnshire Council 
v G & L said: 
‘The courts are not in the business of providing children with perfect 
homes. If we took into care and placed for adoption every child whose 
parents had had a domestic spat and every child whose parents on 
occasion had drunk too much then the care system would be 
overwhelmed and there would not be enough adoptive parents.  So, 
we have to have a degree of realism about prospective carers who 
come before the courts’.88 
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The following extract from one of the judges who participated in this research 
highlights the realities in applying the application of the threshold for State 
intervention in the lives of children and their families: 
 
“The case law on threshold criteria under Section 31 of the Act 
(Children Act 1989) before the State is justified on intervening, 
emphasises the broad range of eccentric parenting that should be 
seen as eccentric parenting rather than harmful.  If you couple that 
with the extreme shortage of social child service resources, then that 
result is that there is not intervention in a vast range of families where 
there ought to be intervention and where intervention would improve 
the outcomes for the children.  We have struck a balance.  On the one 
hand, it is an economic balance, we do not have the money to spend 
on it and on the other it is a principled balance.  We have decided that 
parents can beat their children to a degree so long as they don’t go 
too far that inhibits best outcomes for children, because otherwise you 
may have to take (20%) of children from their parents.  You would also 
intervene a lot earlier than you do at the moment”.  (County Court 
Judge)    
 
Cleland believes that the current threshold of significant harm for State 
intervention in the lives of children and their families is too high a legal test, 
and that the circumstances of most children would not meet the current legal 
test.89  This, according to Cleland results in late intervention to support the 
family, a consequence of which may not ensure a safe outcome for the child 
and therefore does not promote the child’s well-being.  However, Lady Hale 
in Re SB in relation to the likelihood of future harm stated: ‘Predictions about 
future facts need only be based upon a degree of likelihood that they will 
happen which is sufficient to justify preventative action’.90 
 
The above views from case law and this research reflect a resignation to the 
fact that you cannot provide comprehensive protection for children, some 
harm is inevitable and acceptable in law.  While the aim may be to have 
transparent, consistent and principled procedures in place to deal with these 
issues, the potential implications of intervention highlighted prevent the 
system securing a level of protection and safety that is consistent with article 
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3 of the ECHR91 and articles 19 and 37 UNCRC.92  This was highlighted in a 
case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in M v Croatia.93  
Albeit in a different domestic jurisdiction, this case has pertinence here as an 
example of how in particular article 3 (child’s best interests) UNCRC is 
applied and interpreted.   
 
The child’s father had been granted custody of his daughter, who was nine 
and a half years old when proceedings commenced.  The child’s mother 
brought proceedings to have the custody order reversed, due to allegations 
made by her daughter of physical abuse against her father.  The child wished 
to live with her mother.  The father was charged and pleaded guilty to bodily 
injury against his daughter.  Attempts by the mother to bring proceedings for 
child abuse were unsuccessful.  As a consequence of her abuse, the child 
started self-harming.  Following a psychological assessment, a 
recommendation was made for the child to return to the care of her mother to 
prevent further harm, particularly in relation to the consequences of 
continuous abuse.  The threshold of severity required under Article 3 ECHR 
in relation to the child’s allegations was met and therefore the State had an 
obligation to prevent further ill-treatment.94   
 
While the ECtHR found the State in breach of its obligation to carry out an 
effective investigation into the allegations made by the child, in M v Croatia, it 
found there was no violation by the State in relation to the prevention of 
further ill-treatment.  The court also found that the child’s wishes to live with 
her mother were ignored and that her best interests were not served by the 
court in the initial proceedings through not hearing from the child herself and 
by the lengthy proceedings (over four years).  The young person was 13½ 
when the proceedings came to an end.  The ECtHR considered the child as 
having the capacity to form and express her views as to which parent she 
wished to live with and, therefore, by not respecting the child’s views on this 
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matter in the circumstances of this case, infringed her right to respect for her 
private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.  In this case, the ECtHR viewed 
the lengthy proceedings alone sufficient to find the State had not discharged 
its positive obligation under Article 8 in relation to the child and her mother.  
In their judgment, the ECtHR also highlighted the need in this case for a 
more attentive approach given the trauma and mental anguish suffered by 
the child, which resulted in her self-harming behaviour. 
 
The above case raises a number of serious questions about whether 
domestic legislation and professional practice is centred on the child’s 
welfare and best interests or whether their application in reality is one of 
expediency, when faced with overwhelming consequences.  The 
requirements of the threshold for significant harm and its impact on the lives 
of children presents significant challenges to creating a more child-centred 
public law system, not least the inherent contradiction between such a high 
level of accepted harm to children95 and the primacy of place in the Act given 
to the paramountcy principle.96  Such challenging issues will be explored and 
discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis (see Chapters 4-7).  
 
Hardiker states: ‘The Children Act 1989 nonetheless reflects a belief that the 
great majority of parents want to meet their responsibilities and can and 
should be helped to do so’.97  It also reflects the State’s attitude towards the 
family and children, which is one of keeping its distance unless or until there 
is a crisis that affects significantly the welfare of a child.  The focus of the Act 
itself is on prevention, supported by a much stronger provision of services for 
children in need,98 compared to that of the previous Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969.  In addition, the duty of a local authority to investigate a 
child’s circumstances under section 47, where there is reasonable cause to 
suspect a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant or if the child is 
already the subject of an emergency protection order or is in police 
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protection, supports an early intervention approach.  However, Cleland 
asserts that the concept of ‘significant harm’ ‘…mandates late intervention’.99  
 
The approach adopted by the Children Act 1989 is not only influenced by the 
threshold of significant harm100 but also by the right to respect private and 
family life enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 
under Article 8 and incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 
1998.  The role of the threshold criteria is to ensure that State intervention in 
families’ lives is proportionate and determined by the circumstances of each 
individual case.101  This is strengthened further by the introduction into the 
Children Act 1989 of the presumption of contact, both direct and indirect, 
between the child and their family, even within acrimonious care and 
adoption proceedings, provided such contact is not detrimental to the welfare 
of the child,102 an issue that led to significant reform in the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002.  However, getting the balance right between a child’s right 
to have contact in such cases and their welfare and safety can be finely 
balanced.  More often than not, it is the adults involved in these cases who 
decide on the level of risk involved, without exploring fully the child’s 
perspective of their situation.   
 
2.3.2 Adoption: A cultural change 
 
The Adoption and Children Act 2002 heralded a major reform of adoption law 
since the Adoption Act 1976 and is the key piece of legislation in the field of 
adoption in England and Wales.  It also made a number of amendments to 
the Children Act 1989, the most significant being the amendment and 
addition to the definition of significant harm; the impairment of a child’s health 
and development as a result of witnessing the ill-treatment of another person 
either by seeing or hearing such ill-treatment.103  The main driver and force 
behind this amendment were a number of research studies into the effects of 
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domestic violence on children and their parents, mainly mothers.104  This 
amendment was strengthened further by the Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act 2004, which established the post of Commissioner for Victims 
and Witnesses.  One of the Victim Commissioner’s functions is to, ‘promote 
the interests of victims and witnesses’.105  There are however restrictions 
placed on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions, which limit their 
independence including, not having the power to carry out enquiries in 
respect of individual cases and not being able to look at the conduct of 
particular proceedings.106 
 
The Act reflects not only significant legislative changes and developments in 
child care law in relation to adoption, but also cultural and value changes in 
society over the period since the previous adoption Act in 1976.  The 
Adoption Act 1976 was not ‘welfare checklist’ compliant, particularly in 
relation to the welfare principles contained the Children Act 1989.  The 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 principles are now consistent with those 
contained in the 1989 Act but reflect issues in relation to adoption.  A 
consistent approach is important between adoption and care proceedings, as 
adoption, where it is considered to be in the child’s best interests, generally 
follows on from care proceedings.   
 
Under the 2002 Act, the courts and adoption agencies in the exercise of their 
powers must have as their paramount consideration the child’s welfare 
throughout their life.107  While the adoption process itself has been made 
more open and transparent under this Act including, greater sensitivity and 
attention being given to attachment issues108 and more support for both 
natural and adoptive families,109 it retains a very strong focus on the primacy 
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of adoption and the need for legal permanency in a child’s life, as it was felt 
that Local Authorities are leaving children too long in neglectful and abusive 
families.110  This strong emphasis on one permanency option almost to the 
exclusion of other less legal permanent options, risks excluding an option  
that may be more consistent with a child’s experience, stage of development 
and need such as long term foster care.  However, included in the national 
minimum standards for adoption agencies, issued under the Care Standards 
Act 2000, which was amended in 2005, to ensure compatibility with the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002, is an acknowledgement that children, where 
possible, are best cared for by their own birth family.111  The priority given to 
children’s lives by the present government is reflected in the document, 
‘Putting Children First’ where they state: 
  
‘The fundamental purpose of children’s social care is to make sure 
that our most vulnerable children – those who have been abused and 
neglected, or face other significant challenges such as a disability – 
can have a safe, dependable foundation from which to grow and 
flourish.  This is achieved by supporting parents to provide the best 
possible care for their children or, where this is not possible, by giving 
them a stable and nurturing alternative home’.112 
 
Importantly, in the context of the focus of this thesis, Section 1 of this Act 
places a duty on both the courts and adoption agencies to ascertain the 
wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision to place for adoption.  
This duty indicates a move towards making the decision on the option of 
adoption more child-centred, although potentially the option of adoption given 
its pre-eminent status within the child protection system, may exclude equally 
appropriate options for a child’s long-term care.  It is an issue that judges in a 
number of cases, for example, Re B-S113 and Re MM114 have felt the need to 
remind local authorities of the importance for the child to maintain 
attachments with their birth family and extended family members and of the 
need to evaluate in an open and balanced way other realistic options for the 
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child’s long-term care.  This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6 (section 
6.4). 
 
Reflecting a more child-centred approach in adoption in relation to meeting 
children’s needs and circumstances, the Act widened the range of people 
eligible to adopt to include unmarried and same sex couples.115  In relation to 
step-parent adoptions, only the step-parent is now required to make an 
application, while the natural mother retains all her rights during the adoption 
process.116  These changes in adoption law also reflect and are an 
acknowledgement that society has developed a wider and richer perspective 
on the composition of families and their lives.  It also reflects a further move 
toward putting children’s needs at the centre of policy and legislation rather 
than continue to adhere to discriminatory legislation and a system that 
reduced potential permanent care options for children, should such an option 
be considered in the child’s best interests. 
  
2.3.3 Working together for all children to achieve best outcomes 
 
 
Following Lord Laming’s inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié,117 the 
government of the day produced a green paper in September 2003, ‘Every 
Child Matters’, which set out its vision for children’s services.  It introduced 
five national outcomes in respect of every child, namely, being healthy, 
staying safe, enjoying and achieving, making a positive contribution and 
economic well-being.  The green paper proposed provision of greater 
emotional and practical support for parents and carers, early and more 
effective protection, greater and more transparent accountability and 
integration locally, regionally and nationally and a reform of the workforce 
involved in the provision of children’s services.118 
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The Children Act 2004 was introduced to provide a statutory basis for the 
implementation of the changes to children’s services recommended in ‘Every 
Child Matters’ including, inter-agency working at local and national level and 
significant structural and organisational changes in the way children’s 
services are provided and placed a duty on all statutory agencies involved 
with children and young people to work together to ensure children are 
adequately protected from abuse and neglect.119   
 
The 2004 Act established Local Safeguarding Children’s Boards (LSCB), 
replacing the area child protection committees.  Their main role was to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children.120  Membership of these 
boards was to be from a much wider range of professions and agencies than 
was the case with the previous committees, with the expectation of more 
contact and involvement with frontline child care / protection services to 
ensure safeguarding policy was informed and shaped by the realities and 
challenges of safeguarding and protecting children.  The LSCBs have now 
been replaced with Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panels under the 
Child and Social Work Act 2017,121 whose role is monitor more closely 
frontline safeguarding practice, as it was felt that the LCSBs were too far 
removed from frontline practice and therefore from the experiences of 
children in the child protection system.    
 
Under the 2004 Act, the statutory post of Director of Children’s Services in 
each Local Authority was created, vesting in that person legal responsibility 
for children’s safety and welfare.122  Children’s services authorities were 
established, with a lead member from the local council being appointed for 
children’s services.123  These new authorities are tasked with producing a 
Children and Young People’s Plan based on the five national outcomes 
outlined in Every Child Matters.124  The Act introduced a closer level of 
scrutiny at local and regional level with the introduction of joint area reviews 
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of children’s services between relevant statutory and non-statutory agencies / 
organisations, the aim of such reviews being to improve the well-being of 
children.125  At a national level, separate performance rating for children’s 
services in each local authority was introduced, with performance being 
measured against the five national standards and the authority’s children and 
young people’s plan.126   
 
The 2004 Act also established the post of Children’s Commissioner for 
England, their role being to promote awareness of children’s views and 
interests, particularly in relation to their safety.127 The Act however did not 
give the Commissioner the power to investigate individual cases.  The 
Commissioner however does have the power to carry out an enquiry where 
there is an issue of public policy, which is relevant to other children,128 but 
must consult the Secretary of State responsible for children, prior to carrying 
out such an enquiry.129  However, the Children and Families Act 2014 
changed and strengthened the role and responsibilities of the Children’s 
Commissioner.  It gave a legal mandate for the Commissioner and their office 
to promote and protect children’s rights.130  Under this Act, which amended 
section 8 of the Children Act 2004, the Commissioner and their office are 
empowered to provide advice and assistance and represent individual 
children or groups of children, where there is a risk of their rights being 
disregarded.131  The 2014 Act strengthens the position of the child’s voice in 
relation to accessing and exercising their rights.  This piece of legislation 
brings the role of the children’s Commissioner in England in line with the 
Commissioners for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.     
 
Significantly, the Children Act 2004 added a new subsection to Section 17 of 
the Children Act 1989,132 requiring Local Authorities to ascertain the child’s 
wishes and feelings and give due consideration to them when determining 
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services and resources for a child in need.  This requirement in legislation 
reflects a move to a more child-focused approach by obtaining children’s 
views earlier in the process of service provision.  Similarly, the Act imports 
this requirement into a Local Authority’s investigation of a child’s 
circumstances where there is a concern about the child’s welfare under 
section 47 of the Children Act 1989.133  
 
The 2004 Act removed the defence of reasonable chastisement in respect of 
a charge of an assault on a child, while at the same time introducing the 
concept of the ‘moderate slap’,134 making it an offence for a parent to smack 
their child in a way that causes physical or mental harm to the child.  Such an 
offence is punishable by up to five years in prison.  Harm under this Act is 
defined as causing bruising, scratches, reddening of the skin, mental harm or 
if a parent uses an implement.  The introduction of the moderate slap into 
legislation is not consistent with the basic ethos of a child-centred, child 
protection system and belittles the dignity of children as human beings with 
rights including, the right to be protected from degrading treatment and 
punishment.135  In the case of A v UK136, where a 9 year-old child was beaten 
with a garden cane which was applied with considerable force by his step-
father, who claimed the defence of reasonable chastisement and was 
acquitted by the court, the ECtHR held that the beating constituted ‘inhuman 
and degrading punishment’137 and was in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.  
The ECtHR also held that the UK’s domestic law at the time had failed to 
provide adequate protection for the child.  The UK Government in this case 
accepted that the law required amending.138  However, the Children Act 2004 
still supports parents using a ‘moderate slap’139 as a means of disciplining 
their children.  
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The Act attempts to regulate more tightly and provide closer scrutiny of 
services for children, and of relevance to one of the core elements of this 
thesis, it endeavours to involve children in decision making regarding the 
services they are provided with including the family justice system.  While the 
Children Act 2004 rightly focused on children’s welfare and best interests, it 
is quite narrow in its perspective of children’s lives, ignoring for the most part 
the much wider service provision for children and their families, for example, 
health, particularly mental health services for children, and education 
services. 
 
2.3.4 Inequality in children’s lives  
 
Unlike the Children Act 2004, the Childcare Act 2006 adopted a much 
broader and long-term approach to children’s services.  It requires local 
authorities and their NHS and Job Centre Plus partners to work together to 
reduce inequalities in children’s lives and improve outcomes for children 
under five, by providing integrated and accessible services delivered through 
having Sure Start Children’s Centres in every community.140  The Act also 
required local authorities to provide sufficient childcare for working parents 
and those parents starting work for the first time, with a particular focus on 
low income families and those with children who are disabled.141  Local 
authorities are required to take the strategic lead in planning, supporting and 
commissioning childcare.142  The main focus of this Act is on raising the 
standards and quality of childcare in the broadest sense and to make it more 
accessible for all families.143  In the context of this research, this preventative 
approach of the Childcare Act 2006 has the potential for reducing the number 
of children entering the public child law system as a result of parents not 
being able to provide their child with good-enough care (see Chapters 5 and 
6).  Research144 has shown that inequality, particularly that of poverty, is a 
significant contributory factor in children entering the care system.  Children 
in the poorest communities of the UK are over 10 times more likely to enter 
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the care system than those from the wealthiest areas.  One in every 60 
children who live in most deprived communities were in care as compared to 
one in every 660 in the least deprived.145  The Act extended the existing duty 
of local authorities to be pro-active and to provide parents and prospective 
parents with a full, comprehensive and accessible range of information they 
need to bring up their children through to their 20th birthday.146     
 
While the focus of this Act is to raise the standard and quality of childcare, it 
also simplified the framework by integrating the regulation and inspection of 
early education and child care in the hope of reducing bureaucracy.  The 
Childcare Act 2006 also reflects a change of perspective in relation to the 
changing role of carers and families.  The provision of childcare has been 
linked to securing female participation in the labour market as well as 
changing perception on the role and responsibility of both parents in the 
parenting and care of children.  Chan welcomes State intervention in this 
area if its aim is to increase choices and improve access to job opportunities 
for women in the labour market.147  However, she does not feel that such 
intervention has the right to impose choices on women.148  Of relevance to 
the subject area of this thesis, within the context of State child-centred 
policies generally, is Chan’s view that such a policy not only needs to 
facilitate women with children gaining access to the workforce but that it also 
needs to: ‘…accommodate the long-recognised contribution that good 
parenting makes to the lives of children, both as children and as future 
citizens.149 
 
This Act removes the legal distinction between childcare and education in the 
early years of a child’s life (0-5 years), reflecting how young children learn 
and develop.150  Under the Act, the Birth to Three Matters Foundation Stage 
and the National Standards for under 8’s Day Care and Childminding are 
brought together under a new Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS), the aim 
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being to provide integrated and high quality early education and care for 
children from birth to the age of five.  To support this development, a new 
Early Years Register for service providers was set up.151  For those providing 
services for older children, an Ofsted Childcare Register (OCR) was 
introduced.152 
 
The Childcare Act 2006 marks a significant shift in the history of childcare 
legislation, away from a welfare oriented service for children to a much more 
educationally focused perspective, where children’s development and levels 
of achievement are being continuously monitored and assessed.  However, 
while the Act aims to bring together child care and education, the system it 
has created is much more driven by standards rather than welfare principles 
and values including, best interests and paramountcy principles, enshrined in 
the Children Act 1989.  Rutter in her survey of childcare costs highlights how 
these costs can be a barrier for some parents resulting in them having to 
leave their employment when they have children.  One of the consequences 
of such a move is that the family is ‘pushed into poverty’,153 which in turn 
undermine the welfare principles enshrined in legislation, particularly the 
principle of children’s best interests in relation to their welfare and 
development.    
 
2.3.5 Safeguarding, rights and supporting children 
 
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 was introduced due to 
concerns regarding the vetting of people who applied to work with children 
and vulnerable adults.  The Act was also informed by the publication of the 
Bichard Inquiry in 2004, which was set up following the conviction of Ian 
Huntley for the murders of two school girls, Jessica Chapman and Holly 
Wells.  The inquiry found fragmented information systems, which often did 
not communicate with each other about individuals who posed a risk to 
children.154   
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The Act established the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA).  Its role 
was to establish and maintain a ‘barred list’ of individuals considered a risk to 
children and vulnerable adults.155  The main focus of this Act is to reduce the 
risk of harm to children and vulnerable adults, through establishing a national 
centralised vetting process.156 
 
Children and Young Persons Act 2008 was focused on ensuring that children 
within the looked after system and those leaving this system receive high 
quality care and support including, emotional and financial support, 
independent visitors, and personal advisers for care leavers continuing their 
education or training up to the age of 25.157   
 
In relation to the protection of children, section 30 of the Act amends section 
45(9) of the Children Act 1989 by omitting subsection 9, revoking the 72-hour 
restriction on applications to discharge an Emergency Protection Order by a 
parent, a person with parental responsibility, the child herself or anyone with 
whom the child was living at the time the Order was made.  This amendment 
was introduced to ensure the legislation is compatible with Article 6 (Right to 
a fair trial) and Article 8 (Right to privacy and family life) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The next section of this chapter now moves 
on to a different but a related theme in the context of this research, that of 
accessing the justice system.  The cutbacks in the legal aid budget resulting 
in a reduction of legal representatives available to represent parents in public 
law proceedings, will impact on children parents’ right to access the justice 
system. 
 
2.3.6 Access to justice 
 
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) 
followed a review by Lord Justice Jackson of litigation costs, the report of 
which was published in 2009.158  The objective of the review was to 
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recommend ways to control costs, while promoting access to justice.  The 
review report made 109 recommendations across 45 subject areas and put 
forward a range of reforms relating to each of these areas.  Following the 
Jackson review, the Ministry of Justice in 2010 put out for consultation a set 
of proposals for legal aid reform, including fixed fees for legal aid work.159  
The key aims of the proposals were to, ‘discourage unnecessary and 
adversarial litigation at public expense, target legal aid to those who need it 
most, make significant savings in the cost of the legal aid scheme and deliver 
better overall value for money for the taxpayer.160  There were 5,000 
responses submitted regarding the proposals outlined, the majority of which 
rejected the Government’s proposals.  Nevertheless, the Government went 
ahead and implemented their reforms.   
 
A report by the Bar Council one year on from LAPSO becoming law, 
highlighted a number of major concerns among barristers including, cutting 
costs being seen as more important than providing access to the courts for 
individuals to exercise their legal rights.161  It also highlighted the real 
probability of a decreasing number of family practitioners, due to the impact 
of the reforms on the viability of their practice in the long-term.  One of the 
possible consequences is a reduction in the pool of legal representatives 
available to represent parties in public law proceedings and in particular, the 
representation of the child’s parents before the court.  In his forward to the 
Bar Council’s report, Nicholas Lavender, chairman of the Bar Council, 
maintains that, ‘Without a properly resourced system of justice many citizens, 
including some of the most vulnerable in society, will be unable to obtain 
advice or to access the courts to uphold their legal rights’.162  In the context of 
public child law, it is an issue that judges in this research have identified, with 
one county court judge remarking: 
 
“The problems of legal aid mean that there are fewer and fewer 
solicitors available and although the children’s representatives, 
children panel members, are of a very high standard generally, the 
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parents struggle to get really good representation sometimes, not 
always obviously, but you get people who are perhaps less  
experienced representing the parents and that can cause problems.  
The Children Panel has had problems for years in that its population is 
ageing.  Legal Aid practice is extremely difficult.  I do not know how 
any solicitors are surviving frankly and that causes huge problems 
obviously, so that is going to be a difficulty across the board, mainly 
for parents because there are dedicated children panel solicitors who 
fortunately soldier on regardless”. 
 
 
2.3.7 Justice versus timescales 
 
The relevance of the Children and Families Act 2014 to this research is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, which looks at child-centredness within 
the public child law system.  Nevertheless, in the context of this chapter it is 
appropriate to outline the main changes that this piece of legislation has 
introduced, particularly those changes which will have significant implications 
for the representation of parents, highlighted in the above abstract, in the 
context of the introduction of a 26-week timescale for the completion of 
paroceedings. 
 
The purpose of this Act was to reform services and provide support for 
vulnerable children including, look-after children, young carers, children with 
special educational needs, parent carers and children in residential care.  
Under the Act, children in foster care will have the option to remain in their 
placement until they are 21, under ‘staying put arrangements’.163  Young 
Carers are given clearer rights to having their needs assessed by local 
authorities and to receiving adequate and appropriate support to meet those 
needs.164  This Act introduced reforms to the provision of residential care for 
children, to ensure the homes providing such care are safe and secure for 
children.165  Children with special educational needs are provided under this 
Act with a system, which is to be designed around their needs and offer them 
support up to the age of 25.166    
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The Children and Families Act 2014 introduced two measures aimed at 
reducing delay in public child law proceedings.  As part of its Public Law 
Outline (PLO) the Act introduced a 26-week limit for the completion of court 
proceedings, to avoid unnecessary delays.167  This can be extended by a 
further eight weeks, but only in exceptional cases.168  This measure was 
introduced due to cases taking on average, one to two years to complete. 
The second measure is restricting the number of experts appointed in 
cases.169  The criteria for the appointment of an expert was changed to one 
of necessity to resolve the case justly,170 rather than the previous 
appointment criteria, which was desirability of expertise.  The reason for such 
a measure in large part was the belief that such expertise already existed 
within the system, mainly, but not exclusively, in the persons of the local 
authority social worker and the children’s Guardian.  Health and education 
professionals also possess expertise in health and the development of 
children and young people.   
 
Watson however raises a number of serious questions about whether justice 
can be achieved within the 26-week deadline, given that the PLO usually 
requires the Local Authority to file their final evidence and care plan by week 
16 for an issues resolution hearing (IRH) by week 20.171  She maintains that 
the slimming down of the evidence base presented to the court including, 
statements of no more than 20 pages, restricted chronologies, less 
independent experts and a lack of Local Authority resources could risk 
depriving all parties, including the child, of a just hearing.172  For Watson, the 
system requires: ‘…investing in, valuing, and facilitating conscientious skilled 
professionals to provide the court with the evidence and fair analysis needed 
to deliver justice to the child, in a timely fashion’.173  This area will be the 
subject of further and more detailed discussion in Chapter 4. 
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There have been specific developments in Wales, not reflected in the law of 
England because of the competence of the devolved Welsh Assembly in 
respect of child care legislation.  The Social Services and Well-being Act 
(Wales) Act 2014 became law on 6th April 2016 and therefore outside the 
period in which this research was conducted.  Nevertheless, for the sake of 
completeness and currency in relation to current legislation, a brief summary 
on the Act is included in this chapter.  Where relevant, the equivalent 
sections to those of the Children Act 1989 have also been included in this 
chapter. 
 
This Act brings together in one piece of legislation social care provision for 
both adults and children.  It defines well-being as, physical and mental health 
emotional protection from abuse and neglect, education, training and 
recreation, domestic, family and personal relationships, contribution made to 
society, securing rights and entitlements, social and economic suitability of 
living accommodation, child’s welfare and physical, intellectual, emotional, 
social and behavioural development.174  Generally, these elements of the 
child’s welfare are contained in the welfare checklist of the Children Act 
1989.175   
 
In the context of this research and thesis, the legal status of children who are 
in the care of a local authority under a care order of the Children Act 1989176 
is unaffected by the Social Services and Well-being Act (Wales) Act 2014.  
Provisions for looked-after children are contained in Part 6 of the Act.177   
 
The Act establishes a national independent safeguarding board for adults 
and children,178 the purpose of which is to strengthen the provisions for 
keeping children and adults safe from abuse and neglect.  In relation to 
children, the role of the national board is to advise and support local 
safeguarding boards and report on their effectiveness. 
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Importantly, the Social Services and Well-being Act (Wales) Act 2014 
strengthens further the status of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child within public child law in Wales, by placing an overarching duty on 
Local Authorities to have due regard to the Convention when exercising their 
functions in relation to the care and protection of children.179  The 
strengthened status of the UN Convention within this Act reflects a greater 
integration of the Convention into Welsh legislation than is the case in 
England.  It is also reflective of a more children’s rights perspective in the 
application of legislation, decision-making processes and in professional 
practice, thereby facilitating the development of a more child-focused system. 
  
2.3.8 Improving professional standards 
 
The Children and Social Work Act 2017, which has yet to come into force, 
introduces a new regulator (Social Work England) for the social work 
profession in England.180  The new regulator however, must obtain approval 
for professional standards from the Secretary of State for Education181 who 
will also have new powers to set improvement standards for social workers 
and introduce assessments for registered social workers.182   
 
Under this Act, children leaving the care system, will be provided with 
personal advisers until they reach the age of 25.183  This is linked to the set of 
‘corporate parenting principles’, contained in the Act.184 The principles 
include, acting in the best interests of children, promoting the physical and 
mental health and well-being of children and young people, encouraging 
children and young people to express their views, wishes and feelings and 
for professionals to take these into account when working with and providing 
services for children and young people.  Enabling children and young people 
to access and make the best use of services provided by service providers, is 
seen as part of the Local Authority’s corporate parenting role, as is promoting 
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high aspirations for young people, particularly in relation to educational 
outcomes.  Under the Act, empowering children to feel safe and secure in 
their home lives and in their relationships and working life is viewed as an 
important element of the responsibilities of local authorities.  Preparing young 
people for adulthood and independent living is included as a core element of 
corporate parenting.  The Act lists a number of areas in this regard including, 
health and well-being, relationships, education and training, employment, 
accommodation and participation in society, including direct involvement.185 
Such involvement includes all forums where decisions are made about 
children’s lives or have an impact on the quality of a child’s life, an area 
pertinent to this research. 
 
Both the historical path to current legislation and the development of current 
public child law represents a journey from the Poor Law, when the support 
provided to children, in the form of food and shelter, was simply to keep them 
physically alive, to the notion that children require a holistic approach to 
welfare rather than just providing very basic physical care.  Children’s 
physical, social, emotional, health and educational needs came to be 
recognised and accepted as essential for a child’s welfare and development.  
The journey is ongoing, with children being acknowledged and respected as 
human beings with rights and the right to exercise their rights.  However, as 
will be argued in this thesis, children remain on the periphery of a system that 
makes decisions, which have life changing consequences in relation to 
children’s lives. 
 
2.4 Current Policy and Guidance 
 
Formal policy and guidance in relation to children’s welfare reflects the 
priorities of the government of the day and play a significant part in 
influencing decisions made about children who are subject to proceedings.  It 
is therefore important to look at the main details of current policy and 
guidance, particularly in terms of their focus on the areas of professional 
practice, which impact significantly on the lives of children and their families.   
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This section will look at the three main documents informing and guiding the 
practice of child care professionals, namely the Framework for Assessment 
of Children in Need and their Families, the Common Assessment Framework 
(CAF) and Working Together to Safeguard Children.   
 
2.4.1 Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families 
 
Although this framework remains the current guidance for the assessment of 
children and families’ needs, it needs to be understood in conjunction with 
guidance issued in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children 2015’.  The 
Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families was 
published in 2000 and encompasses three interconnected systems; the 
child’s developmental needs, family and environmental factors and parenting 
capacity, as shown in Figure 1 below.     
  
 
 
 
The framework is based on the principle of working together in partnership 
with children and families to gather information and identify both the positives 
Source:   
Department of Health, Framework 
for the Assessment of Children in 
Need and their Families  
(HMSO 2000) 
Figure 1 
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and the difficulties in the child’s life, their family and in the community in 
which they live.  It is meant to be a systematic way of gathering and 
analysing information about the needs of children and their families, but with 
the capacity to discriminate between different types and levels of need.  For 
example, a child who has a physical disability and requires adaptations to be 
made within their home is quite different from the needs of a child who is 
being abused and neglected.  It puts the child’s welfare and safety at the 
centre (Figure 1) and endeavours to adopt a holistic approach to the 
assessment of need and risk.186  However, this framework was developed 
without any input from children187  and very little consideration was given to 
enabling children to become involved in the assessment process.   
 
Research carried out 17 years ago by Cleaver et al found that professionals 
using this framework were to a very limited degree obtaining the views of 
children about their situation, evidenced by the exclusion of their views in four 
fifths of the core assessment records included in Cleaver’s research.188  The 
issues identified by Cleaver and her colleagues are similar to Ofsted’s 
findings in their report on children’s social care in 2016, which found that 
inadequate time and attention was being given to listening to children’s 
views.189  While the framework has as its central focus the child’s welfare and 
safety, the voice of the child continues to receive very limited attention.  
Given that the assessments carried out under this framework are used to 
formulate care plans for children and are used as evidence in proceedings, 
the child’s views of their circumstances and needs would seem not to be the 
central focus of a system that informs and influences the decision-making 
process within proceedings.    
 
 
 
                                            
186 Department of Health, Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (HMSO 2000). 
187 M C Calder, ‘The Assessment Framework: A Critique and Reformulation’ in Calder, M. C. and Hackett, S 
     (eds) Assessment in Child Care: Using and Developing Frameworks for Practice (Russell House Publishing 
     2003). 
188 H Cleaver, S Walker and P Meadows, Assessing Children’s Needs and Circumstances: The Impact of the 
     Assessment Framework (Jessica Kingsley 2004). 
189 Ofsted, The Report of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills 2016: Social 
     Care (The Stationery Office 2016). 
45 
 
2.4.2 Common Assessment Framework (CAF) 
 
The Common Assessment Framework aims to help practitioners working with 
children, young people and families to assess children and young people’s 
additional needs at a much earlier stage, specifically needs, which are not 
being met by the current services being provided to the child and their family.  
The framework also aims to help professionals develop a common 
understanding of those additional needs and ways to work together to meet 
them, through ‘…sharing information legally and professionally.190  It is ‘…a 
shared assessment and planning framework for use across all children’s 
services and all local areas in England’.191  In Wales, similar provisions to 
those included in the ‘Common Assessment Framework’ are contained in the 
Social Services and Well-being Act (Wales) Act 2014.192   
 
While this framework was developed to identify additional needs of children 
and not for children at risk of harm, its assessment approach has much to 
offer child-centred decision making within a range of forums including, public 
child law proceedings.  Among the factors that make good assessments, and 
of particular relevance to the subject of this thesis, it includes the 
empowering of children and young people and their families to engage and 
participate and take responsibility for their contribution to the assessment, 
facilitating a collaborative approach.193  It places importance on the 
assessment having validity in terms of evaluating the child’s needs rather 
than the parents’ needs.194  The approach adopted is one of transparency, 
having a clear purpose for the assessment and facilitating open and honest 
discussion with no hidden agendas.195  The framework embraces inclusivity, 
ensuring that the views of the child and the family are each reflected in the 
assessment in their own language and expressions without bias.196  This 
framework overall in relation to carrying out assessments of children’s 
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additional needs, tries to ensure that the child’s views and experiences are 
given full expression within an environment that enables the child to feel 
comfortable and safe, with reassurance that their views are taken seriously 
and respected.197  Piper however maintains that assessment frameworks in 
relation to children’s needs, should be: ‘…designed and used with extreme 
care so that they are, and remain, a tool to guide professional judgement, not 
to determine what that judgement should be’.198  Professionals still need to 
reflect on their recommendations and decisions and their impact on a child’s 
life, ensuring that the outcome is child-centred rather than based solely on 
the requirements of the framework.  
 
2.4.3 Working Together to Safeguard Children 
 
The guidance contained in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’199 lays 
heavy emphasis on the need for professionals to adopt a child-centred 
approach in their work with children and their families.  The delivery and 
provision of services must be based on a clear understanding of the needs 
and views of children.200  Importance is placed on making sufficient time 
available to listen to children and to take their views seriously.  Such an 
approach should inform and guide professionals to work with children in a 
collaborative manner when making decisions about how their needs are met 
and supported.201  The guidance highlights the value children place on 
establishing a stable and trusting relationship with their social worker.202  
However, research and professional practice reflect a system that is only 
able to give a very limited amount of time for listening to children, due to 
Local Authority social workers having to deal with high caseloads203 and 
children’s Guardians who represent children in proceedings204, being asked 
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to work within an operating framework205 that requires a safe minimum 
amount of time to be spent getting to know the child they represent.206   
 
The guidance sets out what it considers high quality assessments of 
children’s needs and circumstances including the principles and parameters 
of such assessments.  While supporting a working in partnership with parents 
approach, the guidance emphasises the need to ensure that the best 
interests of children prevail where there is a conflict of interests between 
children and their parents.207  The guidance recommends that the carrying 
out of assessments of children’s needs and those of their families, should be 
done in a transparent manner and open to challenge by all parties involved in 
the assessment.208  The introduction of the 26-week limit for the completion 
of proceedings209 allows very limited time for realistic challenges to be made. 
 
The guidance is clear about valuing the importance of research based 
practice particularly in relation to the impact of abuse and neglect on 
children’s lives.  It highlights the need for social workers and managers to 
reflect on the latest research in this area and on the findings from serious 
case reviews,210 all of which highlight the need to listen to children and for 
agencies to work together effectively when assessing and analysing 
children’s level of need and risk.211    
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides the legal and policy backdrop to subsequent chapters 
of this thesis and to the findings of this research.  It is the framework that 
judges work within when they adjudicate on public child law proceedings, and 
what is presented to them in court is influenced by the policies and decisions 
made much earlier in the process (see Chapters 4 – 8). 
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The development of legislation in the area of public child law and its 
accompanying guidance and policies, outlined in this chapter, reflect a 
growing awareness, knowledge and understanding of children’s needs and 
development.  This development also reflects a family justice system that 
endeavours to place the child’s best interests in a position of paramount 
importance, as defined mainly from the perspectives of adults.  While 
guidance and policy advocate a child-centred approach to assessing and 
meeting the needs of children,212 this thesis will explore further how the 
public child law system itself remains distant from the lived experiences of 
children who are subject to proceedings.  The principle of paramountcy in 
relation to the child’s welfare,213 is the core principle underpinning current 
legislation and professional practice and yet the child’s presence and status 
within the system is one which has been described by Munby P as almost 
‘invisible’.214  The public child law system has made significant progress 
since the time of the Poor Laws in protecting children from harm and neglect, 
with acknowledgment of the importance of the child’s voice, but the 
acknowledgement and acceptance of the direct voice of the child in 
proceedings needs to be considered in practice.  The current system of 
public child law needs to be proactive, supported by amendments to current 
legislation, in empowering children to participate in all areas of the system, so 
that decisions made on their behalf are child-centred, rather than just being 
both adult and system-centred.   
 
The next chapter discusses the methodological approach and research 
method adopted to achieve the aim and objectives of this research in 
examining the application of the principles outlined in this chapter.    
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Chapter 3 
Methodological Approach to identifying and exploring Child-centredness in 
decision-making in Public Child Law Proceedings from the  
Perspectives of Judges 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the chosen research strategy and method are discussed.  The 
qualitative research methodology is outlined and explained including the 
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the selected methodological 
approach.  The strengths and limitations of the chosen method are also 
considered.  The process of obtaining the research sample and the rationale 
for the selection of the participants is discussed including the relevant ethical 
issues and the validity and reliability of the research data.  The chapter 
concludes by outlining the methods of data analysis and use of NVivo.   
 
3.2 A Qualitative Research Approach 
 
 
The qualitative approach underpinning the research strategy of this study  
explores with judges what they consider to be key elements of child-
centredness when making decisions and directions in public child law 
proceedings.  Underpinning this qualitative approach is the paradigm of 
interpretative phenomenology, the goal of which is to describe and interpret: ‘ 
… accurately a person’s lived experience in relation to what is being 
studied’.215  Judges’ experience and perception in the area of public child law 
proceedings are crucial in this respect.  A phenomenological approach was 
therefore considered an appropriate research strategy to use for this 
research study, as it will facilitate gaining an understanding of how judges 
view and understand their decision-making role in relation to children in 
public child law proceedings. 
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The approach adopted for this study is located broadly within the paradigm of 
phenomenological research, which seeks to identify the core elements of 
human experience in respect of a particular concept or issue.216  Denzin and 
Lincoln define a research paradigm as a: ‘ … basic set of beliefs that guide 
action’.217  For Balls a phenomenological approach explores and examines: ‘ 
… the qualities of the experience, allows us to identify its essence’.218  
Husserl, the father of phenomenology, felt the most important thing is to 
always return to the things themselves,219 to the world as lived and 
experienced by the research participants.220  The focus of phenomenology is: 
‘... on the intentional dimensions of human action and the social world’.221  
Moran describes a phenomenological approach as primarily descriptive, 
seeking to illuminate issues in a radical, unprejudiced manner, paying close 
attention to the evidence that presents itself to our grasp or intuition’,222 while 
Hughes sees: ‘One of the tasks of phenomenological philosophy is to 
describe this everyday experience of the “life world”, the world, that is, as 
given in immediate experience independent of and prior to any scientific 
interpretation’.223   
 
Lester maintains that: ‘Phenomenological methods are particularly effective 
at bringing to the fore the experiences and perceptions of individuals from 
their own perspectives …’.224   Moustakas sees phenomenological research 
as an interactive process, using open-ended comments and questions,225 but 
this approach according to Finlay, is not unproblematic:  ‘The challenge for 
phenomenological researchers is twofold: how to help participants express 
their world as directly as possible; and how to explicate these dimensions 
such that the lived world – the life world – is revealed’.226  Husserl viewed the 
phenomenological method as one of pure description, without analysis, as he 
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felt such analysis would dilute and even smother the true description of the 
participant’s views or actions.227   
 
One philosopher who is quite critical of Husserl’s phenomenological method 
is Jacques Derrida, questioning whether such ‘purity’ is possible: 
 
‘When this consciousness is forced to enter the world in order to 
communicate with others, this meaning, formerly accessed by a pure, 
indeed mystical intuition, must be articulated, and this means split up 
into concepts and expressed in words.  Now at this point, potential 
misunderstandings creep in, and a certain lack of transparency enters 
into the meaning of the words …. and this will mean that signification 
infects meaning, that meaning will always already involve 
signification’.228  
  
Derrida’s perspective identifies correctly that language is in itself a social 
construct and therefore people’s views and the significance they give to the 
language they use are, to an extent, determined by the structures and 
cultures within which they live and work.  It is also acknowledged that in the 
analysis and interpretation of the participants’ views, signification will 
inevitably occur, given that qualitative analysis involves making judgements 
about data, which are unavoidably subjective and which are influenced by the 
researcher’s own professional background, in this case as a former Local 
Authority child protection social worker and as a children’s Guardian.  
‘Heidegger thinks that there is a basic articulation of one’s situation which 
gets expressed in language in such a way that by an examination of 
language it is possible to grasp the structural determination of one’s situation, 
thereby revealing the constitutive elements of any possible experience’.229  In 
this study judges’ structural situation including, relevant legislation and case 
law, court rules and judicial guidance, as well as their own personal values 
and principles, contribute significantly to their thinking and experience and 
therefore it is important to gain an understanding of this, as reflected through 
their views on what elements constitute child-centred decision-making.   
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While this research locates itself within the broad principles of a 
phenomenological approach, it departs from Husserl’s principle of ‘pure 
description’ in that analysis is seen as necessary, given the applied nature of 
the research subject area to inform future development in this field in relation 
to policy making, professional practice and future legislation.230  The above 
critique of Husserl’s concept of a pure description may be valid, but it does 
not take from one of the core principles of his phenomenological approach.  
Being faithful to the research participants’ perspectives and meaning is what 
lies at the heart of the approach adopted for this research study.  Such an 
approach facilitates maintaining the integrity of the raw data and it requires 
that the interpretation of such data reflects accurately the views of the 
participants.  ‘The aim should be to be faithful to the participants, and to be 
aware (in so far as is possible) of biases being brought to the inevitable 
editing, which is needed …’,231 to avoid distortion or misrepresentation of the 
participants’ views, which according to Plummer would be ‘treachery’.232  
Groenewald highlights the need for balance between serious reflection on 
what is being said and ‘ …descriptive notes, such as hunches, impressions, 
feelings, …’233  Maintaining this balance in this research is particularly 
important, given the researcher’s own professional background in child 
protection and in representing children in public child law proceedings as a 
children’s Guardian.   
 
Interpretative phenomenology maintains that it is impossible to remove from 
the research process the researcher’s own knowledge, experience and pre-
conceptions about the area being researched.  This phenomenological 
approach, also known as the hermeneutic tradition, was developed by 
Heidegger with the belief that it is not possible to be completely neutral in 
carrying out research, as our knowledge and experience forms part of the 
research process in interpreting and explaining data.234  Interpretative 
                                            
230 J D Crist and C A Tanner, ‘Interpretation / Analysis methods in hermeneutic 
     interpretive phenomenology’ (2003) Nursing Research 52 (3) 202. 
231 Lester (n 223) 4. 
232 K Plummer,(1983)  Documents of Life: An Introduction to the Problems and Literature of a Humanistic Method 
     (Unwin Hyman 1983).  
233 T Groenewald,(2004)  ‘A phenomenological research Design illustrated’ (2004)  International Journal of  
     Qualitative Methods 3 (1) 14.  
234 M Heidegger, (1962) Being and Time (Harper and Row 1962). 
53 
 
phenomenologists also suggest that we use our experience to develop and 
influence our research questions.  It is acknowledged that such experience 
has influenced both the choice of the research area in this study and the 
content of the interview focus areas schedule in this research project.    
 
Although writing in relation to the nursing profession, it is equally relevant to 
this research and the researcher, Koch points out that as researchers we are 
interpreting data about areas within which we ourselves exist and therefore it 
is not possible to have a totally detached standpoint.235  Neither is this 
desirable, as caring about the research and realising its value is important, as 
well as encouraging participation in the study.  However, Balls notes: ‘… that 
those conducting interpretative phenomenological research will need to show 
how their own experiences have shaped the choice of the research topic, the 
questions and their interpretations.236 
 
In discussing research design, Cresswell outlines the essential aspects of a 
qualitative research process: ‘Qualitative researchers tend to collect data in 
the field at the site where the participants experience the issue or problem 
under study’237  and: ‘In the entire qualitative research process, the 
researcher keeps a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold 
about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the 
research … ‘238   Creswell sees the main task of a qualitative researcher as 
trying to: ‘ …develop a complex picture of the problem or issue under study.  
This involves reporting multiple perspectives, identifying the many factors in a 
situation, and generally sketching the larger picture that emerges’.239  In 
discussing where a qualitative research interview is most appropriate, 
Robson states: ‘Where a study focuses on the meaning of particular 
phenomena to the participants ..‘.240  In this study, the focus is on judges’ 
perspectives of the concept of child-centredness as it relates to their 
decision-making.  In relation to interviews, Robson feels that the interview: ‘ 
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... has the potential of providing rich and highly illuminating material’.241  
Bryman in relation to the focus of qualitative interviewing maintains that: ‘... 
there is much greater interest in the interviewee’s point of view …’ 242  and 
the researcher: ‘ ... wants rich, detailed answers …’.243   
 
A qualitative approach, as opposed to a quantitative methodology, provides a 
deeper and a more nuanced understanding of the concept of child-
centredness as it relates to decisions made by the Judiciary in public child 
law proceedings in England and Wales.244  According to Guba and Lincoln: 
‘Human behaviour, unlike that of physical objects, cannot be understood 
without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors 
to their activities.  Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide rich insight into 
human behaviour’.245 
 
In his critique of qualitative research Bryman246 like Robson,247 highlights a 
number of limitations of a qualitative approach including, being time 
consuming, too subjective, difficult to replicate, problems with generalisation 
of the results and a lack of transparency.  However, Bryman feels that a key 
area that can address limitations in qualitative research is transparency, 
particularly in the research design and in the analysis of the results.  He 
concludes that: ‘There is no necessary reason why qualitative research 
cannot be employed to investigate a specific research problem’.248 
 
3.3 Research Method 
 
In relation to the choice of method, Hughes maintains that: ‘Researching a 
problem is a matter of using the skills and techniques appropriate to do the 
job required within the limits set; a matter of finely judging the ability of a 
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particular research tool to provide the data required’.249  For May: ‘... the 
selection of a method ought to depend on the purpose and circumstances of 
the research, rather than being derived from methodological and 
philosophical commitments’ 250 and she highlights the relationship between 
the position of the researcher and the chosen research method and how this 
relationship influences strongly the way a researcher approaches the framing 
of questions. 
 
The research method chosen for this study was one-to-one interviews with 
individual judges in district, county and high courts throughout England and 
Wales, who were involved in public child law proceedings.  These three 
levels of court have now been combined to form the Family Court, into which 
all care and adoption applications are lodged,251 although the distinct levels 
of court remain in place.  The research sample for this study was a purposive 
sample of 30 judges in England and Wales from the District Court, County 
Court and High Court involved in public child law proceedings.  The 
purposeful selection of participants enabled the researcher to include 
participants that have the expertise, knowledge and experience to achieve 
the aim of the study.252  These courts deal with the vast majority of child 
protection cases and in particular with the determination of fact hearings 
where children’s participation is most central.  Focusing the research on 
these courts was important, as they are at the ‘coal face’ of public law 
proceedings.   
 
In this study, it was important to gain an understanding of judges’ 
perspectives on child-centred decision-making and how they apply their 
perspectives to the decisions they make in court and whether their idea of 
child-centred decision-making values and includes children’s involvement, 
including direct involvement in court proceedings.  Gaining such an 
understanding will enable the researcher to identify divergences and 
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consensus of views between members of the judiciary and current relevant 
legislation, formal guidance, literature and research.   
 
This research study entered a specific area of practice where, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter on the legal and policy framework, there has 
been a significant increase in public child law legislation and policy within the 
last 27 years.  It is an area that requires an ‘up-close’ and sensitive research 
method253 to explore with members of the Judiciary their perspectives of what 
lies at the heart of child-centred decision-making.  The research method 
needs to be both flexible and focused to facilitate the gathering of in-depth 
data with many nuances.254   
 
Bell maintains that interviews can provide rich material and provided the 
interview is focused,255 it enables the participants the freedom to talk about 
what is important to them.256  The research questions / focus areas explored 
with judges the specific contexts in which they work and make decisions 
about children's lives, identifying barriers; human, legal, cultural, systemic 
and structural that get in the way of achieving a public child law system that 
is transparent for children, child-friendly and child-accessible.  The research 
also obtained judges’ views on whether there are principles of the law that 
may conflict and collide with child-centred decision-making.  Such an 
approach permitted the researcher to gain insight into and an understanding 
of the working world of the Judiciary in this area.257    
     
The semi-structured open-ended interviews were audio-recorded, using a 
digital audio-recorder, to ensure accuracy of recording of the participants' 
responses for the purposes of subsequent analysis.  The questions were 
open-ended, to facilitate space for and flexibility of responses from the 
participants.258  The interviews took place in the Judge's chambers in their 
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respective courts, on a mutually convenient pre-arranged date and time. 
There was one exception, where a judge requested to be interviewed in their 
home.  Interviews lasted one hour on average. 
 
3.4 Research Sample 
 
Access to potential participants for this study was limited, so a priority for this 
research was to secure the required number of participants by the most 
effective means possible.259  The research proposal itself, in addition to 
gaining ethical approval from the University of Liverpool, required approval 
from the Ministry of Justice and the President of the Family Division of the 
High Court (see Appendix 5).  On granting approval, the Judicial Office 
helpfully informed judges involved in public law proceedings of the proposed 
research, via the judicial intranet, and invited interest in participating in the 
study.  In addition, contact was made with potential participants through 
existing contacts via the Liverpool Law School and through the researcher’s 
own contacts in the field.  Through these contacts more potential participants 
were identified, a process commonly referred to as ‘snowballing’.260  Such an 
approach, alongside the Judicial Office’s invitation secured a sample of 30 
participants.  It is acknowledged that such sampling methods, while being 
flexible, restrict the potential sample of participants to a limited network of 
individuals.  However, every effort was made to secure a sample across a 
wide geographical spread within England and Wales, obtaining as far as 
possible, a varied range of court locations, level and practice (see Appendix 
6 for table of participants’ level, gender and national location). 
 
Following the identification of potential participants, each was given a 
participant information sheet (see Appendix 2), outlining the nature and 
purpose of the study and the time commitment involved.  Contact details of 
the researcher (telephone and email address) was included on the participant 
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information sheet, as was the contact details of the researcher’s supervisor, 
to facilitate a reply indicating their willingness to take part in the study.  
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
The research was carried out in accordance with the University of Liverpool’s 
Research Ethics Policy.261  Ethical approval for this research was granted by 
the University of Liverpool on 14th May 2012 (see Appendix 4).  Prior to each 
interview the researcher confirmed with each participant that they understood 
the nature and purpose of the study and the time commitment involved, and 
that they were still willing to take part in the research.  Each participant was 
guaranteed anonymity and were informed that their responses would be kept 
in a secure place for one year following the completion of the PhD thesis, 
before being destroyed.  Prior to the interview commencing, the researcher 
requested the participant to read and sign a pre-printed consent form (see 
Appendix 3). 
 
Given the nature of this study and the status of the sample, no adverse 
effects were anticipated in respect of the participants or in respect of the 
researcher.  However, it was important to ensure that the participants in this 
study felt safe and comfortable in giving their true opinions of what for them 
constitutes child-centredness in the course of making a decision about a 
child’s welfare.  It was also important for the integrity of the study to ensure 
that the interviews obtained data that was both sufficiently in-depth and rich, 
the aim being to obtain: ‘... fresh, complex, rich descriptions of a phenomena 
as it is concretely lived’.262 
 
3.6 Pilot Study  
 
It was necessary for this research to carry out a pilot study as there are no 
validated interview schedules or questionnaires available for data collection 
in this specific research area of public child law including judges.263  A small 
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purposive sample of five judges were selected for interview.  The purpose of 
the pilot study was to find out from judges whether the language and 
questions used in the interview schedule and focus areas were clear, 
comprehensive and pertinent.  
 
The participating judges in the pilot study were happy with the range and 
focus of the interview questions and did not recommend any changes.  The 
pilot study interviews yielded very full and complete responses.  The 
researcher on reflection felt that the content and sequence of questions and 
focus areas facilitated detailed and informative responses from judges.  
Judges engaged readily with the questions, making the interview process 
smooth and fluent.  It was, therefore, decided that these completed 
interviews would be included as part of the full sample.  
 
3.7 Validity and Reliability 
 
Hesse-Biber defines validity as:  
 
‘Validity refers to whether a measure is actually measuring what a 
researcher thinks it is measuring’ and reliability as, ‘... to whether or 
not the measure produces the same result each time it is used to 
measure the same thing’.264   
 
In this study, relevant literature and research and the findings of the pilot 
study informed the final design and wording of the research questions / focus 
areas, to ensure that the interview schedule / focus areas had the capacity to 
achieve the stated objectives of the research.  This is an essential 
component of validity.265  For Oiler, the question that needs to be asked, as a 
test of validity is: ‘Are the findings recognised to be true by those who live the 
experience?’.266  Following the transcription of each interview, the complete 
transcript was forwarded to the participant to check for accuracy and to 
amend and / or add to, if they considered it appropriate to do so.  The final 
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transcript was then agreed with the participant, ensuring that the content is a 
true and accurate record of the participant’s views.267  
 
Given the nature of this study, the ever-changing landscape of public child 
law and the sample size, it is acknowledged that there are limitations in terms 
of repeatability of the study.268  However, Hesse-Biber in relation to reliability 
in qualitative research maintains that: ‘Being more explicit about the 
procedures used to analyse data can make secondary analysis / replication 
of research studies of qualitative data more possible’.269  Close attention was 
given in this research to being consistent and transparent about the 
procedures used to code and analyse the data.     
 
3.8 Analysis of Results 
 
In qualitative research, according to Hesse-Biber and Leavy: ‘There is no one 
right way to proceed with analysis’.  They further state: ‘There is no wrong or 
right way to synthesize data, and often the researcher jumps back and forth 
between collection, analysis and writing’.270  The analysis in this study was 
inductive, where themes and ideas emerged following an in-depth 
engagement with and exploration of the data: ‘Qualitative researchers build 
their patterns, categories, and themes from the bottom up’.271  Such an 
approach is consistent with the paradigm of phenomenology, which in itself is 
an ‘inductive methodology’272 with themes and experiences emerging, 
generated from the spoken words of the participants.273      
 
Ritchie and Spencer outline the essential elements of a qualitative analysis: 
‘Qualitative data analysis is essentially about detection, and the tasks of 
defining, categorizing, theorizing, explaining, exploring and mapping are 
fundamental to the analyst’s role’.274  In relation to methods of data analysis, 
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Balls states: ‘... whichever method is chosen, it involves categorising 
participants’ experiences into themes using their own words.  In 
phenomenology, these are presented often in relatively extended quotes, to 
illustrate the themes’ thus ensuring that researchers, ‘... remain true to 
participants’ words and meanings and to represent their experiences’.275 
 
Following the transcribing of the audio-taped interviews, themes and patterns 
were identified and explored.  With a large volume of qualitative data, it is 
both cumbersome and time-consuming to carry out this task manually.  A 
qualitative data computer assisted analysis package met this need as it: ‘... 
allows the researcher to electronically mark with key words or titles, 
passages of stored free-format text.  Occurrences of the same theme in large 
volumes of text can later be retrieved easily, via a keyword search’.276  While 
Hesse-Biber acknowledges that: ‘There exists the fear that machine 
technology will separate the qualitative researcher from the creative process’, 
she nevertheless sees the advantage of using such packages: ‘Automating 
the time-consuming labour-intensive aspect of doing qualitative work, that is, 
the time it takes to code, index, retrieve, and store data, allows the 
researcher to concentrate on the generation and testing of theory’.277   
 
Conrad and Reinharz in discussing the balance to be struck when using 
computer packages in the analysis of qualitative data make an important 
point when they suggest that: ‘... the computer should be used to enhance, 
not control, the work of the investigator … If we compute first and think later 
we may well loose the essence of qualitative sociological work’278 and Mason 
asserts: ‘But computers cannot perform the creative and intellectual task of 
devising categories, or of deciding which categories or types of data are 
relevant to the process being investigated …’279  
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The analysis of the research results in this study was facilitated by the use of 
the qualitative computer analysis programme, NVivo 10.  This particular 
programme was chosen to aid a thematic analysis of the data, identifying the 
main themes, ideas and issues emerging from the participants' responses,280  
which are explored and discussed in the following chapters under sub-
headings that represent the main findings of this research.  
 
In relation to the analysis of data, the researcher needs to engage actively 
with and constantly reflect on the data to, as Finlay puts it: ‘... dwell with the 
data and interrogate it, for example asking: If a person has said this, what 
does this suggest of their experience of the world? ….’  The key is to try to 
capture the complexity and ambiguity of the lived world being described’.281  
Accordingly, each demands or is owed the attentiveness proper to it.282 
 
The perspectives of the participating judges, based on their responses, forms 
a significant part of the critical discussion included in the chapters of this 
thesis, particularly in Chapter 4 on Child-centredness in the Public Child Law 
System, Chapter 5 on Judges’ Perspectives of Child-centredness, Chapter 6 
on The Reality of Judicial Practice and Chapter 7 on Towards a Child-
Centred Public Child Law System.    
 
The process of analysis consisted of two stages:    
 
First, the transcribed interviews were imported into NVivo to facilitate the 
identification of the main themes, issues and concepts emerging from the 
participants’ responses.  Second, the main themes, issues and concepts 
were identified through the use of nodes i.e. themes identified by participants.  
This process was undertaken at two levels.  First, descriptive nodes were 
identified.  These nodes have a clear and close link with the interview text, 
using words that appear in the text itself.  Secondly, following a more in-
depth exploration and interpretation of the data by the researcher, the nodes 
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became much more focused and analytical283 based on the researcher’s 
insights and understanding of the text.  Denzin calls such interpretation of 
qualitative data more of an art, rather than a technical skill, ‘I call making 
sense of what has been learned the art of interpretation’.284   
 
Both levels of analysis are necessary in qualitative research and complement 
each other, ensuring that interpretation and analysis never lose contact with 
and are grounded in the original text of the interview.  These levels of coding 
are also necessary to generate theories and draw conclusions from the   
data,285 identifying consistencies and consensus between the participants in 
relation to themes and issues as well as difference of perspective, in relation 
to child-centred decision-making. 
 
The results from the above analysis were integrated into a detailed review of 
the socio-legal literature, the legal and policy framework, children’s rights, 
principles and theory and relevant case law and are discussed throughout 
the chapters of this thesis.  In relation to the analysis of the data, the factors 
identified and put forward by children who had knowledge and experience of 
how the system affected their lives and of the legal framework underpinning 
the child protection system, provide an important contribution to the 
discussion (see Chapter 4).286   
 
Throughout the thesis, the discussion of the results are informed and 
enhanced by the inclusion of direct quotes from the participants’ responses 
and from relevant case law judgments.  Back is very critical of qualitative 
researchers who use long quotations and who feel they can stand on their 
own without analysis.  He sees this as the researcher neglecting their 
responsibility to provide an analysis of the data.287  In relation to the use of 
direct quotations in the analysis of qualitative data, Smart makes a valid point 
in this regard, posing the question, do we: ‘ ... chop them up too much into 
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manageable bite-size pieces, or whether we use them too much as simple 
illustration rather than points of departure for deeper thinking’.288  In this 
thesis, the length of the direct quotations from the participants will be 
determined by their relevance to the critical discussion of the themes, issues, 
concepts and theories emerging from the analysis of the data.  It is important 
in the discussion of qualitative data that the critical analysis of such data is 
very much connected to the source material: the participants’ perspectives as 
expressed in their responses and to the aim and objectives of the study.  The 
inclusion of direct quotes, long or short, facilitate a deeper exploration and 
richer understanding of the main themes and issues emerging from the 
analysis.  This is very much in line with one of the main principles of a 
phenomenological approach, that of, returning to the things themselves.289 
 
3.9 Limitations of research 
  
This research is a qualitative study involving 30 judges involved in public 
child law proceedings throughout England and Wales.  The research sample  
provides a wide range of judicial views on what constitutes child-centred 
decision-making in the reality of everyday practice within care and adoption 
proceedings.  The research solely focused on judges and did not include the 
perspectives of other professionals and parties involved in proceedings.  The 
perspectives of children did not form part of this research aside from that 
reported in other existing research.  The rationale for focusing only on judges 
was firstly, the lack of research in this area generally and secondly, judges 
were considered a pivotal group within the public child law system, as they 
have the responsibility for making significant and far reaching decisions in the 
lives of children and their families. 
 
Gaining approval to access members of the judiciary for the purposes of 
research is not an easy task and is a process that requires sensitivity and 
understanding, given the nature of the work involved and the issue of security 
around members of the judiciary.  Gaining access to 30 judges who were 
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front-line practitioners in this area was considered an adequate and an 
appropriate sample for this PhD research study.  The one-to-one interviews 
provided rich and detailed information about what the judges considered to 
be child-centred decisions. 
 
The research did not collect biographical information on the participating 
judges, the sole focus and priority being on gaining an insight into and an 
understanding of judicial thinking in relation to how they make decisions 
about children’s lives.  However, the importance of variables such as gender, 
age, ethnicity and their influence on areas like values is acknowledged.  For 
this research, see Appendix 6 for tables containing the number of judges, 
their judicial level, gender and national location.  A larger study in the future 
would enable comparisons to be made in relation to the impact these 
variables may have on child-centred decision-making (see section on areas 
for future research in Chapter 8). 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 
The core aim of this research was to explore with judges their perspectives of 
what constitutes child-centred decision-making in public child law 
proceedings (Care and Adoption).  The broad phenomenological approach 
adopted for this research facilitates the maintaining of a direct link between 
the exploration, interpretation and discussion of themes and issues and the 
raw data from which they emerge.  This ensures that judges’ perspectives 
are represented accurately and that discussion of the data is balanced and 
makes a worthwhile contribution, in terms of deepening, extending and 
enriching knowledge of judicial views on an area in which major decisions are 
made about the lives of children and those of their families.   
 
The following chapter explores and discusses child-centredness, setting out 
the conceptual framework from the perspectives of both judges and the 
public child law system itself, in relation to children who are subject to 
proceedings. 
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Chapter 4 
Child-centredness in the Public Child Law System 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the elements of what is considered to be child-
centredness within the public child law system of England and Wales, 
defined by current child care legislation, formal practice guidance and 
relevant international conventions.  This chapter builds on the legal and 
policy architecture presented in Chapter 2.   
 
It is not a chapter on child-centredness as a universal concept, as there is no 
worldwide consensus as to what constitutes this concept.  It is a concept that 
is both defined and constrained by a huge range of interrelated factors, such 
as culture, religion, history, social norms, values and professional, legal, 
economic and welfare contexts.  This thesis explores critically child-
centredness through the prism of the public child law system, underpinned by 
both the spirit and letter of legislation and formal guidance, applied and 
translated through professional practice.  All cases that are subject to 
proceedings originate from the child protection system and therefore it is 
necessary to look at how both arenas engage with the concept of child-
centredness, given that they inform and are informed by each other in 
relation to decisions regarding the welfare and best interests of children.  The 
concept of ‘child-centredness’ identified from the values in the child 
protection system will also underpin the analysis in the remaining chapters of 
the thesis. 
 
The chapter will firstly outline briefly the historical background from which the 
term child-centredness emerged.  This chapter builds upon the historical 
background presented in Chapter two from which the term child-centredness 
emerged and evolved.  Current professional perception and understanding of 
this concept as represented and applied in the public child law system is then 
explored and discussed.  The key components underpinning a child-centred 
approach in practice are identified including the principle of paramountcy in 
relation to the best interests of the child.  Factors that impact on the 
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paramountcy of the child’s welfare including, expediency, accountability, 
transparency and the child’s own wishes and feelings, will be considered in 
relation to the challenges and tensions such factors pose in the application of 
this core principle within public child law. 
 
4.2 Child-centredness and child participation 
 
The term ‘child-centred’ has its roots in the field of early year’s education.  It 
was first used by Froebel290 in 1826 in relation to early-years education in the 
United States and placed the child at the centre of everything in her / his life, 
with the child viewing everything only in relation to herself / himself.  Chung 
and Walsh291 in tracing the history of the term child-centred in relation to 
early year’s education in the United States, found that there was much 
debate about what constituted the nature of child-centredness.  They 
highlight a number of perceptions of the concept by various groups involved 
in early years’ education down through the years, including, learning based 
on children’s interests, children’s participation in decisions regarding their 
learning, an emphasis on children’s developmental stages and the 
development of individual potential.  Generally, despite different perceptions, 
the child’s own experience of their world was placed at the centre of the 
system and seen as a core element of child-centredness.   However, Chung 
and Walsh292 in tracing the history of the concept of child-centredness, posed 
the question: ‘Of what is the child the centre?’  In the context of this research, 
the following chapters of this thesis will explore and analyse through the 
responses of the judges, current legislation, policy and formal guidance, as 
well as relevant literature and research, the reality of the child’s position 
within the public child law system.  Although this core element of child-
centredness emerged in the early 1800’s, current legislation,293 literature294 
and research295 continue to highlight the importance of seeing the child in the 
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centre of their world as one of the core elements that should form the basis 
on which child-centred decisions are made in both the child protection 
system and in public child law proceedings.   
 
Placing a child’s own experience of their world at the centre of decision-
making processes and having such an approach accepted as a core element 
of child-centred decision-making, has become an integral part of the 
language of children’s rights and child-friendly justice today.  
 
Article 12 of the CRC296 states: 
 
1. ‘States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his 
or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child’. 
   
2. ‘For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
    opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings 
    affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
    appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
    national law’. 
 
In relation to Article 12 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child assert:  
‘… States parties cannot begin with the assumption that a child is 
incapable of expressing her or his own views.  On the contrary, States 
parties should presume that a child has the capacity to form her or his 
own views and recognise that she or he has the right to express them; it 
is not up to the child to first prove her or his capacity’.297  
 
The Committee298 places great importance on children being able to 
participate in decision-making processes, the outcome of which will affect 
their lives.  The Committee asserts that such participation must not be 
momentary, but needs to be meaningful, intense and ongoing throughout the 
entire process.299     
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In relation to vulnerable children who need protection in relation to the status 
of their rights, the UN Committee makes clear that a child’s right to be 
protected from abuse and neglect does not relegate the standing of their 
other rights to a subordinate position.300  The right to be heard and participate 
in decision-making processes in the meaningful and intense way, as outlined 
by the UN Committee, and the right to express their wishes and feelings 
throughout such processes should not be given any less importance than 
their need for and right to protection from harm.  According to the UN 
Committee, parties need to presume a child has the capacity to form a view 
and that a child should not have to first prove their capacity.301  There is no 
age limit attached to Article 12 and the UN Committee discourages States 
parties from introducing age limits in legislation.302  For the UN Committee, 
children should always be at the centre of processes and systems that make 
decisions about their lives.303   
 
However, just listening to the views of children is not enough to characterise 
an approach as being child-centred.  Their views must also be given serious 
consideration.304  Of relevance to this research, the Council of Europe’s 
guidelines on ‘child-friendly’ justice, which reflect the approach adopted in 
General Comment Number 12, cautions against a tokenistic approach in the 
application of Article 12 of the UNCRC.  In relation to processes for hearing 
children, the Council of Europe outline the essential elements that should 
characterise child-friendly processes; transparent (to the child), informative, 
voluntary, respectful, relevant, child-friendly, inclusive, carried out by trained 
staff, safe and sensitive to risk, and, finally, accountable (to the child).305  
Both the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Council of Europe 
stress the importance of children’s rights being accessible, thus enabling 
children to use their rights.  The decision whether a child wishes to exercise 
their rights is solely the child’s and is under no obligation to do so. 
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Guidelines adopted and ratified by the International Association of Youth and 
Family Judges and Magistrates (IAYFJM) present a global approach in 
relation to children who are involved in justice systems.306  The guidelines are 
based on children’s rights, as contained in the UNCRC and the Council of 
Europe Guidelines on Child-friendly Justice.  Within these guidelines, 
children are acknowledged as having rights in their own right and are not 
seen as objects where their rights take second place to those of adults.  One 
of the fundamental principles of the guidelines is, ‘The right to be treated 
according to the rule of law, which must recognise children as subjects of 
substantive and procedural rights’.307  In relation to ensuring that children are 
aware of what is going on in proceedings, principle 8 of the guidelines state 
that judges should show sensitivity and communicate with the child and 
indeed with all parties, in a manner ‘adapted to their level of 
understanding’.308  The IAYFJM sees this principle applying to all justice 
officials and professionals involved in proceedings.  The guidelines stress the 
need for a child-centred focus, both throughout proceedings and in the 
processes and procedures that have led up to the proceedings.  These 
guidelines complement the Council for Europe guidelines in offering 
clarification to judges and magistrates about how to give effect to these 
children’s rights principles in practice. 
 
The guidance on judges meeting children309 was put forward by the Family 
Justice Council as representing good practice in the area of public child law.  
The Council in their guidelines for judges meeting children, outline why such 
meetings are important for children, the main purpose being to help children 
feel more involved in their proceedings and to be reassured that the judge 
has understood their wishes and feelings.310  The guidance makes clear that 
the purpose of a meeting between child and judge is not to gather evidence, 
as this is role of the child’s Guardian and the child’s Local Authority social 
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worker.  It emphasises that the responsibility for making the final decision in a 
case is the Judge’s and not the child. 
 
Prior to such meetings taking place, either the child’s legal representative or 
the child’s Guardian will explain to the judge from the child’s perspective, the 
purpose of the meeting.  The judge needs to be assured, usually by either 
the child’s Guardian or legal representative, that such a meeting is in the 
bests interests of the child.311  The other parties involved in the case have the 
right to make representations regarding such a meeting.312  The age of the 
child and their level of understanding of the circumstances are factors taken 
into account by the judge, but are not determinative of the judge’s decision as 
to whether or not he will meet the child.  If the judge decides not to meet with 
the child, there is an expectation that the judge will communicate his reasons 
in writing to the child.313 
 
The above guidance was followed by guidelines in relation to children giving 
evidence in Family Proceedings.314 
 
The two primary legal considerations that a judge needs to take into account 
are: 
 
i) the possible advantages that the child being called will bring to the 
determination of truth balanced against; 
ii) the possible damage to the child's welfare from giving evidence i.e. 
the risk of harm to the child from giving evidence 
 
The child's wishes and feelings are taken into account by the judge 
irrespective of whether or not they are willing to give evidence.  If the child is 
not willing to give evidence, they rarely would be obliged to do so.315  A wide 
range of factors are taken into account before a child is asked to give 
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evidence including, their needs and abilities, the quality and importance of 
the child’s evidence, the level and quality of support they have available.  The 
guidelines outline a number of procedural and practical issues that need to 
be taken into account by the court: 
 
a. giving the child the opportunity to refresh his memory; 
b. the appropriate identity of the questioner; 
c. matching the skills of the questioner to the communication needs of the 
   child; 
d. where the questioning should take place; 
e. the type and nature of the questions;  
f. advance judicial approval of any questions proposed to be put to the child;  
g. the need for ground rules to be discussed ahead of time by the judge, 
    lawyers (and intermediary, if applicable) about the examination; and 
h. how the interview should be recorded. 316 
  
These latter guidelines in relation to children giving evidence, were issued 
following the Supreme Court decision in Re W (Children) (Family 
Proceedings: Evidence),317  where it was held that there was no longer a 
presumption, or even a starting point, against children giving evidence in 
family proceedings.  In her judgment Lady Hale set aside the presumption 
against children giving oral evidence in public child law proceedings, citing 
Article 6 ECHR318 which requires that proceedings should be conducted in a 
fair manner and this includes the opportunity to challenge the evidence 
presented.  Lady Hale acknowledged that a balance needs to be struck in 
care proceedings between the impact on the child of giving evidence and 
ensuring a fair trial.  An assessment of the factors involved in each case 
needs to be made, the outcome of which should determine if it is in the 
interests of justice and in the best interests of the child.  Both sets of 
guidelines and case law indicate a growing awareness of the need to adopt a 
more child-centred participatory approach.  
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4.3 Child-centredness and effectiveness – a double-edged sword 
 
There is a perceived tension that exists between Article 12 (Children’s right to 
express their views) and Article 3 (primacy of the child’s best interests) of the  
UNCRC.319  In essence, it is a tension between the child’s welfare and their 
right to participate.  Fortin’s view is that children have a moral right to have 
their capacity to make decisions promoted through consultation, while not 
giving them: ‘…complete responsibility for choice’.320  Children have a variety 
of rights, with Fortin remarking that a child may need care and protection in 
one situation while their right to autonomy and self-determination needs to be 
respected in another.321  For Fortin, it is important that the substance of 
children’s rights are acknowledged and respected, rather than being 
embroidered through what she calls: ‘spin’, ‘’…while at the same time failing 
to deliver what children really require’.322  However, Fortin views the UNCRC 
as having two major weaknesses.  First, the rights themselves are 
aspirational and second, the lack of means for formal enforcement.323  In 
England and Wales, UNCRC is not part of domestic legislation, although 
Wales is further on than England in terms of integrating the spirit of the 
articles of UNCRC into their legislative framework in terms of the importance 
placed on enabling the child to express their views on all matters that may 
affect their lives (see Chapter 2).    
 
The balance that needs to be struck between protecting the child and 
respecting their right to express a view, is an area addressed by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.  The Committee in General Comment 
12 states: ‘Article 12 manifests that the child holds rights, which have an 
influence or her or his life, and not only rights derived from her or his 
vulnerability (protection) or dependency on adults (provision)’.324  The family 
court system as presently constituted, sees such tension being resolved in 
favour of the child’s welfare and by the indirect participation of children in 
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proceedings.  This approach is restrictive and limits children in their exercise 
of their rights, notwithstanding their vulnerable position.  David Archard 
makes an important and relevant comment in this regard: 
 
‘We can better protect children.  Children will become better 
participants if we give their views weight.  The world as a whole is 
better managed, and the overall outcomes are better ones, if we allow 
children to have some say in what happens to them'.325   
 
Ang et al focusing on the support needed to enable children to participate 
maintain that, adults should: ‘.... learn to speak and understand the ‘language 
of childhood’ and to develop empathic communication skills’.326 The issues 
outlined by Ang and her colleagues, were also highlighted in the Family 
Justice Review Panel Report: ‘Children’s interests are central to the 
operation of the family justice system. Decisions should take the wishes of 
children into account and children should know what is happening and  
why’.327  The review panel were of the view that an effective family justice 
system is one that, ‘... provides children, as well as adults, with an 
opportunity to have their voices heard in the decisions that will be made’.328   
 
Carol Smart329 makes the point that having a voice is considered in 
developed societies as being a basic human right and she questions whether 
participation is possible without having a voice and an environment where 
that voice can be expressed.  Given the findings of the Family Justice 
Review, which found that courts were scary and daunting places for 
children,330 child-centredness therefore requires the child’s voice to be heard 
at all stages of proceedings, including before the judge.  For Smart, this is 
merely a small first step and in relation to space, this space needs to be 
created within the legal process and the judicial system itself to enable 
children speak if they wish, with confidence.  Smart places a lot of emphasis 
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on children being given the time to be able to: ‘... try out their thoughts and to 
change their minds’.331   
 
The ‘capabilities approach’ developed by Dixon and Nussbaum,332 lays great 
emphasis on opportunities for children’s level of functioning and choice in 
whatever arena children find themselves and state that, ‘... all human beings 
possess equal and inalienable human dignity, whatever their attainments, 
talents, or potential …’.333  Dixon and Nussbaum’s perspective is 
encapsulated powerfully in the following abstract from one of the judicial 
interviews in this research.  It captures the true essence and spirit of child-
centred participation in practice:  
 
“ …. even really severely disabled children who maybe can’t 
communicate other than, just with a flicker of their eye or just touching 
you, but they have a view and even if that is simply wanting to be 
there, just to see what you look like, to make sure you have not got 
two heads, that is really important”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Nolan attributes the insufficient attention paid to the voice of the child in 
proceedings to the fact that children are ‘non-voters’ and therefore have very 
little opportunity to apply pressure on ‘... the policy-making process’ and by 
implication, the legal process and system.334  Space on the political agenda 
for children’s issues is more often than not achieved through what Nolan 
describes as, the ‘... emotive effect of child-related discourse’.  Sadly, on 
occasions, such child-related discourses come about at the cost of the value 
of life itself and results in a child’s death, as was the case of Victoria  
Climbié 335, which led to the Children Act 2004.  In relation to Article 12 of the 
UNCRC336, an article that should have been to the fore in relation to Victoria, 
since she was a child who was well able to express her views, Lundy has 
argued that this article will only be implemented successfully when the 
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factors of space, voice, audience and influence are given serious 
consideration.337      
 
For Lundy, children need to feel they are in a safe environment, which is 
welcoming of their presence and of their right to express views freely and 
have their views listened to and acted on appropriately.  Lundy stresses the 
importance of providing children with a range of ways to express their views 
and of being given adequate, age appropriate and accurate information with 
which to make choices including the choice not to express a view.  Children 
need to be assured that their views are reaching and influencing those who 
have the power to effect change in their lives.  Influence according to Lundy, 
needs to be seen as an integral part of the application of Article 12 UNCRC, 
which reflects the value of respecting the dignity of the child.338  Of relevance 
in the context of this chapter is the factor of children’s influence within the 
legal system, which Nolan would argue is one area that the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has engaged far less in compared to their pro-
active stance in relation to space, voice and audience.339   
 
The Irish Government endorsed and incorporated Lundy’s model of 
participation into their ‘National Strategy on Children and Young People’s 
Participation in Decision-making’.340  This strategy follows on from their 
‘Brighter Futures Programme’, which sees children connected, respected and 
contributing to decisions which are being made about their lives.341  
Participation within this strategy is defined as: ‘…the process  by which 
children and young people have active involvement and real influence in 
decision-making on matters affecting their lives, both directly and 
indirectly’.342  For such participation to be meaningful, genuine and 
sustainable, the strategy places importance of seeing participation as an 
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ongoing process and not a one-off event, which needs to be supported by 
time and resources.343   
  
4.4 What is considered Child-centredness in the public child law system 
 
Current guidance from the Department for Education,344 the purpose of which 
is to provide advice on best practice for professionals working with children 
and families, adopts the view that an effective working together system is 
synonymous with being child-centred.  The concept of effectiveness is 
equated with the concept of child-centredness.  The system is considered 
effective if it meets the needs of the child and protects the child from abuse 
and neglect.  Where appropriate and necessary, court proceedings are 
initiated, conducted and managed in a timely manner without undue delay, 
meaning that all proceedings should be concluded within a 26-week 
period.345  This deadline is part of the Public Law Outline (PLO) 2014, and 
has the legislative backing of the Children and Families Act 2014 (see 
Chapter 2).   
 
Equating the effectiveness of the current working together system with being 
child-centred is an assumption that is very much open to challenge, given the 
tenuous nature of children’s involvement in the system, an issue that was 
highlighted at length by Munro throughout her review of the child protection 
system.346   Munro was commissioned in 2009 to carry out an independent 
review of the child protection system with a view to improve child protection 
practice.  The then Secretary of State felt there was a need to reform front-
line social work practice in the area of child protection, to enable social 
workers to have more freedom by having less bureaucracy and regulation, to 
make well-informed judgements, based on up-to-date evidence in the best 
interests of children.347  Munro’s review followed Lord Laming’s progress 
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report on the protection of children in England,348 since the death of Victoria 
Climbié.349 
 
It is from the child protection system that all proceedings emerge and within 
which children find themselves subject to a range of professional actions, 
decisions, perspectives and opinions in relation to their case.  Masson350 in 
her critique of the Public Law Outline notes that the reform of the public child 
law system was based on the principle of ‘enhanced judicial management’, 
not on what constitutes child-centred proceedings.  While the reforms were 
meant to have a much greater focus on the child by reducing the time taken 
to complete court proceedings, three significant developments took place 
around the same time.  First, the introduction of fixed legal aid fees for 
lawyers representing children and parents,351 which has had the effect of 
reducing the number of experienced lawyers, as their firms found this area of 
work had become financially unsustainable.  Such a development has the 
real potential to undermine the quality of representation and raises concerns 
around the whole area of justice for children and parents.352  In relation to 
children’s rights, Wall LJ in the case of Mabon v Mabon and Others, stated in 
relation to the adversarial nature of public child law proceedings: 
 
‘Without the benefit of representation by those experienced in 
encouraging the involvement of children and young people, the rights 
afforded to children under Article 12 are in danger of slipping away’.353 
 
Secondly, there was an increase in court fees for care applications.  It 
increased ten-fold to £5,000 at a time when local authorities’ budgets were 
being cut significantly due to the prevailing global economic crisis.  The new 
fee was payable in stages, rewarding early completion of proceedings.   
 
Thirdly, the Children and Families Court Advisory and Support Service 
(Cafcass) produced a new work model for children’s Guardians and family 
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court advisors to enable them to provide the courts with advice early in care 
proceedings.  This model also introduced the concept of proportionate 
working, which required Guardians to only do what was necessary to provide 
the courts with advice and information about the best interests of the child.354   
 
Masson maintains that the 26-week rule and the above three parallel 
developments are much more to do with control and management of 
timetables and court processes than with adopting a child-centred focus to 
proceedings, with the purpose of achieving the best welfare outcomes for 
children.355 In effect, such developments limit significantly the time 
professionals can spend getting to know and understand the child’s 
perspective of their circumstances.  One of the consequences of a lack of 
time spent with the child is that the quality of information, in terms of detail 
and depth and the analysis of this information, is limited in terms of its 
usefulness to the court, in enabling the judge to make the right and best 
decision for the child.  This area has been highlighted by Brandon et al356 in 
relation to serious case reviews who found a number of concerning issues 
relating to the system including, a lack of critical thinking in relation to the 
analysis of evidence, lack of professional experience and lack of engagement 
with the child and their family.  This situation continues to prevail, as Ofsted 
in their annual inspection report in 2016 found that children continue to have 
too many changes of social worker, children not being seen alone during 
home visits, lack of analysis in assessments and social workers having high 
caseloads, which impact significantly on the amount of time they can spend 
with children and their families.357  For judges in this research, these factors 
are real barriers to child-centred decision-making.  These issues will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, particularly the lack of time for 
professionals to get to know the children they are working with and 
representing in proceedings. 
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4.5 Key components underpinning a child-centred approach 
 
4.5.1 The principle of paramountcy and welfare of the child 
 
In public child law the principle of paramountcy, as contained in s.1(1) of the 
Children Act 1989, is accepted by judges and lawyers and by child care 
professionals in the field including, social workers and children’s Guardians, 
as the over-arching principle that should guide and inform all decisions made 
by the court in relation to the welfare of a child.  The Act states:  
When a court determines any question with respect to: 
(a) the upbringing of a child; or 
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any 
     income arising from it, 
the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration   
 
The purpose of the paramountcy principle is to place the child at the centre of 
proceedings and is the basis of child-centredness within our current public 
child law system.  In addition to the principle of paramountcy, there is the 
‘welfare checklist’,358 which lists a number of areas that need to be taken into 
account when considering the welfare and best interests of children 
including, obtaining the child’s own wishes and feelings.   
 
The principle of paramountcy is supported by Rule 8 of the Family Procedure 
Rules (FPR) 2010, which has inserted in rule 4.14A of the FPR 1991 a 
definition of the timetable for the child in proceedings for Care and 
Supervision Orders: 
 
 4.14A – (1) The court shall set the timetable of the proceedings in 
accordance with the timetable for the child 
 
(2) The timetable for the child means the timetable set by the court in 
accordance with its duties under sections 1 and 32 of the CA 1989 and shall 
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(a) Take into account dates of the significant steps in the life of the 
     child who is the subject of the proceedings and 
 
(b) Be appropriate for that child 
 
This principle however does not extend to affording the same status to the 
voice of the child.  The child’s wishes and feelings is but one element 
contained in the welfare checklist and does not take priority over the other 
elements.359   
 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in General Comments 12360 
and 14,361 talk about the interrelationship between the child’s best interests 
(Article 3) and the right to express a view (Article 12).  The Committee 
emphasises that any assessment of a child’s best interests must include 
respect for the child’s right to express their views freely and for these views 
to be taken seriously in all decisions that impact on a child’s life.  The 
requirements of Article 3 UNCRC are not satisfied if the child’s right under 
Article 12 UNCRC is not respected and given due consideration.  The 
Committee sees the roles of both Articles as having complementary roles; 
achieving the child’s best interests and providing a way to facilitate the child’s 
active inclusion in the process.362  The UN Committee in relation to babies 
and very young children state: 
 
‘Babies and very young children have the same rights as all children to 
have their best interests assessed, even if they cannot express their 
views or represent themselves in the same way as older children. 
States must ensure appropriate arrangements, including 
representation, when appropriate, for the assessment of their best 
interests; the same applies for children who are not able or willing to 
express a view’.363  
      
The above paragraph from General Comment No 14 makes clear the 
inclusive nature and requirements of Articles 3 and 12 UNCRC in relation to 
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all children including children who are not in a position to exercise their rights 
and children who exercise their right to not express their views.  In the 
context of a child’s welfare and vulnerability, areas pertinent to this research, 
the UN Committee makes an important point about a child’s rights in the 
context of these areas and the requirements of children’s rights in relation to 
any balance that needs to be struck between a child’s vulnerability and their 
right to express their views: 
 
‘The fact that the child is very young or in a vulnerable situation (e.g. 
has a disability, belongs to a minority group, is a migrant, etc.) does 
not deprive him or her of the right to express his or her views, nor 
reduces the weight given to the child’s views in determining his or her 
best interests’.364 
 
The UN Committee acknowledges that in situations of vulnerability, the 
child’s needs require assessment and support, particularly emotional support, 
to ensure both their full participation in the assessment of their needs and in 
the decision-making regarding the identification of what is in their best 
interests.365  The UN Committee makes clear that if a child has not been 
given the opportunity to express their views and have those views taken 
seriously in relation to their best interests, this represents a lack of respect for 
the child’s contribution to, ‘…influence the determination of their best 
interests’.366   
 
Thorpe LJ in Mabon v Mabon and Others367 maintained that a child’s right to 
express their views and participate directly in proceedings should take 
precedence over a paternalistic assessment of the child’s welfare.  However, 
the principle of paramountcy of a child’s best interests in itself, within the 
context of care proceedings had for one district judge, real limitations in 
terms of outcomes for children:  
 
“Paramountcy of best interests – Let us put it another way; the 
outcome for a child is almost always, as far as the court is concerned, 
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the least worst outcome.  You don’t get care proceedings with a best 
outcome”. (District Court Judge) 
 
In this research one county court judge provides a good summary of the core 
realities underpinning the above issues, with a comparison being made were 
an adult to be treated in the same way in a different life situation: 
 
“There is a greater onus when we are talking about a legal system, 
which is making decisions about a child’s life, because we really can’t 
make decisions about a child’s life and leave them powerless in the 
process.  Decisions about a child’s life include such matters as, 
whether a child or when a child sees the absent parent, if a child 
should live with a particular parent or with their family at all.  These 
have massive repercussions.  If we took that forward and said that 
somebody may lose their job, be summarily dismissed and the tribunal 
system that considers them thereafter, in so far as there is any tribunal 
system at all, won’t hear from that person, except through the medium 
of another person, and will make a decision about them, and they 
won’t even be present at the proceedings, we would regard that as 
sort of a nightmare. When we think about what in fact we decide about 
children, it is all being done in their absence and often contrary to their 
wishes and feelings.  I don’t think we have signed up to the idea that 
there is anything wrong with that. …  I think we have a faith that we 
will get to the right answer, but sometimes the right answer would be 
better informed and might be a better answer if there was more of an 
input from the child in question”. (County Court Judge) 
 
While the principle of paramountcy, the welfare checklist and Rule 8 all have 
a clear focus on the child and their individual needs, the introduction of the 
26-week rule368 under the Children and Families Act 2014, where all public 
child law proceedings are required to be completed within this timescale, 
appears to be inconsistent with the notion of proceedings being child-centred 
and conducted at the child’s pace.  The introduction of this rule seems to 
ignore the uniqueness of each child’s circumstances, despite the Family 
Justice Review Panel369 having already highlighted significant deficiencies in 
the system in relation to the treatment and experiences of children during 
periods of their lives when they are feeling very vulnerable and powerless.  
Discussion on the Family Justice Review is part of the following section of 
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this chapter, which examines the reality of child-centred transparency and 
accountability, drawing on relevant research, formal reviews and empirical 
data.  
 
4.5.2 Child-centred transparency and accountability 
 
Munro’s second report370 (Interim Report), focused on the child’s journey 
through the child protection system, from the point of referral to exiting the 
system and beyond.  Munro places a strong emphasis on the need for the 
child protection system to be child-centred, meaning a recognition and an 
acknowledgement of children as people with rights371 including their right to 
be part of the decision-making process,372 particularly when major decisions 
are being made about their lives.373 
 
The Family Justice Review was commissioned by the Government to make 
the family justice system more coherent, effective and accessible to children 
and families.  Part of its brief was also to look at how the system could be 
made more cost effective while at the same time improve case management 
to avoid undue delays.  At the time care proceedings were taking on average 
56 to 61 weeks to complete.374  This was considered to be far too long with 
the potential to damage further children’s welfare and development.375  The 
Ministry of Justice was aware that the system was confusing for children and 
parents, who were unsure about what was happening in relation to their case 
and therefore a much greater level of transparency was needed within the 
system.376  Part of the Family Justice Review’s brief was to explore options 
for a more inquisitorial system rather than it being predominantly adversarial.  
Such a re-balancing of approach would facilitate a system that would be 
more open to listening to all parties, including the child, rather than pitting 
views against each other.  The recommendations of the Review were 
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designed to work in tandem with both Munro’s recommendations from her 
review of the child protection system377 and the work of the Social Work 
Reform Board.378  Munro’s findings will feature significantly in this thesis, as 
care proceedings are initiated by the Local Authority’s child protection 
system. 
 
The Social Work Reform Board was set up to enable social work practice to 
deliver better support and better outcomes for children including, much 
earlier identification of the needs of children and their families.379  However, 
the Local Authority’s children’s services were under severe pressure at the 
time, having to contend with increased caseloads, while at the same time 
experiencing significant cuts to their budgets.  In addition, the social work 
profession faced negative media attention, which led to the creation of a 
‘blame culture’, resulting in experienced practitioners leaving the 
profession.380  In 2016 the Government put forward a set of proposals to 
address these issues, which included, reduced caseloads, better working 
conditions and strategies for the retention of experienced social work 
practitioners.381 
 
4.5.3 Inclusivity and independent representation 
 
Guardians are appointed by the court to represent the views of the child.382  
Part of the role of the children’s Guardian is to explain to the child in age 
appropriate language what is happening throughout the proceedings.  The 
child also has the right to request to be represented independently of the 
Guardian, appointing and instructing their own legal representative.383  This 
does depend however on an informal assessment by the Guardian and the 
child’s legal representative of the child’s level of understanding of the issues 
involved and their age.  The appointment of a Guardian under s. 41 of the 
                                            
377 Munro (n 293). 
378 House of Commons Education Committee, Social Work Reform: Third Report of Session 2016–2017 (House of 
     Commons 2016). 
379 ibid 38. 
380 ibid 25. 
381 ibid 24. 
382 s 41 Children Act 1989. 
383 Family Proceedings Rules 1991 r 9.2A (1) re P-S (Children) EWCA Civ 223, [2013] 1 WLR 3831. 
86 
 
Children Act 1989 was introduced to ensure children’s views are heard, 
respected and taken seriously.   
 
For children to feel that their views are really heard, respected and taken 
seriously, they need to understand the system into which their views are 
channelled and how it works for them.  This requires the system to be 
transparent.  Achieving such transparency for children and their families is 
not without its challenges.   Lord Justice McFarlane in his Bridget Lindley 
Memorial Lecture 2017384 considered the issue of transparency in the Family 
Justice System.  He raises a number of issues in relation to this research, 
particularly the lack of knowledge about rights and as a consequence, 
children and their family not knowing how to access and become involved in 
the system: 
 
‘There is little point in having a child protection / family justice system 
which affords proper respect to the human rights of children and family 
members if those individuals whose rights are to be respected do not 
know of them or understand how they may achieve access to the 
justice system in a way that permits them to benefit from that level of 
respect. Respect for human rights is only likely to be as effective as 
the ability of the individual involved to engage with the process and 
gain access to that respect’.385 
 
McFarlane LJ focuses the spotlight on the non-inclusive and opaque nature 
of proceedings, particularly in relation to children and brings into question the 
fairness of the process itself: 
  
‘Ignorance of the system, both in general terms and with respect to its 
detailed provisions must massively erode the ability of any individual 
to take part in the various pre-proceedings and court processes in a 
way which maximises the potential for their rights to a fair process and 
family life to be respected’.386 
      
The Family Justice Review Panel387 placed the child at the centre of the 
operation of the family justice system, with children being supported in an 
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age appropriate manner to express their views, including been given age 
appropriate information that will explain what is happening during the course 
of proceedings.  To achieve this the review outlined in some detail the tasks 
of a child’s Guardian including entering the world of the child to understand 
what the child is going through from the child’s perspective.  This approach is 
very much in line with Froebel’s idea of child-centredness, that of seeing and 
understanding the child within their world from the child’s perspective.388  It 
also emphasised the importance of Guardians building relationships with 
children to fulfil their role of representing accurately the child’s views. 
 
Children who contributed to the Munro Review found the child protection 
process confusing and did not feel it was a transparent system.389  This does 
not facilitate children and their families feeling comfortable, safe and 
confident in expressing their views and where appropriate, giving evidence.   
 
The issue of transparency is not confined to pre-proceedings and the 
proceedings themselves, it extends to post-proceedings in relation to the 
publication of judgments.  The President of the Family Division has issued 
guidance390 including, guidance around the need for a thorough 
anonymisation of judgments to protect the identity and privacy of children and 
their families.  However, there is a body of opinion that views such 
anonymisation as dehumanising children.391 (see discussion of Jackson J’s 
approach in the next section of this chapter). 
  
While one of the main purposes of this guidance is to educate and inform the 
general public about the Family Justice System and how judgments are 
reasoned, it is an area that can potentially cause difficulties for children and 
their families, particularly in relation to the issue of privacy.  Brophy et al 
carried out research392 among a group of young people who had concerns 
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about the risk of ‘jigsaw’ identification’393 and the intrusive nature of the detail 
included in published judgments placed on the BAILII database.394  There is 
also the issue of children and families feeling reticent about giving 
information and evidence to professionals and the court395 knowing that there 
was a possibility of their case being published, albeit in anonymised form.  
The difficult balance between the court’s need to have full and frank evidence 
to ensure a fair trial396 and the need to respect the child’s privacy and family 
life,397 is one that potentially could lead to a level of disengagement with the 
system. 
 
An evaluation involving children and young people, of responses to the 
guidance on the publication of family court judgments and its effects found 
that that there was no guidance or training provided for children’s Guardians 
to advise and inform children about the possibility that their judgment may be 
published,398 which indicates that ‘transparency’ is normally analysed from an 
adult perspective.  In their response to the evaluation, Cafcass Young 
People’s Board expressed their strong opposition to the routine publication of 
judgments.399 
 
Transparency for children encompasses a public child law system that 
children can understand, access and feel welcomed by.  They need to know 
clearly and in age appropriate language, what is going in the system 
throughout proceedings, a system that is acting on their behalf, to reach a 
decision that will be in their best interests.  However, transparency of the 
system does not extend automatically to exposing children’s lives and those 
of their families to the public at large, even if judgments are thoroughly 
anonymised to prevent ‘jigsaw’ identification.400  Equally important with a 
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thorough anonymisation of the judgment is the child’s consent to publication, 
otherwise their right to privacy and family life is being dis-respected under 
Article 8 ECHR.  There is a legitimate perspective401 that views 
anonymisation as belittling the dignity of the child by replacing their name 
with a letter from the alphabet.  Here lies a potential conflict between 
openness and transparency and upholding children and their families’ rights 
under Article 8 ECHR.  The resolution of this conflict will require in each case 
bespoke approaches, which needs to include the child’s voice being valued, 
respected and given real weight in relation to the level and extent of 
transparency that the child would feel comfortable with.    
    
4.5.4 Child’s narrative of their world 
 
Those who are entrusted with protecting children and those who are 
appointed by the court to ensure that their voice is heard throughout 
proceedings, do not have adequate time to listen to children and assess and 
understand their needs.  Such a situation is not consistent with the 
perspective of the Family Justice Review, placing children at the centre of the 
system nor is it consistent with the role of the Guardian outlined by the 
Review earlier in this section.   
 
Rawls’ theory of justice talks about the duty of ‘mutual respect’402 defining it 
as, ‘…. to show a person the respect which is due to him as a moral being, 
that is, as a being with a sense of justice and a conception of the good’.403  
For Rawls, part of mutual respect is a willingness to, ‘…. see the situation of 
others from their point of view’404 and therefore it is important for judges to 
listen to children’s views, rather than hear an interpretation of their view or at 
best a few sentences in a report or statement about what their stated wishes 
and feelings are.  By listening to children, we get an understanding of how 
they experience and make sense of their lives.405  Koh Peters406 lays great 
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emphasis on adults allowing themselves to be taken into the world of the 
child and to find out about and understand that world from the child’s 
perspective through listening to the child’s story, which requires giving the 
child enough time and space to tell their story.  She feels it is important for 
the child, in terms of affording enough time and space to communicate their 
story and for professionals to meet the child where they are in their life and 
enabling them to make the difficult transition between their world and the 
world of court proceedings.  For Eekelaar,407 equality of rights between adults 
and children should be the focus of the whole child welfare system and that 
children should have the right ‘to begin writing the script of the way their life is 
to enfold’.  Macdonald408 goes further than Eekelaar, holding the view that 
the voice of the child should be given priority over adults and that their voice 
should be central throughout the entire period of State intervention in the 
child’s life, reflecting the reality of the child’s journey through the child 
protection and family justice systems. 
 
For judges, listening to a child is generally considered to be an integral part 
of being child-centred in terms of our attitudes and actions toward children.  
The ability to listen is considered one of the core judicial values.409  For one 
county court judge in this research, the need to listen rather than create 
barriers to children expressing their views directly to the judge was important:   
 
“I don’t know, but I can be fairly sure that if a child is telling their legal 
representative, if they have got one, “I really want to see the Judge”, 
that it is important to that child.  They are not feeling so overwhelmed 
that they cannot face the idea, and so I should not be barring my door 
because it might make me feel less comfortable about the decision I 
am going to make”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Raitt410 asserts that this would facilitate the construction of a child-centred 
narrative around the individual child’s life where the starting point is always 
the child’s perspective of their situation.  Munro sees children as the ‘key 
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source of information’ about what is going on in their lives and about how 
statutory intervention is affecting their family.  It also increases the accuracy 
of the professional’s assessment of the child’s situation.411   
   
The Committee on the Rights of the Child in General Comment Number 
12,412 state clearly that there should not be the assumption that a child is not 
capable of expressing a view.  They further state that it is not up to the child 
to prove that they are capable of understanding their proceedings.  However, 
it is clear that there are significant barriers within the current public child law 
system limiting opportunities for children’s voices to be heard, with Ackers 
and Stalford413 asserting that, ‘… the age and capacity test entrenched in 
legislation is rarely interpreted as a presumption in favour of participation …‘ 
 
Macdonald414 acknowledges that the child’s voice is often ignored and silent.  
Munro’s review found that direct contact with children was given a low priority 
within the child protection system for the same reasons that Pemberton found 
i.e. high caseloads and lack of resources.415  Munro noted that one of the 
main criticisms in reports of inquiries and serious case reviews into child 
deaths is that people did not speak to children enough.  This continues to be 
a significant issue within the system according to the most recent research 
on serious case reviews,416 which looked at 292 cases between the years of 
2011 and 2014 and highlighted the importance of providing children with 
‘safe and trusting environments’ so that children are enabled to speak freely 
about their situation and be listened to. 
 
Research however by Daly et al417 found that children in the context of 
participating in justice systems prefer to be supported by family and friends 
rather than those in authority, as they did not feel confident that they would 
be believed and that confidentiality would not be respected.  Nevertheless, 
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they very much wished to participate in justice systems that have an impact 
on their lives.  This research, which was a desktop study, included the 
findings of a large-scale consultation by the Council of Europe with 3,700 
children from over 25 European countries about their views and experiences 
of justice systems.418  The participants completed a questionnaire and data 
was also obtained through focus groups.  The Council of Europe report 
highlights, ‘... the huge challenge for those who aim to provide services to 
children at risk, in particular concerning the question of how to develop and 
maintain positive relationships of trust with them’.419  Just over a third (36%) 
of the participating children felt that their views were taken seriously, which 
Kilkelly maintains, ‘ ... can lead to children being not only ill-positioned to 
participate, but actually nervous concerning what the hearing is about’.420  
Daly et al in relation to children’s participation concludes: 
 
‘Clearly, better efforts need to be made so that proceedings are 
conducted in a way that children can attend, understand what is going 
on, and feel that their participation is both possible and welcome’.421 
 
It is not possible to be child-centred in making decisions about children’s lives 
and welfare without meaningful participation including, that of having direct 
input into in any forum, system or process, official or unofficial.  The following 
quote from one of the participating judges in this research reflects the reality 
of a child’s position in the current public child law system: 
 
“I accept that you therefore might get a situation, and we probably do 
in most cases, where all these discussions taking place in court about 
the child, who is not there at all and has no way of putting a direct 
input and yet, that is whom the case is about.  The child is subject and 
often the object and how do you turn the object of the proceedings into 
somebody who can actively and properly participate?” (County Court 
Judge) 
 
In relation to legal systems, Habermas422 makes an important and relevant 
observation that: 
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‘ ... the legal system is a recursively closed circuit of communication 
that self-referentially delimits itself from its environment, with which it 
has contact only through observations’423 and he goes on to suggest 
that, ‘ … legal communication is robbed of its socially integrative  
meaning’.424 
 
Here, Habermas points to the fact that, very often, legal proceedings are 
detached from the realities of the participants, and this is particularly true of 
children.  In public child law proceedings, judges are far removed from the 
realities of the lives of the children with whom they are entrusted to make 
decisions on what is in their best interests.  Being so far removed is much 
valued by the judicial system, being perceived as facilitating greater 
objectivity and fairness, but it is a distance which ensures that the child’s own 
voice rarely impinges on the conduct of the proceedings or on the outcome of 
such proceedings.  Connolly and Masson425 make a relevant observation 
here, ‘…. Court practice illustrates how adversarial practice allows 
professionals with little or no direct relationship with the child and family to 
shape the process and determine the outcome”426 and yet for Sutherland, 
‘There is a sense in which listening to the child’s views is simply the right 
thing to do, since it represents recognition of, and respect for, the child’s 
separate identity’.427  In their discussion of the importance of and reason for 
judges adopting a children’s rights approach in their decision-making, 
Stalford and Hollingsworth state: ‘It is thus children’s invisibility and 
vulnerability within the law and their lack of political voice that gives even 
greater legitimacy to the explicit judicial adoption of a children’s rights 
perspective’.428  In proceedings where children’s best interests are being 
decided, Daly’s view is that the child’s autonomy should be given priority, 
which she sees as resulting in the following benefits: ‘Children will genuinely 
become the most important individuals in proceedings concerning them. True 
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influence on outcomes will be enjoyed’.429  This perspective accords with the 
central position of children in the system, as envisaged by the Family Justice 
Review.430 
  
4.5.5 Communicating with children 
 
In a relatively recent case431 however, Jackson J wrote his judgments in a 
manner that was age appropriate, so that both children and parents could 
understand the reasoning and thinking behind his decisions.  The case  
involved four children, aged 10 months to 12 years, all of whom were in 
foster care.  There was a risk that the children’s father, because of his 
extreme views, would take his children to a war-torn country.  Of relevance to 
this research, is the manner in which the judge went about outlining the main 
issues of the case, in language that would enable both the children’s parents 
and the two older children (aged 10 and 12) to understand the final decision.  
This child-centred aspect of the case is particularly evident in the clear, 
accessible and age-appropriate language used by the judge to explain what 
‘significant harm’ is in the context of this case,432 a concept that can 
challenge even experienced professionals.  The following abstract from the 
judgment serves as an example of this: 
 
‘After thinking carefully about this and listening to everyone, I do not 
agree with Mr A at all.  People are not out to get him.  His problems 
are his own fault.  I do not know why he was trying to buy guns and 
whether he is dangerous to everyone.  The jury will decide about that.  
What I am clear about is that he is dangerous to the children and their 
mother because of the way he behaves and because the mother is not 
able to stop him.  There is a good side to Mr A – everyone has a good 
side – and this makes it hard for H and A and their mother to see what 
he is really like’.433     
 
In a later judgment, albeit in a private law case, but has equal relevance to 
public law, Jackson J took his child-centred approach to another level, writing 
his judgment in the form of a three-page letter to the young person Sam, who 
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was 14 years old.434  This case centred around a dispute between Sam’s 
parents regarding residence and contact.  Sam’s own wish was to go and live 
with his father in a Scandinavian country.  His mother and step-father did not 
think this would be in his best interests. 
 
Jackson J allowed Sam to give evidence, which lasted half an hour at the 
start of the proceedings.  The prepared questions from both his parents were 
put to Sam by the judge.435  The striking feature about this judgment is the 
age appropriate and warmth of language used by the judge, while not 
glossing over the real issues involved.  Jackson J went out of his way not to 
belittle Sam’s parents, while at the same time keeping the issues to the fore.  
He wrote of their positive qualities in language that was down to earth and 
affirming.436  An example of this is when he mentioned in his letter how he 
shared with Sam’s father their love of the film, ‘My Cousin Vinny’, albeit for 
different reasons.  Such a sensitive approach respects the dignity of both 
Sam and his family.  This judgment heralds a real beginning in making 
proceedings accessible to and welcoming of children’s participation 
throughout.  This judgment also was attentive to Sam’s feelings on 
completion of the case, as the outcome was not what Sam had wished for, 
with the judge giving Sam the option of replying to his letter. 
 
4.5.6 Perspectives on the Child’s voice in proceedings 
 
Tobin puts forward a range of approaches adopted by Judges in relation to 
children’s rights when making decisions about children’s lives; invisible, 
incidental, selective, rhetorical and superficial, which fall short of what he 
terms a ‘substantive rights approach’.437  Such an approach is where children 
are acknowledged and respected as individuals with rights in their own right 
rather than what Freeman438 describes as relying on ‘noblesse oblige’ hoping 
that those with responsibility and power will be cooperative and attentive to 
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their views.  For Tobin, seeing proceedings through the eyes of a child is 
essential.  Lady Hale’s remark in a case relating to an allegation against the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, that they did not provide adequate protection for 
schoolgirls caught up in a street riot on their way to school, is relevant 
here.439  Such confrontations according to Lady Hale are often viewed and 
analysed from an adult’s perspective and she reminds us that seeing a 
confrontation through adults’ eyes is quite different to seeing it through the 
eyes of a child.  Court proceedings, particularly public child law proceedings, 
are essentially a series of confrontations, making courts, ‘scary and daunting 
places for children’.440  In the case of Re D (A Child)(Abduction: Foreign 
Custody Rights), Lady Hale outlines cogent reasons for listening to children: 
 
‘There is now a growing understanding of the importance of listening 
to the children involved in children's cases. It is the child, more than 
anyone else, who will have to live with what the court decides. Those 
who do listen to children understand that they often have a point of 
view which is quite distinct from that of the person looking after them. 
They are quite capable of being moral actors in their own right. Just as 
the adults may have to do what the court decides whether they like it 
or not, so may the child. But that is no more a reason for failing to hear 
what the child has to say than it is for refusing to hear the parents' 
views’.441  
 
The following abstracts from judges in this research highlight contrasting 
perspectives on children expressing their views directly to the judge.  One 
county court judge in relation to listening to children’s views stated: 
 
“They must not think that coming to see me they are going to 
persuade me one way or another because what they want to say will 
come through the Guardian and the solicitor.  I am not there to do 
what they want, although their wishes and feelings of course are very 
important to me and one of the factors in the Welfare Checklist that I 
must take account of”. (County Court Judge) 
 
One district court judge however saw benefits for both child and judge, “It is 
empowering for the child.  It is a useful exercise for the Judge because no 
longer is this child or these children names on documents.  You have got a 
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picture of the child”.  These responses represent range of judicial views on 
enabling child-centred participation.  The culture of proceedings is an area 
that judges reflected on in this research.  Judges made reference to the 
historical roots of proceedings including their adult-centric nature and 
professional attitudes.  The following selection of extracts from judicial 
interviews in this research shines a light on this culture:  
 
“The culture is deep seated in that you distance the children from the 
proceedings.  The rules are quite labyrinthine about the involvement of 
children within the proceedings, even where separately represented, 
whether they should attend the hearings and all the rest of it, raise all 
sorts of separate questions of their own.  It is because of that 
historical, cultural thing, which has fed into a regime and rules which, it 
is not a presumption but it has stuck.  Now when you look at the 
Family Justice Council’s papers on it, all hedged around with a 
considerable degree of cautionary thinking. (County Court Judge)  
 
In terms of trying to involve them, I think the whole process is very 
adult-centric.  The way professionals work, it is this old thing that 
Dame Butler-Sloss said about children, the object of concern rather 
than the subject of the proceedings and whereas if they really were 
the subject you would be saying ‘right how are we going to involve the 
child in this?’  We don’t, it is all very much adults in rooms talking and 
deciding about the child.  There is this historical and perhaps natural 
tendency not to think about involving the children and just say this is 
going on for you, you don’t need to come.  It is a lazier way of working 
and it is adults just dealing with adults.  Part of the structure is to 
intimidate people, isn’t it?  That is a natural barrier as well”. (County 
Court Judge) 
 
“I think it might be a perception that the Judge is unapproachable and 
a long-standing practise that has perhaps developed as a result of a 
message from the judiciary over the years”.   
(District Judge) 
 
“ …. I suspect that a lot of the professionals in child care cases have 
perhaps absorbed a message that; that the courts are very busy; the 
Judge is very busy; the child might be over-powered by the thought of 
going to see the Judge; the child themselves might get the message 
that you don’t ask to see the Judge; “You tell me all about it and I will 
tell the judge for you” and many children prefer that I suspect”. (District 
Judge) 
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The public child law system is a system that quite rightly is protective in 
nature but this can and does exclude children from the process.  One county 
court judge reflected: 
 
“I think the difficulty is; that as the process is intended to be largely 
protective, and one cannot expect the subject of the proceedings to 
understand the broad and detailed nature of the concerns about their 
parents and what implications those concerns may have for their well-
being”. (County Court Judge) 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The principle of paramountcy is accepted as the core child-centred principle 
in public child law.442  An essential element in the application of this principle 
is establishing a meaningful and trusting relationship with the child to gain 
insight into and an understanding of the child’s world from the child’s 
perspective.443  However, the evidence from formal reviews444 and 
research445 indicate that the child’s own view of their world and their lived 
experience do not occupy a central position within the system.  These 
challenges and barriers within the current system will be explored critically 
throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis including, through the 
perspectives of judges in this research in relation to child-centredness and in 
the interpretation and application of a child-centred approach in decision-
making. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Judges’ Understanding of Child-Centredness 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the focus is on how judges perceive the concept of child-
centredness in the context of their decision-making within public law 
proceedings and how child-centredness fits within established judicial 
practice and thinking.  The findings of this research study 
gives an insight into judicial reasoning around such perspectives.   
 
While the need for a child-centred approach within public law proceedings is 
not in dispute among the participating judges in this study, their perspectives 
are much nuanced and multi-faceted in nature, particularly in relation to 
making decisions, which affect significantly the lives of children and their 
families.  It is important therefore, to first explore the judicial values which 
inform such perspectives, as such values are often implicit in a judge’s 
decision.  The interrelationships between judicial values and child-
centredness can serve to facilitate or limit significantly the extent to which 
child-centred decision-making can take place.  Secondly, public law 
proceedings are part of the child protection system and the values of this 
system are inextricably linked to the public law system.  This chapter will 
explore critically how these systems coalesce in terms of their respective 
approaches to child-centred practice.  The chapter will conclude by bringing 
together the main divergent strands of judicial child-centredness emerging 
from this research alongside the realities of the child protection system.  
Such realities form the core of Chapter 6, which looks at judicial interpretation 
and application of child-centred approach in decision-making.  
 
5.2 Judicial Values and Child-Centredness 
 
Within the literature,446 judicial values are often listed as broad concepts and 
notions and are very much seen as umbrella terms under which there exists 
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a range of contextual and situational values.  In public child law proceedings, 
such values are often expressed in terms of what is in a child’s best interests 
or the paramountcy of the child’s welfare447 (see Chapter 4).  Identifying and 
interpreting these values is challenging, as they are often a combination of 
professional and personal values, where the dividing lines between the two 
have long since disappeared and are underpinned by legal principles 
enshrined in legislation such as the ‘no delay’ principle448 and the 
paramountcy principle, to name just two.449  Both principles govern and 
inform proceedings and decisions. 
 
In this research, judges were very much aware of and acknowledged their 
personal and professional values and the difficulties in distinguishing 
between the two.  One High Court Judge said, 
“You cannot without a degree of peer review and independent critique, 
discern whether you are acting only on professional values rather than 
personal values, but you should at least make your decisions 
transparent, so that, not only the parties, but the public can deduce 
that.  Whether it is research we are relying on, whether it is a 
combination of principles, I think you should set them out clearly in 
judgement for everybody to be aware of them”. 
 
 
While a County Court Judge felt, her personal values were her ‘non-objective’ 
input into the case: 
 
“Professional value; that would be the judge’s value, which is one of 
balance and fairness.  Personal values; obviously, I cannot escape the 
fact that I have got personal values, they are my non-objective input 
into the case, what I know about families and how they operate from 
my experience of my own family …”. 
 
In her research Cahill-O’Callaghan in relation to personal values of judges, 
highlights the significance of judges’ personal values and the implications for 
judicial decision-making and found there was an interplay between a number 
of factors, including values, which influence the decision-making processes 
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of Judges: ‘Personal values influence and are influenced by political ideology.  
Personal values are associated with attitudes, moral judgements, and 
activism, each of which have been implicated in judicial decision making’.450 
Singh lists some of the main values of the judicial role.  He sees the law as a 
system of values stating, ‘Without attempting an exhaustive list I think that 
most observers of our legal system would acknowledge that its values 
include the concepts of fairness, equality, democracy and the rule of law.451  
The European Network’s list is more extensive, ‘Independence, integrity, 
impartiality, reserve and discretion, diligence, respect and the ability to listen, 
equality of treatment, competence and transparency are the common values 
identified as essential to the judicial role’.452  
 
These judicial values stem from the Judicial Oath, which all judges and 
magistrates take on appointment.  This Oath is enshrined in different Acts of 
Parliament, depending on the level of court.  For High Court Judges, it is 
section 10(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, Circuit Judges and Recorders, 
section 22 of the Courts Act 1971, District Judges, section 76(1)(a) of the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and for Magistrates it is Promissory 
Oaths Act 1868.  The Oath itself reads as follows: 
 
‘I... do swear by Almighty God that I will well and truly serve  our 
Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth the Second in the office of..., and I 
will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this 
realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God’.  
 
Doing right to all manner of people without fear or favour, affection or ill will is 
very much linked to and based on the values of fairness, justice and equality.  
The values of fairness and justice in respect of children and parents, who 
often are faced with pressures from powerful professionals and agencies 
involved in court proceedings, who may have quite different agendas in 
relation to what they consider the best interests of the child, is an area that 
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concerns Eekelaar and Maclean, ‘There must also be concern that the values 
of the legal process, namely holding public authorities to account, showing 
respect for all individuals by treating them fairly and upholding the human 
rights primacy of seeking family reunification may be under threat’.453  They 
further state that there is a, ‘… real concern that the ethos that respects 
these values of the legal process are seen as a source for criticism, and that 
solutions are seen almost entirely in terms of managerial efficiency’. 454  An 
example of such efficiency, namely the 26-week rule governing the length of 
all public law proceedings, has already been discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In this research a number of participating judges highlighted the importance 
of achieving the best outcomes possible for children, underpinned and driven 
by the values of justice and fairness.  A county court judge saw his role as, 
  “The role has an ultimate outcome, which is to achieve better 
  outcomes for children, but it has obligations along the way,  
  fairness is the most obvious courtesy to litigants”. 
 
It also needs to include the following elements as well as particular 
challenges, which were outlined by a district judge: 
  “The right to family life, the right to respect for privacy and  
  personal identity, personal integrity, the right to a fair hearing 
  and a fair trial.  I think that is actually sometimes quite a  
  struggle to make sure that people really get a fair hearing  
  and a fair trial.  I hope that that is the value that really does  
  drive me”. 
 
Judicial values and the reality of a child’s quality of life, can present real 
challenges.  A high court judge highlighted his predicament in this regard: 
  “ ... you are perpetually doing the best you can in the   
  circumstances and my test in those circumstances is, can I  
  leave this child or this incapacitated person in a better place  
  than I found them.  If I can then I will engage with it, if I can’t, 
  we are all wasting our time”. 
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Leaving children in a better place, particularly very vulnerable children who 
are subject to proceedings is not always easy to discern.  The findings from a 
Council of Europe consultation with almost 4,000 children, which 
documented their views and experiences of the justice system, found that a 
fifth of the children who took part in this consultation would not tell those with 
responsibility for their safety and welfare if they were being neglected or 
abused for fear of what might happen to their family.  They said they would 
prefer to handle it on their own.455  It is as if children are aware of their 
powerlessness in a system that is mean to consider their best interests as 
being paramount.  The values of fairness, justice, equality of treatment, 
respect for the dignity of the child would appear to ring hollow here.  In the 
author’s own research a county court judge felt it was important for all parties 
including, children to feel that they have been heard and was of the view that 
judges need to be pro-active in this regard: 
 
  “I do think it is important that the legal system enables  
  people to be properly heard and that sometimes requires  
  work from a Judge to make that happen, particularly in the  
  days of reduced public funding”. 
 
On a related issue and one that has the potential to make judicial decision-
making more difficult and challenging was highlighted by a district judge who 
felt that,  
 
  “As a Judge you don’t always know because you never know 
  whether you are actually getting all the information and all  
  the evidence, that is one of the problems”. 
 
The judge is mainly concerned with making a just, fair, good and right 
decision for the child.  In this research, judges in their responses capture the 
complex and conflicting situations in which they find themselves, particularly 
in relation to being fair to the child’s parents in terms of affording them 
opportunities to show they can provide adequate care for their children.  
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However, they also felt that being fair to parents needs to be balanced with 
the ‘no delay principle’.456  For one high court judge, the principle of 
paramountcy may also present challenges in balancing justice for children on 
the one hand and justice for parents on the other, requiring in some cases a 
compromise in respect of this principle.  The following extract relates to the 
issue of contact between a child and their parents:  
 
“Paramountcy has slight problems in it.  Let us take the example of a 
parent who is a seriously questionable parent for contact, not because 
they are bad, but because of a mental health issue or some such thing 
like that.  There are circumstances in which the paramountcy of the 
child’s welfare may just yield to justice to the parent if it makes the 
difference between a little contact and no contact.  Quite often for 
example, I’ll hear myself saying I am not prepared to decide contact 
on the basis of whether this child needs contact or not, because the 
child may not, I am going to do it on the basis of, is this contact 
consistent with the needs of this child, and if it is, then it ought to 
happen in fairness to the parent.  That gets quite near tinkering around 
paramountcy, although I think most of this would probably be 
articulated on the basis of the long-term best interests of the child.  If 
you can have some kind of relationship you should”.  (High Court 
Judge) 
  
The above extract is an example of a judicial decision-making approach in 
practice, in balancing and reconciling the needs of children and those of their 
parents in terms of justice and fairness while applying the paramountcy 
principle.  Archard and Skivenes457 view the commitment to the perspective 
of the child in relation to their best interests and the adult perspective of best 
interests as the pulling in different directions, with the adult’s perspective 
prevailing in the final decision in this ‘tug-of-war’ arena.  In discussing the 
procedural constraints in relation to hearing the child’s voice and the use of 
narrative to ‘centralise children’s experiences’, Stalford and Hollingsworth 
maintain that: ‘The adoption of this children’s rights method to judging 
depends upon understanding the experiences and lives of the children 
involved which in turn depends on hearing the child in compliance with Article 
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12.458  Yet, throughout legal proceedings, the voices of children are excluded, 
silenced or distorted, hindering the ability of the most willing judge to produce 
a ‘children’s rights judgment’.459  This is compounded, as has already been 
highlighted in Chapter 4, by the lack of time and resources available to 
professionals460 to enable them to get to know the child and their 
perspectives of their circumstances.461  Ofsted in their report on the state of 
social care of children in 2016462 also found that high caseloads resulted in a 
lack of time spent listening to children a significant issue in their inspection of 
children’s services, stating: ‘Social workers need time to spend with the 
children and families on their case list’.463  The report highlights the 
importance of getting decisions right for children as: ‘The consequences of 
decisions about children’s lives can be enormous…’.464  In their report, 
Ofsted focuses attention on the importance of social workers having time to 
reflect on and review their practice, particularly in relation to the decisions 
they make about the lives of children, so that they feel confident about their 
professional judgements in respect of children who are subject to 
proceedings.465  In relation to achieving high practice standards in this area, 
Ofsted places great importance on sufficient time being devoted to direct 
work with children and their families, making the observation: ‘Where good 
work with children and families is common practice, social workers have 
manageable caseloads’.466  However, research already highlighted and 
discussed in Chapter 4, among social workers themselves, found high levels 
of physical exhaustion, due to high caseloads, which militated against 
opportunities for reflective practice, with social workers feeling a lack of 
confidence about making the right and best decision for children on their 
caseload.467  
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Henaghan argues that: ‘Decision-making that is truly in the best interests of 
children is less about whether a child’s best interests should be paramount, 
or primary or something in-between, and actually about considering the 
particular child and his or her own way of seeing the world’.468  Regarding the 
child’s view of their world Henaghan asserts: ‘...only giving such matters 
superficial consideration, (feelings, aspirations and concerns), makes a 
mockery out of the claim that the decision is based on the best interests of 
the child’.469  The application of the best interests principle however should, 
as far as Eekelaar is concerned, be accepted as a child’s right rather than 
just being seen as a duty of decision-making authorities.470  Having a child’s 
right approach in the application of this principle can: ‘…reduce the risk of its 
application from solely an adult perspective’.471 
 
Abeit in a different jurisdiction, the following case has relevance in this 
regard.  In a case from the Supreme Court in Canada, about whether parents 
had the right to physically discipline their children,472 the majority were of the 
view that, while acknowledging the best interests of children was an 
important legal principle, is not fundamental to society’s concept of justice 
and therefore not a principle of fundamental justice.  In this case the right of 
parents to discipline their children was upheld.473  This case serves to 
illustrate a lack of integration of children’s rights with the core principle of 
justice and therefore a child’s rights can be overridden in favour of the rights 
of adults, justified by Article 18 UNCRC,474 which sees parents as the main 
guardians of their child’s rights and respects parental responsibilities in this 
regard.  Article 18 UNCRC states: 
 
‘States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the 
principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the 
upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may 
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be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing 
and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be 
their basic concern’.   
      
However, in the case of R v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment and Others,475 the House of Lords considered whether a ban on 
the corporal punishment of children in schools was in breach of the right to 
freedom of parents’ religion.  In this case the child’s parents supported use of 
corporal punishment.  Lady Hale in her judgment makes reference to a 
number of the articles in the UNCRC including, Article 3 (Child’s best 
interests), Article 37 (Right to protection from abuse, neglect and exploitation) 
and Article 37 (Right to be protected from torture, cruel and inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment).  She stated: ‘If a child has a right to be 
brought up without institutional violence, as he does, that right should be 
respected whether or not his parents and teachers believe otherwise’.476  
 
In his discussion on values and their influence on judicial decisions, Hedley’s 
view is that, ‘The difficulty today is in determining what those values are to 
which society generally (not just particular parts of it) subscribes.  That really 
can sometimes seem like a chasing of the wind’.477  Hedley sees three sets 
of potentially competing values at play when the court exercises discretion, 
including in the area of the child’s best interests; society’s values, the values 
of the family involved in the case and the judge’s own values.  Hedley 
acknowledges that a judge’s values are part of what he calls the, ‘welfare 
pot’.478 
 
The decision which emerges from such a process is one that may have the 
best interests of the child in mind, but it is a decision that is without the in-
depth perspective of the child.  The child’s voice needs to be a central part of 
judicial values and of the decision-making process and not just a passive 
recipient of the outcome of their proceedings.479 
                                            
475 [2005] UKHL15 [2005] 2 FLR 374. 
476 ibid paras 81-84.  
477 M Hedley, The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility and Society’s Expectations (LexisNexis 2016) 6. 
478 ibid 51. 
479 M Freeman, ‘Disputing Children’ (2000) in N Sanford, J Katz, J Eekelaar and M Maclean, Cross Currents: Family 
     Law and Policy in the US and England (Oxford Scholarship Online). 
108 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the judge relies heavily on the child’s Guardian 
for advice and guidance.  Given the diminishing time Guardians spend with 
children, an issue highlighted by judges in this research and by the 
‘proportionate working’ adopted by Cafcass,480 judges are receiving minimum 
information about children’s lives and circumstances.  Munby P in his 15th 
View from the President’s Chambers, points to a looming crisis in the public 
child law system.481  As a consequence of the case of Peter Connelly,482 the 
number of care cases coming before the court has increased significantly. 
Although to date the time taken to complete proceedings has not increased 
as a result, the President is less than optimistic for the future, given the ever 
increasing numbers of applications.  He acknowledges that the professionals 
working within the system are at full stretch and that the system is facing a 
crisis without a clear strategy being in place to deal with the increase in 
workloads.  He also acknowledges that no clear cause(s) emerge for such a 
significant and sustained increase.  Munby P warns of the potential risk in 
relation to the principles of fairness and justice and therefore to Articles 6 
(Fair Trial) and 8 (Family Life) ECHR.  The President highlights the grave 
nature of public child law proceedings, stating: ‘Care cases, with the potential 
for life-long separation between children and their parents, are of unique 
gravity and importance’.483 
  
The above views serve to illustrate a real concern in public child law 
proceedings that judges have in relation to the values of justice and fairness, 
in ensuring that their decisions reflect these values, particularly in relation to 
the rights of children and parents including, adherence to the principle of 
paramountcy in achieving the best interests of children.  This chapter now 
moves on to examine critically the interrelationships between judicial values 
and child-centred decision-making. 
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5.3 Judicial values and child-centred decision-making 
 
Aoife Nolan points out, that while children have the right to be heard and their 
views given due consideration, their views are not determinative and very 
much take second place to that of the child’s welfare and safety.484  Within 
court proceedings, their rights as opposed to their ‘best interests’ under s.1 
Children Act 1989 are promoted far less.485  Such a position may seem very 
unfair to a child involved in proceedings.  It is where the judicial value of 
fairness and the right of a child can be in conflict.  This is an area on which 
two of the participating county court judges in this research addressed in their 
views on the challenges that judicial values can present, albeit from very 
different perspectives.  In relation to balancing potential conflict between 
fairness and protecting the child one county court judge stated: 
 
“I suppose there are times when there is in a court hearing some 
conflict between the desire for fairness and the desire to protect the 
child and you would lean in favour of protecting the child if it were an 
absolute conflict, but your professional role is to combine the two 
sufficiently that you achieve the outcome without compromising the 
fairness”. 
 
While another county court judge in his response appears to separate his 
judicial values and the making of a decision: 
 
“Values in the sense of fairness, respect for the individual, respect for 
their integrity and their rights, these are all there, values that I run with, 
but I don’t think that really informs the decision or makes the decision.  
The decision is made on the evidence and the arguments”. 
 
Tobin feels that, ‘... courts must inform the content of a right by reference to 
the experiences of children’.486  The realities of the application of judicial 
values alongside the rights of children seem to lay greater emphasis on the 
letter rather than the spirit of rights and legislation.  Tobin sees such an 
approach as being dominated by a ‘welfare model’ of children’s best interests 
                                            
484 Nolan (n 333).   
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and rights,487 while Fortin maintains that a child’s welfare should not be 
inconsistent with their rights.488  Furthermore, Bainham and Gilmore view 
welfare as being something that, ‘... can be too easily used to cover anything 
someone else thinks is good for you,489 which is why Eekelaar suggests that 
that the concept of children’s well-being, which is a much more broader view 
of a child’s life, replace the current welfare model.490   
 
In their discussion around the conflation of children’s welfare, paternalism 
and best interests, Stalford and Hollingsworth argue that the ‘protective 
obligations’ resulting from a highly paternalistic assessment of children’s 
welfare and best interests, including protecting children from potential harm 
that may result from their involvement in court proceedings, is a real barrier 
to children exercising their rights in a manner of their choice.491  
Assessments of children’s best interests for Stalford and Hollingsworth: 
‘…necessitates transparent, rigorous, systemic, even forensic, deliberations 
of the various factors that have comprised that assessment’.492    
 
Judges in this research acknowledged such tensions in legislation, 
particularly in relation to balancing a principle like ‘no delay’ with the rights of 
parents and the best interests and welfare of children.  The following lengthy 
quote from a county court judge, delivers a frank reflection on the application 
of legislation and serves to demonstrate some of the tensions and conflicts 
involved in balancing rights, values, principles and rules in practice: 
“The professional value is to say, “Right, that is what the President of 
the Family Division wants us to do” and there is very good reason for 
that because so many cases have lasted much too long, but when you 
then start to relate that to a particular case, you can find that your 
personal view is, “Well actually, if I was just able to give this mother an 
extra three months, she probably could pull herself round and she 
probably could provide the evidence of adequate parenting, but that is 
going to take us well outside that 26 week limit that I am supposed to 
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be working to, so you do get a tension there.  My view then has been 
that, going back to those statutory principles and rules, if you 
overriding desire is to meet the welfare of the child and also to reach a 
just decision, then you need to go beyond that 26 weeks.  My guiding 
principle is that when you go home at night, are you satisfied that you 
were fair?  I would rather be told that I was wrong by the Court of 
Appeal than to drive home thinking, I don’t think that was really fair but 
at least it complied with the rules”. (County Court Judge) 
 
The issue of processes and procedures getting in the way of being child-
centred was acknowledged by judges in this research. 
“ We get far too wrapped up in all our processes and procedures”.  
(County Court Judge) 
 
“The only thing that concerns me about it overall, it has become too 
legalistic in some ways.  ... I wonder if we have actually made it much 
more legalistic than child-centred in that wide sense, that we now 
become very concerned with procedural rules and procedural steps 
and the child fades into the background.  We do I think become so 
involved in the actual process itself that we can forget the child.  We 
are all doing the best for the child, but the child must feel quite 
marginalised very often because they just are told what has 
happened”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Munro in her analysis of the child protection system makes the following 
observation: 
“It may seem self-evident that children and young people are the focus 
of child protection services but many of the criticisms of current 
practice suggest otherwise.  In a system that has become over-
bureaucratised and focused on meeting targets, which reduce the 
capacity of social workers to spend time with children and young 
people and develop meaningful relationship with them … “ 493 
 
Munro’s observation is very relevant to the current public law system, given 
the introduction of the Public Law Outline (PLO) with its 26-week limit on 
proceedings, which is an adult defined and adult led arbitrary target (see 
Chapter 4).  It is also an observation that is reflected in the responses of 
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judges.  The following graphic quote is a relevant and insightful response of 
one county court judge, which encapsulates the reality of the current public 
law system: 
“Our system is not remotely child-centred.  It is not set up to be in any 
way at all, other than in the abstract conceptual idea.  This touches on 
something that has been in my mind for years, although we talk about 
being child-centred, we spend all our time in Court dealing with the 
adults.  Inevitably that does affect how you think because you tend to 
be more aware of what is in front of you than what is not in front of 
you.  In a care case, we generally spend 95% of the time working out 
what is wrong with the current care givers, the parents, and that is 
partly because the nature of the contest in a court hearing tends to be 
about in care cases, removal, rather than anything else.  The focus is 
on diagnosis of the problem or fault finding rather than on prescribing 
the cure because the cure is seen to be within very narrow confines, a 
matter of received wisdom.  Our forensic focus is on, was it Mum or 
Dad who broke the child’s skull, was it uncle Peter who sexually 
abused the child?, is the standard of care given such that it amounts 
over time to emotional abuse and neglect?, if that is the dispute, then 
what you focus on are the parents.  In public law proceedings we don’t 
focus on the child.  We think we know what is right for the child so we 
focus on what is wrong with the adults.  My perception of our 
professional thinking is that by and large we keep children as far away 
as possible, in their own interests, we think.  The idea of inclusion of 
accountability, transparency, it is all mediated through the child’s 
Guardian in other indirect ways, it is not the Court’s structure itself”.  
(County Court Judge)  
 
The above response sees the concept of child-centredness as something 
remote from the court and is an area that lies within the domain of the 
children’s Guardian and Local Authority social worker rather than being an 
integral part of the legal process and system itself.  Yet, for Stalford and 
Hollingsworth ensuring that the child’s voice is heard ‘…conveys to the child 
that her views are worth listening to, an aspect of the recognitional function of 
rights and reinforces the child’s dignity, autonomy and status as rights-
holder…’494 while Willow495 feels the child’s voice should be at the heart of 
the system, as they are key sources of information in relation to their situation 
within their family and the impact it is having on their lives.     
                                            
494 Stalford and Hollingsworth (n 427) 76. 
495 C Willow, ‘Putting Children and Their Rights at the Heart of the Safeguarding Process’ in H Cleaver, P Cawson 
     and S Gorin, Safeguarding Children: A Shared Responsibility  (Wiley Blackwell Jones 2009).  
113 
 
Listening to children within the context of child-centred timeframes was very 
much seen by the participating judges as a core element of child-
centredness: 
 
“Time for a child is very different from time for an adult.  ‘How many 
sleeps before I know where I am ‘gonna’ be’?  I say to people in court, 
how would you like not to know where you are going to be next 
Christmas?  What do you think it feels like not to know whether you 
are going to be friends with the girl who is sitting next to you?  What 
school you are going to?  Where are you going to live next year?  
Whether you should put pictures up on the wall because you don’t 
know whether you are going to stay.  What’s the point of me investing 
anything in this house, these friends, these people?  I say in court, 
wouldn’t it do your head in if you were living in that kind of limbo? that 
is the key word, limbo.  How do you think that feels?”  Children get lost 
in the decision, they get so desperately lost.   (County Court Judge)   
 
One County Court judge reflected on how historically timetables have been 
set: 
“…. I think for far too long we have been timetabling care proceedings 
at the convenience of professionals.  We have worked our timetables 
around how long does it take this expert to prepare his report?  How 
long does the social worker want to be able to do that piece of work?  
When are counsel going to be available?  What are the dates that 
most suit them?  That is the way in which historically timetables have 
been set”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Returning to the Munro review of the child protection system, as it is this 
system that feeds into the public child law process, and the issue of the 
system itself being given priority over the need for children to get to know 
significant professionals involved in their lives and for the professionals to get 
to know the children they are protecting and representing, Munro stated, ‘The 
ones who lose out most are the very children the system is intended to 
protect. The reforms have driven compliance with regulation and rules over 
time, with social workers increasingly operating within an over-standardised 
framework that makes it difficult for them to prioritise time with children, to get 
to know them, and understand their feelings, wishes, and worries’.496  She 
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found that children needed to develop an enduring relationship with their 
social worker, who would listen to them. 
 
While making time to listen to children is very important, children also need to 
know what is going on in proceedings.  They need to be kept up to date 
throughout the entire process; pre-court, during proceedings and post-court.  
Judges in this research viewed this as central in terms of being accountable 
to children and in terms of being transparent, helping children to have an age 
appropriate understanding of the system.  One County Court judge felt that 
children were seen and treated as ‘small adults’ within the system; 
“Children aren’t just small adults, they function in different ways and I 
think the system we currently have is certainly geared up for adults.  I 
do not think it is anything children are well informed about.  I do not 
think they understand it.  They need to have some understanding in a 
way that they could comprehend.  They would need to understand the 
limitations of the system.  They would need to have information put to 
them in a child-friendly way and then have the opportunity to comment 
in a way whereby their own views could be properly recorded in a way 
that gave them confidence that it was their views, as long as they 
understood that nobody had the determining view, apart from the 
judge, assuming we are still in a court arena.  I think that children need 
to understand what is happening and have it made relevant to them, 
so they can understand it properly”.  (County Court Judge) 
 
In her final report of her review, Munro states, ‘The centrality of forming 
relationships with children and families to understand and help them has 
become obscured’.497  The development of such relationships becomes 
much more difficult when the centrality of the relationship with the child is 
both diminished and diluted, as seen from the discussion of the evidence 
cited in Chapter 4.498  Brophy highlighted the need for transparency for 
children in a decision making process, where adults represent their wishes 
and feelings.  Attention to the language used and the length of documents 
produced is also highlighted, as they often make both children and their 
parents feel less than equal partners in care proceedings.499  In their review 
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of the child care proceedings system, the Department for Education and 
Skills and the Department for Constitutional Affairs back in 2006 
recommended the need for an informal approach by the Judiciary when 
talking with children and parents and the need for better, more detailed and 
clearer information about care proceedings and what to expect of the 
court.500  
 
Making child-friendly, age-appropriate information available to children was 
considered by the judges in this research to be very much part of the court’s 
child-centred approach, but such an approach in this area of the proceedings 
is not without its difficulties. 
“For children who can be given information, and even very small 
children can be given information, they need to be given information in 
a form that they can absorb and that may be in different ways; that 
may be something in writing for children who can deal with that, then 
they should be given something in writing.  Again, it needs to be child-
friendly.  There also needs to be materials for children who can’t cope 
with things in writing, they may need the written material 
supplemented by other forms of information.  I think we don’t do that 
probably enough.  That needs to be done at a very early stage it 
seems to me”.  (District Judge) 
 
“I am not sure that they are given the information early enough.  How 
early do they need to be made aware if they are able to take it in, that 
they may not be going home?  That is quite difficult.  I think it is very 
important that they are given information about the process in a way 
that they can understand.  I guess what is quite hard for them is to 
actually know who really is making the decisions along the way”.  
(District Judge) 
 
In general however, judges felt that providing children with clear and 
accessible information throughout the course of their proceedings was an 
important element of transparency and accountability (see Chapter 4).  For 
one District judge it was also important that children themselves felt confident 
about the system: 
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“I think it is important by one means or another, preferably not directly, 
that children have confidence in the integrity and reliability of the 
system.  That is really down to Guardians in particular; Guardian’s 
solicitor to an extent, to make sure that the child understands, within 
their ability to understand, what is going on and how he might be 
affected by the outcome”. 
 
Given the lack of resources, particularly the time allocated to Guardians for 
each case, making the above aspiration a reality is a significant challenge for 
the present system, even though it was formally recommended over ten 
years ago.501  Conflicts and barriers surrounding the whole area of 
accountability were also highlighted and acknowledged by judges.  The 
following quote from this research summarises some of main issues in this 
area: 
“There is a conflict and it is one which is uncomfortable.  We have a 
rather paternalistic view that we know better, similarly to perhaps 
dealing with our own children, that terrible reply, “Why do I have to do 
it”? “Because I tell you to do it”, because we know best.  There is a 
danger that the hard-wired nature of not seeing children, which has 
been so much part of the system for so long, stands in the way of the 
issue of our accountability to them.  Accountability to children doesn’t 
necessarily mean that you go to the child and say, “This is why I did it 
and this is why I have decided it”.  I think that there is a place for that 
accountability.  Somebody should be identified to feedback to the child 
the decision that you have made and why you have made the decision 
and how it is going to be implemented.  Accountability to children is 
more a broader ranging concept.  This system is accountable to the 
child and ultimately it will only be judged by whether we deliver to 
children, individual children, what has been genuinely assessed as 
being in their best interests.   
 
I fully accept that if, as I know is the case, there are a large number of 
children feeling that they are alienated from the system and ignored by 
it, although in the theoretical sense, the system may still be 
accountable to them in the sense that its success is measured by what 
we deliver for the child in the very tangible sense of the child saying, 
“What does it mean to be accountable to me, I wasn’t even listened to, 
I wasn’t told anything about what was going on and why the decision 
had been made”.  Yes, there is a conflict there”.  (District Judge) 
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Macdonald holds the view that the voice of the child should be given priority 
throughout the entire period of State intervention in their lives, but feels their 
voice is often ignored.  He feels that through listening to the child’s voice, this 
increases the accuracy of the assessment of the child’s needs.502  
 
Judges in this research identified the need for the legal system to be 
transparent for and accountable to children, but very much view this area as 
the domain of Guardian’s and Local Authority Social Workers, yet they also 
acknowledge that neither children’s Guardians or social workers have 
adequate time to fulfil their role adequately in relation to these areas.  
Paramountcy of the child’s welfare and best interests were viewed by judges 
as the core principle underpinning the public child law system.  However, 
they view their role in applying this principle in practice as one which is 
somewhat remote, relying on Guardians and social workers to keep children 
informed and up to date about their proceedings and to be the eyes and ears 
of both the child and the court, ensuring the court is aware of the child’s 
wishes and feelings, albeit at a distance.  It is acknowledged by the judges 
that the system itself, with its complex rules and procedures and adult-
centred timetables, take priority over the reality of a child’s situation and their 
need to feel part of a system that is making such important decisions about 
their lives. 
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The discussion in this section highlights a lack of progress regarding what 
constitutes a child-centred approach within the family justice system, even 
though over the past twenty years, much has been written by eminent 
academics and children’s rights experts503 about the need and importance of 
hearing and listening to the voice of the child, particularly in those areas that 
affect significantly the nature and quality of their lives and the lives of their 
families.  The child’s voice is by common consent, the core of any work 
undertaken with children and needs to be embedded in any environment 
within which such work takes place.  It is not possible to be child-centred in 
making decisions about children’s lives without children’s meaningful 
participation including, that of having direct input into in any forum, system or 
process, official or unofficial.   
 
5.4 Listening Directly to Children: Judicial Perspectives 
The responses from the judges in this study, when asked about their views 
on meeting children directly and on enabling children to participate directly in 
proceedings, reflect the restrictive nature of current formal guidance in this 
area (see Chapter 4 section 4.2) and of a legal system that is barely open to 
children’s direct participation.  Judges in this research made reference to the 
need for the court system to be more open and welcoming of children, but 
their views ranged from openness without restriction to those hinged on a 
variety of parameters, to questioning the usefulness and value of children’s 
direct involvement in proceedings.  One county court judge said:       
 “There shouldn’t really be any barriers, there should be far more         
 openness in my view toward seeing children and letting children   
 feel they are being heard”. (County Court Judge) 
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While another felt such openness should serve to facilitate and inform 
children about decisions made by the judge: 
 
 “I would never refuse a request by a child to come to court unless I 
 was advised that there would be adverse consequences for the 
 child in so doing”.  I would be happy to explain why I can’t go along 
 with their wishes to them so that they may find it easier to accept   
 the decision of the court”. (County Court Judge) 
 
The importance to children of hearing their views directly and of 
understanding the decision-making process was highlighted by the response 
from a County Court Judge: 
 
“I think it is very important that the child has an opportunity to come 
and tell me in their own words what they want to say, more particularly 
if I am going to make a decision which is not necessarily on all fours 
with their wishes and feelings because otherwise there will be another 
candidate out there thinking, “well it is no good saying anything to the 
social worker, to a Judge, to a teacher, they never listen”.  At least the 
child will know that I have heard what he or she has to say and I will 
have to think of some reasons that he or she can understand to make 
a decision which runs contrary to what they would like to happen.  It is 
not just the child’s parents’ understanding, it is their understanding, 
which matters too”. (County Court Judge) 
  
The following response from a county court judge gave an insight into how he 
keeps children at the centre of his decision-making: 
 
“I very often say to parents, “What must it be like when we say, 6 
weeks for this 3 months for that.  You are a child; you have to go to 
sleep every night with all of this in your mind”.  I think if they were 
more intimately involved with the process, assured by the process, it 
would be a healthier thing for them.  From the point of view of their 
own welfare and their rights, I think they should be involved.  
 
… when I am having to make a decision in what seems like a finely 
balanced case and you see the merits of both sides, how do I make a 
decision?  I physically imagine, mentally imagine, that the children are 
here with me, and when I look to them, I think it focuses my mind and 
it makes the decision making easy, because whatever we say and 
however often we may say the children’s interests / welfare are the 
paramount consideration, it is easy for that to just become something 
that we trip off and lose sight of it in the adversarial nature of the 
proceedings”. (County Court Judge) 
 
120 
 
Judges acknowledged that meeting children requires much reflection, 
preparation and thought.  The contrasting responses from two County Court 
judges reflect this approach: 
 
 “I think it would be quite a significant thing to do and I think it  would 
need some careful thought, as to how you go about talking to a child 
directly in a case.  I might have a child busy nodding their head but 
saying what they thought I wanted them to say or what they thought I 
wanted to hear.  I think I would have to be quite careful that they were 
not just agreeing with me because I was the judge, and people tend to 
think that judges are people that have to be listened to.  I would 
therefore be conscious to make sure I got the child’s views, because 
that presumably would be the purpose, not for me to tell them, but for 
them to tell me.  I would approach any request to speak directly to a 
child with that very much to the forefront of my mind.  I would have to 
ensure that I went about this in a way which left me feeling confident 
that the child had got their view across to me and not simply reiterated 
something that they thought I might want to hear”. (County Court 
Judge) 
 
For another county court judge, reflecting on how effective and child-centred 
such a meeting is: 
 
“I would have thought myself that a better, more thought out, more 
valuable presentation of views can be obtained in a more relaxed, 
over-time assessment by professionals, rather than just to sit down the 
child over a cup of orange juice or something, and a quarter of an hour 
later they are gone. It is a very fleeting kind of meeting.  They are very 
anxious.  The Judge is a bit anxious about it too and I am not sure that 
it is necessarily the best environment for something important like 
that”. (County Court Judge) 
 
In the same vein a Magistrate from the family proceedings court commented: 
  
“You get more from a child if you can talk to them quietly in a secure 
environment and that is what the CAFCASS Officers are expert at 
doing.  I don’t think we would gain anything or get anything new by 
bringing children into court.  It is not an appropriate forum for them 
anyway”. (Magistrate – Family Proceedings Court) 
 
The above range of views; from being open to children’s direct involvement 
to questioning the usefulness and value of such involvement within the 
current public law system, reflects significant differences in judicial thinking 
on this issue.  Although the responses reflect a range of views in this area, 
the level of judicial acceptance of direct participation of children in 
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proceedings among the participating judges in this study, range from being 
very cautious and restrictive to non-acceptance.  It is restrictive on two levels.  
On one level child-centredness in relation to direct participation is very much 
seen as consisting of a one-off brief meeting with the judge, lasting on 
average no more than 15-20 minutes, while at another level the reality of the 
rarity of such direct meetings indicates that such occurrences are the 
exception rather than the norm.  This reality fits very much what Tobin 
describes as the incidental rights approach, where the rights of children are 
very much on the periphery of the judicial process.504  The following 
responses highlight this reality.  Meeting children directly is not promoted or 
encouraged by judges at the present time, a view that was shared by all of 
the participating judges and magistrates. 
 
“I’m perfectly happy to do it, if it is asked of me, but it has been rarely 
asked.  It is not something I would advertise either, perhaps I ought to, 
thinking about it.  Perhaps I ought to say, well I am always willing to 
see children if somebody thinks it is a good idea and they want to”. 
(District Judge) 
 
 “I did from time to time, not very often.  The reason it wasn’t very   
 often is because it wasn’t very often I was asked to”. (High Court   
 Judge) 
 
The following response from a County Court Judge is an example which 
indicates the rarity of children meeting judges in his court: 
  
 “Not very often at all.  I have been a full-time Judge for seven and   
a half years and I have seen children I think on three occasions”. 
(County Court Judge) 
 
It is clear from this research that there is within the public child law system 
inherent barriers that block the development of a child’s own space and place 
in public child law proceedings.  This space and place for the most part has 
been taken by the children’s Guardian and legal representative and the 
children’s Local Authority social worker and this according to Connolly and 
Morris can lead to risk aversion, ‘Risk aversion can push practitioners, and 
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    Studies Research Paper No. 456 (2009) 33 (2) Melbourne University Law Review 579.  
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the agencies within which they work, toward more professionally-driven 
practices where the professional voice is dominant’.505  
 
Concerns were expressed by participating judges in this study about the 
decreasing level of involvement of Guardians with children in terms of time 
spent getting to know the child.  One district judge expressed concern 
regarding the impact and implications of the lack of time and resources 
available to Guardians on the child’s level and quality of representation. 
 
“If you speed on and do these things quicker, there is even less time 
for relationship building with the child and to involve the child.  There 
ought to be a mandatory provision to say, how to involve the child is 
considered by the court at directions appointments and is part of the 
Public Law Outline.  Guardians and solicitors have to consider it.  It is 
in their guidance but it is not focused enough in court.  It comes up 
more as a by-product if the child has been banging the drum rather 
than as a routine matter that should be considered”. (District Judge) 
 
Another county court judge has observed that, 
In a time of limited resources, the exposure to their own Guardian and 
lawyer is going down, not up. The reports that we get from the 
Guardians now are the work of far fewer hours than once upon a time 
was the case.  They are not seeing the children as much”. 
 
The above responses represent a wide range of judicial views on enabling 
child-centred participation, but the common thread is not one of meaningful 
direct participation.  At best, it is a passive listening to children’s views.  The 
responses portray a judicial process that is wedded to judicial guidance, 
which only allows children to participate in the process if there is agreement 
from the adult parties involved.506   
 
The above understandable and genuine concerns of judges encapsulate the 
real tension that exists between Article 12 (children’s right to express their 
views) and Article 3 (children’s best interests) of the UNCRC.  However, the 
family court system as presently constituted, sees such tension being 
                                            
505 M Connolly and J Masson, ‘Private and public Voices: Does family group conferencing privilege the voice of 
     children and families in child welfare?’ (2014) 36 (4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 403. 
506 Family Justice Council, Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are subject to Family Proceedings (2010) 1. 
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resolved in favour of the child’s welfare and by the indirect participation of 
children in proceedings.  The following contrasting judicial perspectives 
highlight a basis for such reluctance.  A district judge highlighted the 
difficulties, both for the judge and the child in hearing children’s views 
directly. 
 
“With the Judge, the Judge has got great difficulty in discussing with a 
child what the case is, because you don’t want to build up their 
expectations and give them false understandings of what the outcome 
might be.  It also puts a huge responsibility on the child to be able to 
express themselves as to what they really want the court to know”. 
(District Court Judge) 
 
Two county court judges expressed their unease in meeting children: 
 
“One has to be careful because you must not send the message that 
he has in some way responsibility for the decision that you make and 
that is enormously difficult to do.  You have to take away from them 
any assumption of responsibility for the outcome”. (County Court 
Judge) 
 
“I think the underlying reason is that we are very keen that children 
should not feel responsible for the outcome and as soon as you 
embark upon the discussion with a child of what their views are, there 
is the potential for the child to feel responsible for what happens …” 
(County Court Judge) 
 
In contrast, an approach based on the reality of children’s lives prior to and 
during proceedings, is taken by two other county court judges:  
“I can’t see how involving them in it and letting them see what is going 
on and letting them see Mum and Dad and letting them see the Judge, 
would do them much more harm than they have been caused already.  
It would do them a lot of good”. (County Court Judge) 
 
“The message taken on board by the child, who has probably been 
using childlike effective strategies for a long time anyway before it has 
got into the court arena, is that he or she has got to hold the fort, take 
on the responsibility for the decision making”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Judges also referred to the historical roots of proceedings including, their 
adult-centric nature and professional attitudes: 
 
“The culture is deep seated in that you distance the children from the 
proceedings.  The rules are quite labyrinthine about the involvement of 
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children within the proceedings, even where separately represented, 
whether they should attend the hearings and all the rest of it, raise all 
sorts of separate questions of their own.  It is because of that 
historical, cultural thing, which has fed into a regime and rules which, it 
is not a presumption but it has stuck.  Now when you look at the 
Family Justice Council’s papers on it, all hedged around with a 
considerable degree of cautionary thinking”. (County Court Judge) 
 
“In terms of trying to involve them, I think the whole process is very 
adult-centric.  The way professionals work, it is this old thing that 
Dame Butler-Sloss said about children, the object of concern rather 
than the subject of the proceedings and whereas if they really were 
the subject you would be saying “right how are we going to involve the 
child in this?”  We don’t, it is all very much adults in rooms talking and 
deciding about the child.  There is this historical and perhaps natural 
tendency not to think about involving the children and just say this is 
going on for you, you don’t need to come.  It is a lazier way of working 
and it is adults just dealing with adults.  Part of the structure is to 
intimidate people, isn’t it?  That is a natural barrier as well”. (County 
Court Judge) 
 
The public child law system is a system that quite rightly is protective in 
nature, but this can and does exclude children from the process.  As one 
county court judge put it: 
 
“I think the difficulty is; that as the process is intended to be largely 
protective, and one cannot expect the subject of the proceedings to 
understand the broad and detailed nature of the concerns about their 
parents and what implications those concerns may have for their well-
being”. 
 
Another significant barrier, highlighted by judges, in obtaining a child’s true 
view, is that of not being able to keep what the child says confidential.  The 
response of one judge is a reasonable representation of the participants in 
relation to this issue. 
 
“I think the biggest problem about it is the fact that what they say to 
the judge has to be revealed to the other parties and that I think is 
something, which perhaps is a difficult concept for them to understand.  
As we experience often with children, what they say to the parents is 
designed to find favour with the parents most of the time and that 
might not be the child’s true view”. 
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The area of confidentiality can present real problems for children in 
proceedings, for example, a child may not wish their parents to know of their 
true views and feelings about a certain situation, but is quite happy to 
express their views to the judge.  This is an area where achieving a child-
centred approach may conflict with Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) ECHR in 
respect of the other parties involved in the proceedings.  Sensitive 
communication by the judge to the other parties is crucial in such situations 
(see discussion on Jackson J’s judgments in Chapter 4). 
 
There are significant barriers within the current public child law system 
preventing and disabling children from direct participation in their 
proceedings and therefore limiting the child-centred nature of such 
proceedings.  Judicial perspectives and values, which in practice do not see 
children as people with the right to participate directly, except under certain 
criteria and guidelines, with age and capacity being used as justification for 
children not being able to speak with the Judge directly.  In general, the 
barriers to enabling children to participate directly in proceedings did not sit 
uncomfortably with the participants involved in this research, including the 
belief that there are very limited benefits resulting from such a meeting: “One 
of the barriers at the moment is a general reluctance on the part of the 
judiciary to take on board the benefit of speaking with the child directly” 
(County Court Judge).  Although there was a good level of awareness among 
the participating judges that other jurisdictions were much more open to 
hearing children directly, the influence of the practice of other jurisdictions 
seem to have had a very limited impact on established judicial practice: 
 
“When you speak to Judges from different jurisdictions; in Germany it 
is a matter of course that they meet the children in each and every 
hearing.  I am not, at the moment, in favour of that although views 
change, but I wouldn’t want children to think that coming to court was 
routine, as if they were going to hospital.  It is not somewhere that you 
necessarily want to take a child unless there is very good reason.  Not 
many people have positive connotations when they think of courts.  A 
child may well think, this is a dreadful place to come, why am I 
coming”. (County Court Judge) 
 
126 
 
“Courts are not seen as places for children to come, they are seen as 
places from which to keep children because they are adult places of 
dispute”. (County Court Judge) 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Both the child protection system and the public law system are systems that 
currently are driven by targets and efficiency in terms of tightly managed 
timescales and deadlines.  Such timescales and deadlines are micro-
managed on a daily basis.  They are also systems bereft of adequate 
resources, to sustain a child-centred approach to both child protection and 
court proceedings.  Such a reality is acknowledged readily by professionals 
within these systems including judges who find themselves working and 
making decisions with the weight of an historically long established and 
cautious legal system on their shoulders.  The perspectives of the judiciary in 
relation to child-centredness is one of caution, which is informed by the 
sensitive and complex factors involved in balancing a child’s welfare and 
safety with their rights.  In reality, neither system is willing or able to engage 
with children who are subject to proceedings, in a way that makes children 
feel confident and comfortable in using the available legal protections, 
processes and rights enshrined in legislation, to ensure their true voice is 
heard and understood, throughout the entire period of State intervention.  
Children remain the possession of a system that maintains a distance from 
the reality of their lives.  Such a distance silences the feelings of children 
about the true realities of their abuse and neglect. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Judicial Decision-making: Interpretation and Application 
 
  
6.1 Introduction 
 
Judges involved in public child law proceedings do not work in isolation.  
They are part of, yet separate and independent from, the child protection 
system, from which all cases originate.  Judges also work within the 
prevailing political system of the day and abide by the letter and spirit of 
legislation, passed by a democratically elected Parliament. 
 
Judicial principles and values have a significant influence on judicial thinking 
and decision-making.  In the previous chapter, judges’ perspectives of child-
centredness were explored critically within the context of decision-making in 
public law proceedings.  This chapter will focus on judicial priorities in care 
and adoption proceedings, drawing on the findings of this research and 
relevant case law, as well as those factors that influence judicial decision-
making including, judicial values and the current Government’s agenda on 
public child care, as well as the significant reductions in finance and 
resources, both in relation to the English legal system and the child 
protection system specifically.  Using the example of the introduction of 26-
week time limit on care proceedings,507 the chapter will explore the tensions 
judges experience in administering the system of child protection, and in 
placing the child at the centre of these proceedings.  
      
The cases (three care cases and one adoption case) selected in section 6.4 
of this chapter, give an insight into how judges apply and interpret both the 
letter and the spirit of current child care and adoption legislation.  The 
selected adoption case provides a comparison between the priorities of the 
Appeal Court judge in this case in relation to a four-month-old child, and a 
children’s rights approach to the case, as outlined in a re-write of this 
judgment. 
 
                                            
507 Children and Families Act 2014 s.14(2)(ii) (26-week rule). 
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6.2 Values and Judicial Practice 
 
Values are often implicit in a judge’s decision, for example, returning a child 
to their birth family against the Local Authority’s proposed care plan and 
recommendation of the children’s Guardian,508 where the evidence before the 
court indicates that it is in the child’s best interests to do so.509  This reflects 
the value of family life and accords with Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), the right to 
respect for private and family life.510   However, Article 8 is not an unlimited 
right.  Intervention in the family to remove a child at risk is justified if it is in 
accordance with the law511 and is a proportionate response.  However, 
according to Hedley, such decisions are complex, ‘The essential judgment 
between a child remaining in the natural family or going to an adoptive family 
… involves complex value judgments which, whilst they are presented as 
‘welfare’ or ‘best interests’ evaluations, are in fact a nuanced, complex and 
profound distillation and balancing of values …’ .512 
 
Within the literature, judicial values are often listed as broad concepts and 
notions513 and are very much seen as umbrella terms under which there 
exists a range of contextual and situational values.514  In public child law 
proceedings, such values are often expressed in terms of what is in a child’s 
best interests or the paramountcy of the child’s welfare.  Identifying and 
interpreting these values is challenging, as they are often a combination of 
professional and personal values.515  However, it is acknowledged in 
literature516 and in this research, that the judicial values of respect and 
fairness guide and inform a judge’s decision.   
 
                                            
508 North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L [2014] EWCC B77 (Fam). 
509 Children Act 1989 s 1(3). 
510 Incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
511 Children Act 1989 s 31 (Threshold criteria for Significant Harm). 
512 M Hedley, The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility and Society’s Expectations (LexisNexis 2016) 82. 
513 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Judicial Ethics: Principles, Values and Qualities Working Group 
    Judicial Ethics 2009-2010 Retrieved on: 14th November 2014 www.encj.eu; R Singh, Law as a System of Values 
    The Jan Grodecki lecture at the University of Leicester 24 October 2013; R J Cahill-O'Callaghan, ‘The Influence 
    Of Personal Values on Legal Judgments’ (2013) Journal of Law and Society 40 (4) November 2013; Hedley (n 4) 
    50.  
514 Hedley (n 512). 
515 ibid. 
516 ibid. 
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Among those legal principles, which are enshrined in law, are ‘no delay’517 
and the ‘paramountcy’ of the child’s welfare.518  Both of these principles 
govern and inform judicial practice in relation to judicial decision-making in 
determining the outcome of child protection proceedings, if the threshold 
criteria for significant harm are met under s 31(2), Children Act 1989.  In 
addition to these specific principles in the context of child protection, Singh 
sees the law as a system of values that includes fairness, equality, 
democracy and the rule of law519 (see Chapter 5).   
 
In this research, judges were very much aware of and acknowledged their 
personal and professional values and the difficulties in distinguishing 
between the two.  In this research, an example of a personal value would be 
compassion while a professional value would be respect.  A County Court 
Judge felt her personal values was her ‘non-objective’ input into the case: 
 
“Professional value; that would be the judge’s value, which is one of 
balance and fairness.  Personal values; obviously, I cannot escape the 
fact that I have got personal values, they are my non-objective input 
into the case, what I know about families and how they operate from 
my experience of my own family … “. (County Court Judge) 
 
6.3 Accommodating the 26-week deadline and Judicial Values 
 
Both personal and professional values are not without legitimate external and 
internal influences including, political influences.   In her research, albeit 
relating to another jurisdiction (USA), Cahill-O’Callaghan highlights the 
significance of judges’ personal values and the implications for judicial 
decision-making.  She found there was an interplay between personal values 
and the decision-making processes of Judges, ‘Personal values influence 
and are influenced by political ideology.  Personal values are associated with 
attitudes, moral judgements, and activism, each of which have been 
implicated in judicial decision making’.520   
                                            
517  Children Act 1989 (n 3) s 1(5). 
518  Department of Health, The Children Act 1989 - The Care of Children: Principles and Practice in Regulations and  
      Guidance (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1991) and s 1(1) Children Act 1989. 
519  Singh (n 450).  
520  Cahill-O'Callaghan (n 449). 
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Within the public child law system today we continue to have political 
influences, one example being; that all care proceedings should be 
completed within 26 weeks.521  Such influences are both legitimate and 
inevitable, as the public care system is the State intervening and acting to 
protect children at risk in the family and therefore there should be democratic 
oversight and management of how this system works or does not work.  
 
Although judges have discretion to extend the 26-week deadline,522 they may 
only do so in exceptional circumstances and for a limited period of eight 
weeks at a time, to resolve the proceedings justly.523  These restrictions raise 
serious questions around judicial independence and issues such as, access 
to justice and the quality of justice itself.  For Masson, placing such 
restrictions on judges has the real potential of compromising their 
independence, a core judicial value.  She feels that reform of the family 
justice system has impacted negatively on the quality of justice in terms of 
the advocacy available for parties, particularly the child’s parents, due to a 
significant decrease in the number of experienced lawyers undertaking public 
law work, because of severe cuts to the legal aid budget.524  
 
A study carried out by Masson et al was designed to find out how the 
changes introduced by the Children and Families Act 2014 and the Public 
Law Outline (PLO) 2014 have impacted on the decisions made in care 
proceedings and on children’s subsequent care.525  The study comprised a 
random sample of care proceedings issued between July 2014 and the end 
of February 2015.  These cases were compared with a sample of cases 
issued by the same local authorities in 2009-2010.  The total sample included 
373 care proceedings cases, involving 616 children.  The interim report on 
this research provides the initial findings on court process and decision-
                                            
521 Children and Family Act 2014, s 14(2)(ii), with amendment to Children Act 1989 under s.32(1)(a)(ii). 
522 ibid s 14(3)(8), with amendment to Children Act 1989 under s 32(8). 
523 ibid s 14(5). 
524 J Masson, ‘Public child law: a service priority?’ (2011) Journal of Social Welfare & Family 
     Law 33 (4) 361. 
525 J Masson, J Dickens, K Bader, L Garside and J Young, How is the PLO working? What is its impact on court 
     process and outcome? - The Outcomes of Care Proceedings for Children Before and After Care Proceedings 
     Reform Study: Interim Report (University of Bristol and the University of East Anglia 2017). 
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making.  The second part of the study, is due to be completed in 2018 and 
will include the perspectives of the Local Authorities and the Judiciary. 
 
The study found that the PLO reduced substantially the length of care 
proceedings, but not all cases were completed within 26 weeks.  
Nevertheless, 60% of cases were completed within this period.526 
 
The introduction of the 26-week deadline has not escaped formal criticism.  
The All Party Parliamentary Group on Child Protection527 highlighted the 
arbitrary nature of this deadline.   They were also of the view that this 
deadline had the potential to hinder the court in making decisions in the best 
interests of children.  The Justice Committee of the House of Commons in 
the same year felt that this timescale could make it more difficult for members 
of the child’s extended family to be assessed as potential carers.528   
 
The tri-borough project was set up in London to test the viability of the 26-
week deadline.  It involved three Local Authorities, Cafcass and one court.  
The 26-week time limit was applied to all new applications between April 
2012 and March 2013.  Results from this project showed that proceedings 
were reduced substantially by adhering to an agreed timetable and a 
reduction in the use of experts.  Completion of proceedings took on average 
27 weeks.  It was also found that there were no delays in making applications 
or in placing children following the application.  However, an evaluation of 
this project found that the pace of work within this period was ‘relentless’, 
with concerns being expressed as to whether such a pace could be 
sustained in the future.529  One of the messages emerging from the 
evaluation was that the system needs to be well resourced and supported at 
all levels, both in the Local Authority and the Family Justice System, to 
                                            
526 J Masson, J Dickens, K Bader, L Garside and J Young, ‘Achieving positive change for children? Reducing the 
     length of child protection proceedings: lessons from England and Wales’ (2017) Adoption and Fostering 
     forthcoming 2017. 
527 All Parliamentary Group, Making Care Proceedings better for Children: A Report by the All Party Parliamentary 
     Group Child Protection (NSPCC 2012). 
528 Justice Committee, Operation of the Family Courts, 6th Report 2010-2012 H.C. para 518. 
529 C Beckett, J Dickens and S Bailey Concluding Care Proceedings within 26 Weeks: Report of the Evaluation of  
     the Tri-Borough Care Proceedings Pilot (Centre for Research on Children and Families, University of East Anglia 
     2013) 52. 
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achieve the 26-week deadline.530  This message was reinforced further in a 
follow-up study of the Tri-Borough Care Proceedings Project.531 
 
In 2009-2010 it took an average of seven weeks to appoint a Guardian.  The 
expectation at that time for the appointment of Guardians was 48 hours.  This 
delay was due to Guardians already having a full workload and therefore 
could not accept additional cases.  To reduce this delay in the appointment of 
Guardians, Cafcass introduced a new way of working, which they called 
‘proportionate working’.  This meant that Guardians were only required to do 
what Cafcass termed ‘a safe minimum’ of work on each case.532  In effect, 
the Guardians’ work was reduced to assessing the Local Authority’s initial 
care plan and advising the court about the need for further expert evidence.  
For the final hearing, the Guardian was required to submit a written 
assessment of the Local Authority’s care plan for the child.  Masson makes 
an important observation in relation to Cafcass’s new approach for Guardians 
representing children in proceedings, by pointing out that such an approach 
prioritises the avoidance of delay over time spent developing a relationship 
with the child.  In this research judges also remarked on the decreasing 
amount of time Guardians spend in working with and getting to know the 
child they are representing.  This change of approach was also criticised 
strongly by the Justice Committee of the House of Commons as not being 
‘child focused’.533  While the Family Justice Review Panel placed strong 
emphasis on the avoidance of delay in making decisions about children’s 
lives,534 Masson et al asserts that it is of equal importance for the right 
decisions to be made in respect of children who are subject to court 
proceedings.535 
 
                                            
530 C Beckett, J Dickens and S Bailey, Concluding Care Proceedings within 26 Weeks: Messages from the 
     Evaluation of the Tri-Borough Care Proceedings Pilot (Centre for Research on Children and Families University 
     of East Anglia 2014). 
531 C Beckett, J Dickens and S Bailey, Outcomes for children of shorter court decision-making processes: A follow- 
     up study of the Tri-Borough care proceedings pilot: Final Report (Centre for Research on Children and Families 
     University of East Anglia 2016) 38. 
532 Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) Operating Framework (Cafcass 2014). 
533 Justice Committee (n 528) para 199. 
534 Family Justice Review Panel, Family Justice Review: Final Report (Ministry of Justice, Department for Education 
     and the Welsh Government 2011) para 2.9. 
535 Masson et al (n 525) 8. 
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The purpose of introducing the 26-week rule was to reduce delay, which is 
both credible and in the child’s best interests, as cases were previously 
taking one to two years to complete.536  Masson and colleagues highlighted 
several areas contributing to this delay including, concerns around the level 
and nature of Guardians’ workload,537 which limit the amount of time and 
direct work undertaken with children (see Chapter 2).  However, the selected 
arbitrary period of 26 weeks has thrown up concerns and created in some 
cases, tensions for judges in their practice.  It is an area that brings together 
the tensions and conflicts between political policies, legal principles and 
judicial values.  
 
The previous coalition Government made it one of their priorities to increase 
significantly the number of children in the care system placed for adoption 
and to reduce the length of time it takes to assess and approve prospective 
adopters.538  Approved adopters are now able to search and inspect 
prescribed parts of the Government’s central adoption register, ‘… for the 
purposes of assisting them to find a child for whom they would be appropriate 
adopters’.539  This political agenda is driven by the belief that local authorities 
are leaving children too long in neglectful and abusive families.540  The 
political drive to speed up the adoption process for children in the care 
system has created real tensions and conflicts within public child law 
proceedings, with judges having to re-state the value of family life, 
particularly in relation to the child’s birth family and their extended birth 
family.  Such conflicts and tensions also raise questions around the judicial 
values of fairness, respect and the ability to listen to parties.  A number of 
judgments have brought these concerns to the fore.  In the next section of 
this chapter a number of cases have been chosen to show how the values of 
fairness, respect and the ability to listen are interpreted by judges in practice, 
in relation to family life. 
 
 
                                            
536 H Laming, The Protection of Children in England: A Progress Report (The Stationery Office 2009) 83.  
537 J Masson, J Pearce and K Bader, Care Profiling Study (Ministry of Justice 2008). 
538 M Narey, The Narey Report: A Blueprint for the Nation's Lost Children (Department for Education 2011). 
539 s 7(4)(1), with addition of s 128a to the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 
540 Narey (n 538). 
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6.4 Judicial Perspectives on Priorities for Children in Care and 
      Adoption Proceedings 
 
In Re B-S a mother was appealing against the refusal to grant her leave to 
oppose the adoption of two of her children.541  Although the mother’s appeal 
was dismissed, the judge, Sir James Munby, P, took the opportunity to re-
state that adoption should only be explored when all other realistic options 
including, placement with the child’s birth family, have been considered 
properly and discounted as not being in a child’s best interests.  This 
reflected an earlier judgment involving similar issues, by Lord Neuberger in 
Re B.542  In the case of Re B the appeal application by the child’s parents 
centred on whether the threshold criteria for significant harm543 had been 
crossed and whether the response of the Local Authority was proportionate 
in applying for a Care Order, the plan being to place the child in an adoptive 
placement. In this case the threshold criteria related to likely future emotional 
harm to the child, due to her mother’s somatisation and factitious illness 
disorders,544 which could have the potential to cause the child future physical 
harm through excessive and inappropriate medical treatment.  This was a 
complex case, with the first instance hearing lasting 20 days.  Part of the 
complexity of this case was the very strong and loving relationship, observed 
by professionals, between child and parents, who attended all their contact 
sessions since their daughter was placed in foster care.  The strength and 
genuineness of this relationship was not in dispute.  The appeal was 
dismissed by a 4:1 majority (Lady Hale dissenting).  In this case the Supreme 
Court found the threshold criteria had been satisfied and that the Local 
Authority’s response and care plan was proportionate.  The court felt that the 
child’s needs and best interests could not be adequately met without the 
support of the statutory services.  However, they also were of the view that 
the provision of such support would be obstructed by the child’s parents.  
                                            
541 Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
542 Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33).   
543 Children Act 1989 (n 2) s31(2) Real or substantial risk of significant harm in the future. Threshold Criteria under 
     s 31(2) states: (a) the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm; and (b) the harm or likelihood of  
     harm is attributable to the care likely to be given to the child if a care order is not made, not being what it would 
     be reasonable to expect a parent to give to the child, or to the child's being beyond parental control 
544 Somatisation and Factitious disorders is a category of psychiatric disorders under the International Code of  
     Diseases ICD-10-CM Diagnosis Codes - Mental, Behavioral and Neurodevelopmental disorders 2017, published  
     by the World Health Organisation (WHO).  They are characterised by the presence of physical symptoms 
     suggesting a medical condition but cannot be fully explained by known medical reasons. 
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Lady Hale in her dissent from the majority judgment was of the view that 
there was no risk that the parents would harm or neglect their daughter.  She 
held that the evidence did not demonstrate that a Care Order was necessary  
to protect the child and that no other option for protection had been explored 
and therefore the Local Authority’s response was not proportionate.545   
 
In contrast, in relation to a Local Authority’s approach, Munby P in his 
judgment in Re B-S was quite forthright in the language he used in relation to 
the option of adoption. He felt it was imperative that the, ‘sloppy practice’ of 
Local Authorities failing to adequately assess all realistic permanency options 
for the child identified by the Court of Appeal must stop.  Munby P went on to 
state that, ‘… it is simply unacceptable in a forensic context, where the issues 
are so grave and the stakes, for both child and parent, so high’.546  This is a 
clear indication, albeit implicit, of the value of family life for children and of the 
judicial values of fairness and respect. 
 
In the case of Re MM 547 a seven-year old child, who at the time, was the 
subject of an interim Care Order and living in foster care, when a special 
guardianship report548 was requested by the court, which spoke positively of 
the child’s great aunt and uncle who prior to the proceedings, the child had 
unsupervised staying contact and was observed to have responded well.  
However, the great aunt and uncle had not been encouraged by the Local 
Authority to participate fully in the proceedings.  The child’s Guardian and the 
Local Authority objected to the child moving from the foster placement.  The 
issues here were whether a further assessment of the child’s needs was 
necessary and whether the child could remain in long-term fostering.  The 
judge in this case refused to permit further assessment of the child’s needs 
and directed that the child should be moved to the care of the great aunt and 
uncle.  This judgment is yet a further acknowledgement of the value of family 
attachments for children and of the judicial value of fairness, based on 
                                            
545 Re B (n 542). 
546 ibid para 40. 
547 MM (long-term fostering: placement with family members: wishes and feelings) [2013] EWHC 2697 (Fam).  
548 Special Guardianship Orders were introduced in the Adoption and Child Act 2002 with s 14A(6) inserted in the 
     Children Act 1989.  Courts can grant a Special Guardianship Order under s 14A (6), (9) Children Act 1989.   
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evidence before the court in relation to the child’s relationship with their great 
aunt and uncle, observed by professionals during staying contact periods.  
The judicial value of respect for a child to be brought up within their natural 
extended family and of the child’s right to identity is evident in this case.  This 
value accords with the spirit of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,549 the 
relevant sections of which will be highlighted as part of the discussion in 
relation to Re C550 later in this section. 
 
In a case brought by North East Lincolnshire Council551 in respect of a child 
who was almost three years old at the time of the hearing, Black J was very 
critical of the Local Authority social workers involved in the case for not being 
balanced in relation to their assessment of the placement options for the child 
within the extended family, namely both sets of grandparents.  This lack of 
balance led Black J to state that they were visibly biased in favour of the 
Local Authority's preferred option of adoption and ignoring the positive 
elements of the child being placed within their extended family.  Black J 
decided to place the child with his grandparents making the point in her 
written judgment that the Local Authority seemed to be looking for an almost 
ideal family without any problems of their own, saying that the courts are not 
in the business of social engineering. 
 
This section of the chapter will conclude with an adoption case, which has 
been re-written from a children’s rights perspective and was part of a 
children’s rights judgment project involving three university law schools in 
England; Liverpool, Newcastle and King’s College London.552  The project 
included 28 judgments covering seven domestic jurisdictions including, 14 
from England and Wales.  
   
The case concerned a 19-year old woman who gave birth to a child E 
following a one-night stand.  She requested the Local Authority to place her 
                                            
549 Adoption and Children Act 2002 s 4(c), (f). 
550 C v XYZ County Council [2008] 1 FLR 1294 para 10. 
551 North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L [2014] EWHC 77 (Fam). 
552 C Fenton-Flynn re-written Judgement re C v XYZ County Council [2008] 1 FLR 1294 in H Stalford, K 
     Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments from Academic Vision to New  
     Practice (Hart 2017). 
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daughter for adoption.  She did not wish for the father of her child to be 
informed of the birth of her daughter.  In the first instance hearing, His 
Honour Judge Taylor decided that under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
the Local Authority had no choice but to carry out enquiries about the child’s 
extended family.   
He held:  
‘ … that when children are adopted they come to a time in their lives 
when they do inquire about their parentage and it would be cruel in the 
extreme to prevent this child having as much knowledge as possible 
about her background in the event that she is adopted, even if that 
information comes without the consent of the mother but as a result of 
the authorities informing themselves of the relevant information’. 
 
He gave the mother 21 days to consider her position and directed the Local 
Authority to disclose the identity of the child to the maternal extended family 
and to the putative father if located and identified. 
 
The mother appealed.  At the time of the hearing the child was four months 
old.  
 
Arden LJ held that Judge Taylor has misdirected himself in relation to the 
obligation of the Local Authority to carry out enquiries in this case.  In her 
leading judgment, she states: 
 
‘The immediate question with which the guardian and local authority 
were concerned was who would look after the child on a long-term 
basis. The inquiries had to be focused on that result’.553 (para 10) 
 
However, Fenton-Glynn in her re-written judgment held, that the above 
question is too narrow in its formulation and as a consequence, Arden LJ’s 
analysis of the issue is distorted.  Fenton-Glynn points out that Arden LJ 
seems to elevate the principle of ‘no delay’ above all the other welfare 
considerations contained in the ‘welfare checklist’ under s1(3) of the Children 
Act 1989 and therefore ‘… fails to take into account the multifaceted nature of 
the child’s interest’.554 
                                            
553 Re C v XYZ County Council [2008] 1 FLR 1294 para 10. 
554 Fenton-Flynn (n 552) para 12. 
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E was 4 months old at the time of the hearing.  Her stability and security were 
considered by Arden to be very important factors, and indeed a priority in this 
case, given her very young age. However, Fenton-Glynn’s view was that to 
focus only on these factors, albeit important ones at this very early stage of 
her life, amounted to quite a narrow and short-term view of E’s welfare.  She 
felt that identifying the father was important, way beyond the issue of long-
term care, in terms of exploring options for the child’s future permanent care 
within the paternal extended family.  Fenton-Glynn accorded the child’s right 
to identity as being of equal importance.  Her approach in this case was very 
much informed by the spirit of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which 
places a high value on the importance to children of life within their birth 
family.  Such an approach is also in accordance with Article 8 ECHR.555   
 
For Fenton-Glynn, ‘The overarching question that must guide the judge, and 
the question of whether enquiries are warranted, is the paramount interests 
of the child. Nothing more, nothing less’.556   In addition, ‘The child’s welfare 
must be interpreted in a much wider manner than a simple focus on long-
term care, to include a more holistic understanding of her best interests.557 
 
Fenton-Glynn relied on the following specific sections of the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002: 
 
(4) The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters 
      (among others) 
 
(c) The likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased 
      to be a member of the original family and become an adopted 
      person, 
 
(f) The relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any 
     other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the 
     relationship to be relevant, including 
 
(ii) The ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or 
     of any such person, to provide the child with a secure 
                                            
555 ECHR Article 8 Right to Family Life 
556 Fenton-Glynn (n 552) para 11. 
557 ibid para 9. 
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     environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise 
     to meet the child’s needs 
  
(iii) The wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of 
      any such person, regarding the child   
 
Accordingly, Fenton-Glynn in her judgment directed the Local Authority: 
   
a) To take steps to identify E’s father, if possible. While the mother 
should not be coerced, the importance of this for E’s right to   
identity, and the possibility of a permanent placement with family, 
should be emphasised to her, and independent steps taken by the 
Local Authority where the father is identifiable;  
 
b) To assess the father (if identifiable) and the grandparents as 
potential carers for E, if they indicate that they would be willing to 
undertake this role.558 
   
The above cases to varying degrees reflect the high value and respect 
judges place in their decisions on children remaining, if possible and 
appropriate, within their birth family including the wider birth family.  They 
also reflect the values of fairness and justice in respect of children and 
parents, who often are faced with pressures from powerful professionals and 
agencies involved in court proceedings, who may have quite different 
agendas in relation to what they consider the best interests of the child.  This 
is an area that concerns Eekelaar and Maclean:559 
‘There must also be concern that the values of the legal process, 
namely holding public authorities to account, showing respect for all 
individuals by treating them fairly and upholding the human rights 
primacy of seeking family reunification may be under threat’.  
 
This threat is further exacerbated by the introduction of the 26-week limit on 
care proceedings,560 which can limit the amount of time available to the Local 
Authority to explore adequately other options for the child within their 
extended family network. 
                                            
558 Fenton-Glynn (n 552) para 38. 
559 J Eekelaar and M Maclean, Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in Uncertain Times (Hart 2013) 
    154. 
560 Children and Families Act 2014 s.14(2)(ii) (26-week rule). 
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Eekelaar and Maclean go on to say that there is a ‘... real concern that the 
ethos that respects these values of the legal process is seen as a source for 
criticism, and that solutions are seen almost entirely in terms of managerial 
efficiency’.561  This view is evidenced clearly in the cases of MM562 and North 
East Lincolnshire Council.563  The latter point made by Eekelaar and Maclean 
highlights the conflict that can arise between the values of ‘managerial 
efficiency’, for example, adoption being seen as a final and neat solution and 
one that is efficient financially, and achieving the best outcomes for children 
who are subject to care and adoption proceedings.  In the research for this 
thesis, judges reflected on these issues and conflicts, particularly those 
tensions between adult-driven agendas and child-centred practice. 
 
6.5 Putting Judicial Values into Practice: a question of resources 
 
The introduction of the 26-week rule was an issue that emerged in this 
research, with one County Court Judge stating: 
 
‘I will do my level best to achieve that 26-week timetable, particularly 
when it comes to the younger children, but there may well be times 
when that is not achievable.  I have always worked on the personal 
basis, that if it takes me three days, three weeks, three months, to 
deliver a decision, which is in the interests of the child in accordance 
with my conscience, that is what will happen’. (County Court Judge) 
 
This County Court Judge went on to highlight real issues about the lack of 
resources in children’s services, particularly in relation to the assessment of 
children’s needs for the court: 
 
‘So much assessment seems to me to be resourced based and I worry 
about the emphasis, with Local Authorities in particular, going towards 
how much money have we got, therefore how much can we afford to 
spend, therefore how much input can we put into the area.  There is 
an awful lot of resource input issues going on here.   
They are under pressure of timescales.  I am driven by time 
constraints; they are driven by time constraints.  It almost seems as if 
it is some kind of a great race to the finish, but, at a higher level, this is 
                                            
561 Eekelaar and Maclean (n 559). 
562 MM (long-term fostering: placement with family members: wishes and feelings) [2013] EWHC 2697 (Fam). 
563 North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L [2014] EWHC 77 (Fam). 
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all justified because the interests of children shouldn’t be delayed.  Are 
we going to run everybody ragged in the process?  A quick decision is 
not necessarily a child focused or the best decision or the one to be 
relied upon.  As long as the decision is delivered quickly that seems to 
be what will do and that worries me.  I’m not advocating slow 
decisions.  Children are not tins of peas coming off a production line.  
Every case, every child is unique’. (County Court Judge) 
 
Another County Court Judge highlighted potential conflicts between the legal 
system, driven by managerial expediency and the principle of no delay and 
the child’s best interests: 
 
‘I think the ‘no delay’ principle is very important for a child’s best 
interests, because I think in the past, far too much emphasis was 
given to the case proceeding, either in the interests of the lawyers or 
in the interests of the parents, and not in the interests of the child.  I 
think therefore that there has been a lack of rigour applied to the 
enforcement of the ‘no delay’ principle.  I have seen examples in 
courts, where cases just proceed along at a snail’s pace and nobody 
really gives any thought to whether or not that particular pace is the 
need of the child.  Having said that, I can think of those cases, far 
fewer, whereby delay in fact is better for the child, because if a child, 
for example, has an obvious preference to live with a parent rather 
than being in foster care, then allowing more time for the parent to 
either achieve or sustain necessary changes, in order for that child to 
then return safely to live with that parent, is in fact the child’s best 
interests, and occasionally the need to progress a case, particularly to 
progress a case in the light of a timetable, such as, for example, 
twenty six weeks, may well act in conflict with the child’s interests, 
because again the imposition of an arbitrary timetable, cases should 
conclude within a specific period of time, may be wholly outside the 
interests of the child in that regard’. (County Court Judge)    
 
For one District Judge, the Judicial Oath takes priority when it comes to 
making a decision about a child’s life: 
 
‘The needs of the child must come first.  I couldn’t live with myself if I 
was to go home thinking, well, I couldn’t get this case completed within 
26 weeks because important evidence, which was probably going to 
have some really life changing impact on this child, is going to take 
longer, so therefore I would say, “No, we are not having it”, I couldn’t 
do that.  To me, I would have difficulty I think in reconciling such an 
approach with my Judicial Oath’. (District Judge) 
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The above judicial views of the reality of their decision-making approach and 
practice, places the child firmly at the centre of proceedings, even if that 
means going against formal timescales and managerial efficiency.  However, 
the real lack of adequate resources was identified by one of the participating 
County Court judges as a factor, which militates against justice for children 
and child-centred judicial decision-making: 
 
‘My own experience is that it would be achievable (26 weeks) if there 
were resources that were put into the system to allow the agencies to 
comply, but we are in a position where we are trying to do it without 
any additional resources.  The Local Authority is telling us that they 
can’t comply.  We are making them comply but we are having shoddy 
assessments from them.  The Official Solicitor, if he is required to 
come in, they are having delays there.  Cafcass is struggling at times 
with meeting deadlines and the analysis that we are getting from 
Cafcass is often poor.  We don’t have any difficulty in terms of them 
been allocated but it is the quality of ability to analyse the issues in the 
case.  There are two contributors to that: experience, we are getting 
younger Guardians who are not as experienced and we are getting 
Guardians who, on the face of it, have insufficient training in 
expectations in respect of court proceedings’. (County Court Judge) 
 
It is a real challenge to disentangle and unpick judicial values amongst these 
tension and conflicts, given that such values are at times influenced and 
constrained by political ideologies and the realities of limited and reducing 
resources, within the family justice system.   
 
6.6 Judicial Values in Practice: A collaborative endeavour 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, judges do not work in isolation.  
They work with and are dependent upon a wide range of professionals to 
inform their decision-making.  The quality of their decisions depends on 
quality of evidence and information provided by these professionals and the 
parties involved in the case.  For Hedley, an experienced retired High Court 
judge, the aim is to find out as much of the truth as possible in each case, 
based on consistent and accurate evidence and information.  However, 
Hedley acknowledges that achieving this aim can be difficult in situations 
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which are highly charged emotionally564, none more so than in care 
proceedings, where the possibility of a child being removed permanently from 
their family.   
 
Regarding the public child law system, Fortin describes a system that is 
adversarial in nature565, ‘Indeed when battle commences, the parents and 
their advisers, social workers and even the judiciary themselves, take up 
such formalised positions that the child at the centre is treated very much as 
a passive pawn’.  This issue was also highlighted in the research for this 
thesis, with one County Court Judge stating: 
 
“I think there is still, even today, a residual view still lingering in the 
system that goes back to the idea of children been seen and not 
heard.  That decisions are made by people who understand these 
things and that other people know best.  We have not really fully 
grasped the idea that children are individuals with rights, who should 
be allowed to participate in decision-making processes in a way, which 
is appropriate for their age.  We tend to dismiss that and think well, 
they don’t know, they are only children”. (County Court Judge) 
 
However, Fortin makes the point that, ‘Sadly, even when they are listened to, 
abused children may regret disclosing their abuse, feeling ignored and 
‘walked over’ by those who try to protect them’.566  She attributes such an 
outcome to the, ‘speed with which decisions to intervene are sometimes 
taken in the early stages, leaving practitioners feeling that they have no time 
to provide the child with explanations’.567 
 
All cases coming before the court originate in the child protection system.  It 
is appropriate, therefore, to look at Munro’s view of the child protection 
system.  Munro in part one of her review of the child protection, carried out 
an analysis of the system.568  She found that an increase over the years of 
bureaucratic rules and detailed procedures was taking from the time 
practitioners could spend with children and their families, while Willow found 
                                            
564 Hedley (n 512) 21. 
565 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law 3rd Edition (Cambridge University 
     Press 2009) 578. 
566 ibid 588. 
567 ibid. 
568 E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Part 1: A Systems Analysis (The 
     Stationery Office 2010) 7. 
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the safeguarding system gave low priority to developing good quality 
relationships with children and was, ‘… frequently omitted’.569  Munro also 
found that there was much less attention being given to the skills 
practitioners needed to engage with children.  This has led to social workers 
having a real difficulty in prioritising their time with children to understand and 
assess their circumstances.  Munro feels that, ‘Building strong relationships 
with children and families with compassion is crucial to reducing 
maltreatment, but trust needs to be placed with care, and ‘respectful 
uncertainty’ towards families, and interest and curiosity in their narratives, 
needs to be part of the practice mindset’570 and Local Authority records, ‘… 
should provide an accurate reflection of the child’s experiences, history and 
observations571. 
 
In the second part of her report Munro looked at the child’s journey through 
the child protection system572 and found that agencies assumed a level of 
certainty in working together, which just did not exist in the field of child 
protection. 
 
In her final report, which put forward a model for a child-centred system, 
Munro placed great emphasis on forming relationships with children and their 
families and felt that in the current system this important area had become 
’obscured’.573  She sees children as a, ‘… key source of information about 
their lives and the impact any problems are having on them in the specific 
culture and values of their family574.  
 
In this research one County Court Judge stated in relation to children being a 
key source of information about their lives: 
 
“They are in one sense the prime witnesses, they are the ones who 
have known from day one what has gone on and they feel”.  
                                            
569 C Willow, ‘Putting Children and Their Rights at the Heart of the Safeguarding Process’ in H Cleaver, P Cawson 
     and S Gorin, Safeguarding Children: A Shared Responsibility  (Wiley Blackwell Jones 2009) 112.  
570 Munro (n 293) 18. 
571 ibid 58. 
572 E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Interim Report: The Child’s Journey 
     (The Stationery Office 2011a) 90. 
573 E Munro, (2011b) The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report: A Child-Centred  
    System (The Stationery Office 2011b) 8. 
574 ibid 25. 
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For another County Court Judge the principle of paramountcy and judicial 
accountability to children and their families are very much linked and requires 
that the relationship between the child and the system is given priority in the 
context of judicial practice. 
 
“We are accountable to the families in these proceedings and if the 
child’s welfare is paramount then we are accountable to the child 
above all else”. 
 
The above picture of the child protection system has serious implications for 
the public child law system and for the judges who work within it.  The quality 
of services provided to children by the Local Authority inevitably impinge on 
the reality of judicial practice and on the quality of judicial decision-making. It 
was an issue that was highlighted in this research:   
 
“I think it is inevitable however conscientious you are, that the busier 
you get after a certain point the quality of your decision-making 
declines because you do not have the time to take into account every 
feature.  You do not have the capacity to investigate and the more 
pressurised the system becomes, after a point, the quality of the 
decision-making goes down.  Our responsibility in any given case is to 
say, stop, this needs more time.  Above the statistics or the 
Government guidelines, that it is our responsibility.  Of course your 
willingness to do that, your ability to do that is constrained by the 
amount of pressure that there is around”. 
 
It is clear that judges in this research are having at times to base their 
decisions on less than complete or inadequate information, often hurriedly 
collected and assessed, and the lack of available appropriate resources.  
This undermines the judicial values of fairness and justice.  Stalford and 
Hollingsworth make a pertinent point in this regard: ‘The judge’s ability to 
hear and reflect in his or her judgment an individual’s experiences (including 
an individual child) is therefore constrained by the version of the facts and the 
evidence presented’.575  Judges in this research acknowledge a number of 
these factors.  One County Court judge said: 
 
                                            
575 H Stalford and K Hollingsworth, ‘Judging Children’s Rights: Tendencies, Tensions, Constraints and 
      Opportunities’ in H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds) Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From  
      Academic Vision to New Practice (Hart forthcoming 2017) 37.  
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“We are doing our best, but it is far from straightforward simply 
because of lack of resources and by that I mean court time, I mean 
social work time, I mean Guardian time, I mean solicitor’s representing 
parents, many of whom, parents that is, are inadequate.  Can they 
comply with all these timescales? so that ultimately you arrive at a fair 
child-centred decision.  It is a real challenge.  The conflict, if you like, 
are these excellent principles, excellent guidance, excellent working 
practices coming up against reducing resources.  That is the principal 
conflict”. 
 
Another County Court judge in relation to the child’s right to respect for their 
family life under Article 8 ECHR stated: 
 
“You have parents who, given time beyond 26 weeks, could probably 
achieve enough parenting; assessments, all sorts of input from 
support services; psychological, social, family therapy and so on that 
could enable the child to return to the birth family, but not within the 
timescale for the child, which is the 26 weeks …. That is a tension 
straight away between the right of the child to be brought up within its 
birth family and yet the delay that might achieve that for the child, 
being such that the child can’t wait”. 
     
For one County Court judge the lack of resources presents a real conflict for 
the application of the judicial value of fairness: 
 
“The question of what support is offered to families by Local 
Authorities with resource issues is a real conflict because sometimes 
you think, “I could put this child back into, say with a family with a 
learning-disabled parent, but I know that the level of support the 
experts tell me they need will not be provided because there isn’t a 
resource for it.  I think that is a practical issue.  The idea of working in 
partnership with families requires some resource that isn’t always 
there”. 
 
The uneasy relationship between resources and the threshold of significant 
harm for one County Court judge raised many challenging and searching 
issues for judicial decision-making: 
 
“The case law on threshold criteria under Section 31 of the Act 
(Children Act 1989) before the State is justified on intervening, 
emphasise the broad range of eccentric parenting that should be seen 
as eccentric parenting rather than harmful.  If you couple that with the 
extreme shortage of social child service resources, then that result is 
that there is not intervention in a vast range of families where there 
ought to be intervention and where intervention would improve the 
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outcomes for the children.  We have struck a balance.  On the one 
hand, it is an economic balance, we do not have the money to spend 
on it and on the other it is a principled balance.  We have decided that 
parents can beat their children to a degree so long as they don’t go 
too far that inhibits best outcomes for children, because otherwise you 
may have to take (20%) of children from their parents.  You would also 
intervene a lot earlier than you do at the moment”. 
  
The picture emerging from this research is one of system-centred priorities, 
which are often determined by financial considerations including politically 
driven initiatives.  This is an issue touched on by Stalford and Hollingsworth: 
‘Even when there is a willingness to allude explicitly to children’s rights, it is 
often with a view to legitimising decisions that reinforce adults’ or the State’s 
interests rather than children’s rights. Scratch beneath the surface and we 
often find that it impacts only superficially on the reasoning and outcome’.576 
In the end, such priorities take over and the priority that should be given to 
the paramountcy of the child’s welfare577 takes second place. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
The material cited in this chapter and the findings of this research indicate a 
less than child-centred approach in relation to children’s best interests and 
welfare.   As discussed in chapter 2, the reality of Local Authorities having to 
cope with severe cuts to their budgets means that they do not have adequate 
resources to provide a service that is primarily focused on meeting children’s 
needs.  Children who are subject to proceedings are amongst the most 
vulnerable in our society, yet the systems that are meant to be protecting and 
safeguarding their interests find themselves lacking the resources to carry 
out their duties and responsibilities.  Judicial decision-making is having to 
accommodate an ill resourced child protection system and is itself a system 
depleted of resources as a result of cutbacks in the legal aid budget.  In such 
an environment, it is a real challenge at times for the judiciary to apply judicial 
values, such as fairness, justice and respect.  In the research for this study, 
judges were very clear about their role in upholding these core values, 
                                            
576 Stalford and Hollingsworth (n 575) 21. 
577 s 1(1) The Children Act 1989. 
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despite the constraints imposed by statutory timescales and a lack of 
resources within the family justice system.  However, they also 
acknowledged an unease in the reality of their judicial practice, at having to 
make decisions on children’s best interests and welfare, where the number of 
available realistic options are reduced significantly, given the lack of 
resources.  Such restrictions inevitably take from and dilute the application of 
the judicial values of fairness and justice in relation to children and their 
families including, the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of ECHR. 
This research has found that the experience of judges is, at times, one of 
tension between achieving their judicial obligations, their personal value 
system and the challenges that the child protection system may present in 
terms of process and resourcing of judicial decisions.  Such tensions can 
contribute to less than child-centred outcomes.  
 
Enabling children to feel more involved in proceedings and to be assured that 
the Judge is aware of their true wishes and feelings, is becoming more 
obscure given the current operating framework of Cafcass, limiting direct 
work with children to ‘a safe minimum’.578  The child’s Guardian is the ears 
and eyes of the court.  Given the significant reduction in time spent in direct 
contact with children, there is a real danger of Guardians producing shallow 
rather than in-depth assessments of the children’s circumstances and needs.  
Doing the ‘safe minimum’ does not facilitate forming a meaningful 
relationship with children, an essential requirement of a child-centred system 
highlighted by Munro in her review of the child protection system.579  This 
approach by Cafcass has also been criticised by both the All Party 
Parliamentary Committee on child protection580 and the Justice Committee of 
the House of Commons,581 for not being child focused. 
 
 
  
                                            
578 Cafcass (n 350). 
579 Munro (n 293).  
580 All Party Parliamentary Committee on Child Protection (n 527). 
581 Justice Committee of the House of Commons (n 528). 
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Chapter 7 
 
Towards a Child-centred Public Child Law System  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers how we move towards building a child-centred system 
that is rights-based and is inclusive of and transparent to children.  A system 
that is centred on the child’s needs, wishes and feelings, rather than on the 
needs and priorities of the system.  Given the very real distance between the 
child and their proceedings, the voice of the child needs to be an integral, 
valued and respected part of the public child law system and of the 
paramountcy principle, which underpins this system.  A child-centred system 
needs also to be a family-centred system, as the child’s family is the centre of 
their world, albeit a neglectful and abusive world.  Given the high level of 
vulnerability of a child who is subject to proceedings, the system needs to be 
a listening one, with the capacity and resources to reflect.  Such reflection 
needs to pervade the entire process of pre-proceedings, the proceedings 
themselves and post-proceedings, guided and informed by research. 
 
The focus of the chapter will be on moving from a system-centred system to 
a system where the child occupies actively a central position at all stages of 
their proceedings.  The barriers and enablers to hearing and empowering 
children to participate directly in proceedings are explored and discussed, 
through the perspectives of judges in this research including their views on 
the training needs of professionals working in the system, with the aim of 
moving to a default position where the choice for children of direct 
participation (expressing their views directly to the judge) is a statutory 
requirement.  The chapter then puts forward a model for child-centred 
decision-making followed by an example of a case revisited by the 
researcher and re-imagined through the lens of a children’s rights 
perspective.  
 
 
 
150 
 
7.2 From system-centred to a child-centred system 
 
A child’s competence or more particularly, their perceived lack of 
competence from the perspectives of adults, is in evidence throughout the 
history of childhood.582  Assessment of competence based on their age and 
level of understanding of their situation and circumstances, (see Chapters 2 
and 4) has been and remains the yardstick by which we assess the level of 
importance given to children’s views of their lived experience.   
 
Although the above reality is a very real obstacle to moving to a child-centred 
system, judges in this research point to potentially productive ways forward.  
A county court judge put forward the idea of professionals involved in the 
system being informed regularly by children who have gone through the care 
system.  
 
“I would start with much more involvement of children who have gone 
through the care system because they can inform everybody who is 
involved in the process about the pitfalls.  I see a care plan, for 
example, and it all looks very good and I know that in six months’ time 
the situation for that child may be completely different and you need 
more input from people who have gone through the system, who know 
what actually happens.  What happens are the multiple changes of 
placement.  The rate of adoption breakdown is very high but we are 
always told that there is a loving family out there for this child, despite 
his extreme difficulties and behaviour, it is all going to be a golden 
future and it isn’t.  I would involve children who now would be young 
adults who have gone through the care system and who have a 
different perspective on how good the outcome was for them.  I would 
bring them in to help us to understand better what was likely to 
happen.  You cannot bring people like that into individual cases but 
there could be a way, I can’t think what it would be, of bringing into 
consideration what actually happens”. 
 
Another county court judge felt that the system needs to be more open and 
accessible to both children and parents: 
 
“I would also like the system to engage more with young people …. 
We need to empower young people to report concerns without fear of 
                                            
582 H Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500 (Pearson 2005). 
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repercussions and, having reported it, it is essential that those 
concerns are dealt with properly”. (County Court Judge) 
 
This same judge felt the system also needs to become more inquisitorial 
rather than adversarial, which is very much in line with the spirit of the 
Children Act 1989,583 with the following caution: 
 
“That is not to say that you would get rid of the parents’ rights to 
representation.  They raise things that you haven’t thought of.  It is 
wrong for any of us to think that we have all the answers. Counsel and 
solicitors, especially for the children, often raise things”. (County Court 
Judge) 
  
An important element of the child-centred model proposed later in this 
chapter will reflect the above elements put forward by judges.  The model is 
about creating a system that is more inquisitorial and more inclusive in 
approach through empowering facilitating all parties to contribute to finding 
the best way forward in meeting the best interests of the child.  
 
The reality is however, ‘… although, by statute, the welfare of the child is our 
paramount concern, the child is, by and large, completely invisible in 
court’.584  Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division of the High 
Court, has stated that regardless of the availability of the child’s Guardian 
and the Local Authority social worker to communicate the child’s views: 
 
‘… it is surely essential that, if the child wants to, the child should be 
able to communicate with the court independently, saying whatever 
the child wants to say and using whatever means the child is most 
comfortable with … And this should surely extend to the child being 
able to see the judge face to face if that is what the child wants’.585   
 
 
Touching on the factor of age in relation to children giving evidence, Munby P 
maintains that: ‘The idea that family judges should be seeing or hearing 
evidence from children only if they are or will soon be teenagers has ceased 
                                            
583 Department of Health (1991) The Children Act 1989: The Care of Children – Principles and Practice in 
     Regulations and Guidance (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1991). 
584 J Munby, ‘Unheard voices: the involvement of children and vulnerable people in the family justice system’.  The 
     annual lecture of The Wales Observatory on Human Rights of Children and Young People at the College of Law,  
     Swansea University delivered on 25 June 2015. 
585 ibid. 
152 
 
to be tenable, if it ever was’.586  Munby’s perspective of a child’s position in 
proceedings is one that potentially could facilitate our present public child law 
system becoming one that welcomes and values children’s contribution to 
their proceedings and that their contribution is considered as an integral part 
of the decision-making process throughout, from investigations to court 
hearings.  
 
In this research, judges felt that for an approach to be child-centred in nature, 
requires an attitude change.  To embed such an approach in both judicial 
thinking and practice, a District Judge reflected:  
 
“I do think that we all need to have some sort of humility about that 
and to be reminded of the fact that removal of a child into care is a 
very, very traumatic thing for the child.  It is no guarantee that the child 
will thrive because the care system, whether it is a foster home, 
whether it is in an adoptive family, is fraught with its own difficulties”. 
(District Court Judge) 
 
A starting point in creating a child-centred approach, for one High Court 
Judge, is to recognise the nature and reality of proceedings: 
 
“I think I would start by recognition that child public law is necessarily a 
very bitter business, in the sense that what the State is doing in 
increasing numbers of cases is the permanent removal of children 
from families.  It is very difficult when that is what is happening for it to 
be friendly and charming.  It is a very bitter business.  I think we need 
not to lose sight of that”. (High Court Judge) 
 
A county court judge summarised where the focus should be: 
 
“The important thing first of all is to get it right.  We are making huge 
decisions on behalf of our children and clearly it is very important that 
the child understands what is happening, why it is happening and has 
input into that”. (County Court Judge) 
 
In addition, for another county court judge, the quality of such decisions is an 
important factor: 
                                            
586 Munby (n 583). 
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“I think it is inevitable however conscientious you are, that the busier 
you get after a certain point the quality of your decision-making 
declines because you do not have the time to take into account every 
feature.  You do not have the capacity to investigate and the more 
pressurised the system becomes, after a point, the quality of the 
decision-making goes down.  Our responsibility in any given case is to 
say, stop, this needs more time.  Above the statistics or the 
Government guidelines, that it is our responsibility.  Of course, your 
willingness to do that, your ability to do that is constrained by the 
amount of pressure that there is around”.  (County Court Judge) 
 
Munro also felt that there needs to be a clear focus on children’s best 
interests throughout a child’s journey through the system.  She found in 
relation to social work assessments, ‘limited accounts of the child’s 
experience’ rather than an accurate and balanced story of the child’s life 
including, their experiences and history.587  As the starting point for 
proceedings, this aspect of the process should be focused on the child’s best 
interests. 
 
Judges in this research felt that the public law process itself should be a 
listening, just and friendly one and one that is transparent and accountable to 
all parties including the child, with decisions being based on the child’s 
needs.  Their priority in terms of being child-centred in their approach was to 
make the right and just decision in respect of the child, based on the child’s 
needs and welfare.  However, Judges acknowledged that the court’s 
timetable, namely the 26-week time limit for proceedings588 has the potential 
to limit the child-centred nature of proceedings.  Masson also acknowledged 
that limited resources combined with the pressure of completing cases within 
26 weeks may make the task of delivering a humane system very difficult.589  
This issue has been explored and discussed further in Chapter 4.  
 
A county court judge acknowledged the need for judges to reflect on their 
practice and decision-making and suggested the following exercise: 
                                            
587 E Munro, Munro Review of Child Protection – Part 1: A Systems Analysis (The Stationery Office 2010) 58. 
588 Public Law Outline (n 368). 
589 J Masson, ‘Third (or fourth) time lucky for care proceedings reform?’ (2015) 27 (1) Child and Family Law 
     Quarterly 22. 
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“If one conducted a meditative exercise and sat a whole load of 
Judges down in a very quiet room on comfortable bean bags and said, 
right, shut your eyes.  Think your way back to when you were 7 or 8 or 
9 or 10 and bad things happen to you and all of a sudden you found 
yourself in foster care; strange home and environment.  If someone 
did that with us and then got us to the bit about court proceedings, 
what we tell children at the moment, it might just get us thinking, why 
do we do it this way?”.  
 
Guardians, who under legislation,590 are entrusted with the responsibility for 
representing the voice of the child in proceedings, need to develop a close 
and meaningful relationship with the child in order to provide the court with 
accurate and up-to-date analysis of the child’s circumstances and needs.  
However, the following interview extract outlines in some detail issues around 
the quality of such analysis:   
 
“What you need to see from a Guardian in the initial analysis, what 
you need to see from the Local Authority in their initial evidence is, 
what is the prospect of change?  In the 6-10 weeks that we have got, 
what are we looking for in terms of indicators that these parents may 
be on board with change?  The vast majority of cases are neglect 
cases.  In some instances, it is not like that.  What we are getting is 
narrative.  In the case of the Guardian’s analysis, sometimes it is just 
tick box and that is it.  Whereas, 18 months ago I would be waiting to 
see what the Guardian’s analysis was because this would highlight 
issues for me from the perspective of the child.  What needed to be 
done?  Did the child need work?  Should there be any additional 
support put in for the child?  What does the child understand about the 
proceedings and about the process?  I am not getting that now.  
Sometimes the last document I will read will be the Guardian’s 
analysis, because it is not going to tell me anything. (County Court 
Judge)  
 
Reflecting on the reality of the relationship between the child and their 
Guardian and the impact of this relationship on the child’s participation, 
another county court judge stated, “I would very strongly say that Guardians 
have lost the direct link to children.  How can children feel part of it?”   
  
                                            
590 s 41 The Children Act 1989. 
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In relation to the realities of Local Authority practice, the following extract is 
the experience of one county court judge: 
 
“I can get a case where you will have five, six, seven social workers in 
the life of a case, that is not child-centred.  That is the opposite of 
child-centred.  What will happen is, they will be with the children in 
need team, then on issue they will be with an allocation team and then 
on the making of the first ICO (Interim Care Order) they will go to the 
looked after team, then after the first LAC (Looked After Child) Review 
they will go to another team, then that social worker will be an agency 
social worker, we have a real problem with agency social workers; 
who are very transient.  During that term you will probably find there 
can be 2 or 3 agency social workers who will go”.   
 
“I have had in a space of 5 months, after a final Care Order had been 
made but had gone up to the Court of Appeal, I had 4 social workers, 
none of who had read the file, none of who had read my judgement, 
so they were making decisions in relation to this child without any 
proper understanding of the complex issues in the case. That is not 
unusual but there will be no consistency in terms of either the social 
worker or at times, the team manager.  I think that undermines any 
child-centred way of working”. (County Court Judge) 
 
Continuity of professionals in a child’s life, time spent with the child and close 
and meaningful relationships, are three elements considered essential by 
judges for a child-centred way of working with children.  Research among 
children in the looked-after system which looked at the impact of a number of 
the above elements found they had a significant impact on the well-being of 
children.591  611 children and young people from the looked-after system took 
part in this research, covering six local authority areas in England.  The 
majority (77%) of the children and young people were living in foster care 
with 16% in kinship care placements, 3% in residential care and 4% in a 
variety of other placements including, mother and baby homes, semi-
independent living, hostel accommodation, or living with a parent.   
 
                                            
591 J Selwyn and L Briheim-Crookall, Our lives Our Care: Looked after Children’s views on their well-being 
     (University of Bristol and Coram Voice 2017). 
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The purpose of this study was to obtain children’s perspectives of their sense 
of personal well-being.  The term well-being in this study means how children 
feel in terms of their happiness, life satisfaction, life having meaning.   
 
Children were asked about the number of social workers they had in the 
previous 12 months.  69% of the young people had had more than one social 
worker during this period, which included 31% having had three or more 
social workers and 38% having two social workers in the previous year.592  In 
response to the question about what would make their care better, a striking 
response from one young person who stated:  ‘By not having 14 social 
workers in three years’.593  The majority of children felt their care would be 
better if they could retain their social worker.  Regarding their involvement in 
decision-making, children who did not feel involved in decisions made about 
their lives were, ‘…three times more likely to have low well-being in 
comparison with those who felt included most or some of the time.594 
 
Among the recommendations of the report, is the importance that needs to 
be attached to children having a constant trusted adult in their lives, 
particularly children in the look-after system, where they may have no contact 
with either parent or have a number of changes of social worker.  Children in 
this study found they were unable to contact adults when they felt they 
needed help and support,595 which contribute to heightened levels of 
vulnerability and uncertainty about their future lives.  The children who took 
part in this study felt that their social worker was an important person in their 
lives and where frequent changes of social worker occurred, this caused the 
children great upset.  The report recommended that: ‘Stability of social 
workers should be a national priority, as children in all local authorities 
reported frequent changes of workers’.596 
   
                                            
592 Selwyn and Briheim-Crookall (n 591)11. 
593 ibid. 
594 ibid 30. 
595 ibid 33. 
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These findings along with data from this research indicate that the 
importance and priority given to such elements are being affected adversely 
by a lack of professional time and resources available for children in the 
system and therefore their importance in relation to children’s lives is not 
receiving adequate attention, resulting in a less than child-centred approach 
to working with children (see Chapter 4). 
 
7.2.1 Judicial perspectives of what a child-centred system should look like 
 
In this research, Judges were asked to outline their vision of a child-centred 
public child law system, notwithstanding the realities of significant budget 
cuts and the lack of resources.  Giving children unique individual attention 
throughout the process was seen as an essential element of a well-resourced 
child-centred system: 
 
“To direct assessments and to be able to expect that people only had 
to do what needed to be done at the time and didn’t have to balance 
lots of other cases at the same time.  Every individual case got the 
unique attention of everybody who was involved in it, where children, 
given their ability to participate, in terms of age, intellect and the rest, 
would participate”. (District Judge)  
 
A county court judge reflected at length about a total mind shift required to 
create a child-centred system: 
 
“I think in the first place we probably have a total mind shift and decide 
a child should be present at every hearing, unless there was a reason 
for them not to be.  That may well be up to a certain age, that they are 
too young, much too boring for them or whatever.  Rather than starting 
on the basis that it is pretty surprising to see the child there, maybe we 
should start the other way round and say, “Well, actually the case is all 
about this child, so the child should be there unless there is a  
reason for them not to be”.  I can see in many cases there would be, 
there may be all sorts of sexual or personal details that are to be 
given.  That would be perhaps a mind-set that which would cause us 
to look at things differently.  We ought then to have a system that 
requires the Judge to create for any hearing that involves the child, 
something appropriate to the age of that child, to tell the child where 
the case has got to and why.  It might even be appropriate to start 
before that and say that at the very point of social work involvement if 
the child is of any age of understanding, just as one would talk about 
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doing a life story book or something at the end of the case, at the start 
of the case may be the child needs to have a bit of information as to 
why they are not living with Mummy and Daddy and rather than that 
being something that the Guardian has always had to do and had to 
explain, maybe that should be the court’s function as well to provide 
some sort of explanation of that.  Perhaps if we had the money, what 
we would do is, we would always have the facility for the child at least 
to be on the video link.  The child might want to be there.  That also 
would cover some of the problems; perhaps of bits of evidence not 
being appropriate for the child to hear about what Mummy or Daddy 
are supposed to have said.  The Judge would be saying, “Well, John, 
we are just going to have to turn off the television for a minute or two 
and that will give you a chance just to have a bit of a break because I 
need to discuss something with Mummy and Daddy’s barrister before 
we carry on”.  That would be a relatively simple thing to do”. 
 
An experienced magistrate from the family proceedings court felt it was 
important in creating a child-centred system and maintaining the child-
centred nature of the system, that feedback from the child following the 
completion of proceedings, is sought, valued, welcomed and acted on.  This 
magistrate also focused on the need to keep in mind as part of this process, 
the child’s emotional needs when they reach adulthood: 
 
“That children were interviewed after the process, however they do it 
and however it should be done, and would feel that they have been 
involved, that they understood what was going on, whether they were 
informed orally or otherwise and they knew what was being done at 
that court hearing and they understood in terms of their life-story, why 
the decisions were made.  For example, if I am involved, if we are 
writing reasons for a Care Order or a Placement Order, then you are 
bearing in mind that somebody at the age of 18 may want to read that 
and they want to know that their mother loved them and that their 
parents were involved but that these were the reasons for their 
decision at the time and that needs to be borne in mind, so that they 
can access them and help them have things understood”. (Magistrate 
– Family Proceedings Court) 
 
Improving the quality of the current system by giving judges more time on 
cases to enable them focus more on the child was crucial for one county 
court judge, as was continuity of judges in cases in relation to improving the 
child’s experience of the process: 
 
I would have more time to read the papers earlier on in the case, get 
to grips with the issues in more detail of pre-directions hearings.  Start 
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taking well informed decisions without just simply rushing through a 
directions hearing.  Instead of allowing two hours for a hearing, why 
don’t we allow half a day so that we can spend more time on it.  If we 
were improving the quality of the system, give more time to the Judges 
to work on the cases, that would obviously help, because we could 
focus more on the children, we could do more work in advance.  Let 
us ditch half hour hearings.  Let us make every half hour hearing two 
hours so that the Judge can really sit and read and think about it and 
do much more work and not just rely upon the barristers and the 
solicitors presenting the case for us.  We have a lot of difficulties with 
getting the same Judge for the same case all the time because a lot of 
different Judges, lot of different cases and sometimes it is expedient 
for the cases to be heard by any Judge, just to get the case listed.  
Judicial continuity definitely improves the experience for all concerned 
and in particular the children”. (County Court Judge)  
 
Having a system that is less adversarial and more inclusive of children and 
their families was put forward by one judge as a way of achieving a more 
child-centred decision-making process: 
 
“I would like to see the adversarial elements taken out of and 
segregated from the inquisitorial aspects of welfare.  You have got to 
understand parents.  Human beings being human beings and human 
nature is human nature, there needs to be a much less adversarial 
and much more inquisitorial process at the outset in the form of some 
sort of group conference.  There needs to be a Judge involved, a pre-
proceedings process, where everybody is able to sit round and work 
out what the main points are and the children participate and are 
represented”. (County Court Judge) 
 
In the same vein and recognising the need for proceedings to be fair for all 
parties involved, in accordance with Article 6 ECHR, while at the same time 
keeping the focus on the child’s central position in proceedings, another 
county court judge proposed: 
 
“A Judge led inquisitorial system rather than the adversarial system.  
The ability of parents to challenge a plan to make assessment 
demands before a decision is made, all of that is right and that is 
important.  If it is going to be a child-centred system, then we have to 
put the child in the centre and that necessarily moves away from the 
adversarial system, where the parties are in control”. (County Court 
Judge)   
 
However, the above judge also acknowledged the resource implications for 
such a system: 
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“Personally, if you are going to do the Judge led inquisitorial system, 
then you need to be spending at least 80% of your time doing this sort 
of work because that is how you develop the evaluative skills, the 
knowledge, the ability to predict the evidence that you are likely to 
need, your confidence to challenge what you are presented with and 
your ability to drive the case.  Sometimes there isn’t time to reflect”.   
 
The following proposal by a district judge for more direct involvement of 
judges in cases to facilitate a more child-centred approach and process, is a 
radical departure from the present system and may not sit well with human 
rights legislation in relation to the rights of other parties: 
 
“I think you probably take the court to the children.  The court wouldn’t 
be a court room, like this, you would go down to the local primary 
school or youth community centre and hold the court somewhere like 
that.  You would probably spend time with the child yourself as the 
Judge, getting to know the child a bit and talking to them.  It would be 
much more inquisitorial.  It would probably throw out many of the 
Human Rights, right to a fair trial aspects that we have got.  If a child 
could design it, it would really be a radical change.  You would make it 
more informal and more going to the child, where the child was, 
probably the Judge and let us say a Guardian to talk to the child 
together.  It is more like the French system, more like the Scottish 
system, that is, more less human rights based.  You would be taking 
people’s evidence, perhaps taking the parents’ evidence in court in a 
formal way but you would also add on a lot more child-centred work 
that happens.  You might spend a day a week going to see children.  
That would be part of involving them and part of really child-centring 
it”. (District Court Judge)  
 
A county court judge in their response outlined a number of quality issues in 
relation to practice within the system that prevents it from being child-
focused:    
 
“My own experience is that it would be achievable if there were 
resources that were put into the system to allow the agencies to 
comply, but we are in a position where we are trying to do it without 
any additional resources.  The Local Authority is telling us that they 
can’t comply.  We are making them comply but we are having shoddy 
assessments from them.  The Official Solicitor, if he is required to 
come in, they are having delays there.  CAFCASS is struggling at 
times with meeting deadlines and the analysis that we are getting from 
CAFCASS is often poor.  We don’t have any difficulty in terms of them 
been allocated but it is the quality of ability to analyse the issues in the 
case.  There are two contributors to that; experience, we are getting 
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younger Guardians who are not as experienced and we are getting 
Guardians who, on the face of it, have insufficient training in 
expectations in respect of court proceedings”. (County Court Judge) 
 
The need to work with the child’s family and having a holistic approach in 
working with child was viewed by one judge as an essential component of 
child-centred working: 
 
“You have got to treat a family.  My system would be dealing with the 
ills of a family, that would be my core principle, within which the 
interests of the child were paramount, but you can’t deal with the child 
without dealing with the family.  That family is the flowerbed, that is 
where the child is, whether we like it or not, that is the bit of ground 
you have got.  Holistically, you have to deal with all of that, you can’t 
just say, oh dear me, you know this plant needs watering.  Well of 
course the plant needs watering, but it is no good having a huge rose 
bush at the side of it that is stopping the light getting to it.  You have to 
have a holistic approach.  It is family law; it is law about dealing with 
the family”. (County Court Judge) 
 
The location and physical environment of the court was viewed by one 
county court judge as important in establishing and facilitating a child-centred 
approach to proceedings, reflecting the spirit of rule 8 of the Family 
Proceedings Rules:597 
 
“The family court would be a completely different building away from 
other courts, designed in a completely different way.  I would do away 
with the normal structures that one would expect in a court of a raised 
bench and platforms.  I would have the child in a position of obvious 
superiority to everybody else, by putting them in an area where they 
could, at the very least be at the same level, on eye line level with, if 
not looking slightly down upon, the other people involved.  I would 
have a system built around the particular needs of each child and 
trying to work out how a case could fit in with their life”. (County Court 
Judge)   
 
A lack of funding was a major issue for one county court judge including, the 
serious implications of this for making decisions about a child’s life: 
 
“Properly funded proceedings.  The cut-backs in legal aid I think have 
caused some difficulties in terms of the provision of material for the 
court.  For example, if you have got reports that are required you get 
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more often than not, the legal aid agency saying, “They won’t pay or 
they won’t make a contribution”.  At the moment the cost is 
disproportionately picked up by the Local Authority, so you have to 
have regard to resources and so forth.  My view would be, you should 
have what you need.  This decision that you are making for this child 
is life changing.  You can’t do it on the cheap you should have what 
you need.  Presently, you don’t have what you need”. (County Court 
Judge). 
 
Another county court judge highlighted the quality of professional practice as 
a real obstacle to creating a child-centred system: 
 
“In my world of unlimited money, there would be time for social 
workers to do their jobs better; to be able to spend more time with 
children.  I feel social workers and Guardians, if I hear the phrase 
“proportionate working” from one more Guardian …. which means I 
haven’t met this child at all or I went out once at the beginning of the 
case but it is only a fairly small child, I have not bothered to go back.  I 
haven’t talked to the parents other than at court.  I haven’t gone out 
and visited them because they are using drugs, so what is the point’. 
(County Court Judge) 
 
The dominance of children and parents’ needs and the lack of adequate 
resources within the system to meet their needs emerge clearly from the data 
in this research.  These themes and issues are reflected in judges’ 
perspectives, not only on unmet needs but on the contributing factors that 
have real potential to detract from a child-centred approach being adopted by 
the system.  While judges’ focus and aim is to make decisions that are just, 
fair and right for the child, such decisions are sometimes based on less than 
adequate information and a lack of clear analysis of the evidence contained 
in such information about the child and their family.  Judges felt they were 
making decisions at times about children’s lives, where a limited amount of 
time and work with the child had taken place.  Listening to children is 
essential if justice is to be achieved.598  Munro placed great emphasis on the 
need for professionals to make time to listen to children and reflect before 
and after they make decisions about children’s lives, as she felt, ‘The 
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centrality of forming relationships with children and families to understand 
and help them has become obscured”.599 
 
The expectation of both the child and their family is that the decision of the 
system will be just and right for the child, based on their needs, welfare and 
development.  A picture emerges from the data of a system in which the 
judge is between the child and their family on one side and the child’s 
Guardian and social worker on the other.  The judge depends on the 
Guardian and the child’s social worker for information and analysis of the 
evidence and yet has limited influence on these professionals and their 
respective systems, given the acknowledged lack of resources in both 
systems (see Chapter 6).   
 
Judges in this research also identified training needs for professionals 
working in the system, with a view to facilitating a more child-centred 
approach to proceedings.  Such needs have the potential to block the 
development of a more child-centred and child-involved decision-making 
process.  
 
7.2.2 Training needs to improve professional practice 
 
Unmet training needs can contribute adversely to child-centred judicial 
decision-making, thus impoverishing the nature and quality of outcomes for 
children.  Training for professionals in this area is being addressed by the 
Council of Europe HELP programme, which is part of their family law and 
child-friendly justice initiative.  The aim of this training is to enhance the 
capacity of judges, lawyers and prosecutors of all 47 States to apply the 
ECHR in their daily work.600 
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A district court judge in this research felt that there was a need for the 
threshold of knowledge among all professionals working in the system needs 
to be higher, given the importance of their roles and tasks: 
 
“For me personally, I would like to see the threshold of knowledge 
being higher, because we are dealing with such fundamental issues, 
of such fundamental importance, not just to the children, but to parents 
and indeed to wider society as well.  I think the better informed the 
Judges are, frankly, the better the decision-making will be and 
probably the more effective they will be in getting through the work”. 
(District Court Judge) 
  
Two main areas where training was needed emerged from this research.  
Improvement of skills in collecting, marshalling, analysing and presenting 
evidence was identified by judges as a priority, particularly in relation to 
social workers and children’s Guardians.  Judges in this research expressed 
concern about the quality and analysis of evidence presented to the court 
and felt that too much importance was being placed on just reciting facts and 
outlining the chronological history of the case.  This they felt could impact 
adversely on the decision-making process, as clear options based on the 
analysis of information and evidence was not available to the judge, either in 
written statements and reports or in the oral evidence during the hearing.  
Recent judgments have highlighted this issue, with a particular focus on the 
lack of a balanced exploration and analysis of all reasonable options for the 
child’s future care601 (see chapter 6).  The second area to emerge from the 
data was the need for training all professionals including judges, in 
communication skills with children.  This need includes training which 
focuses on the centrality of the child’s position and their needs within 
proceedings, particularly for Guardians, children’s lawyers and social 
workers, to enable the child to participate more fully in the decision-making 
process.  The need for all professionals involved to improve their 
communication skills in talking and discussing with children their lived 
experience to ensure that such experience informs the evidence presented to 
the court.   
 
                                            
601 Re BS North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L [2014] EWCC B77 (Fam). 
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Inter-disciplinary training was seen by judges in this research, as a way of 
facilitating more effective working between professionals and their respective 
agencies.  A high court judge felt strongly about the need for inter-disciplinary 
training, particularly in relation to children’s lawyers: 
 
“For Lawyers, my own view is that lawyers in family justice cannot be 
trained in isolation from the other professionals.  If there ever was an 
inter-disciplinary argument for training, lawyers are at the heart of it. 
They need to train with social workers and discuss things with them.  
They need to train with the expert witnesses, medical or otherwise.  
They need to train, or be trained with the judges, not necessarily on 
the judge only training courses, but on courses that have the same 
content, with judges helping to train them”. (High Court Judge) 
 
 
One district judge felt however, that priority needs to be given to meeting the 
training needs of professionals at the pre-court stage: 
 
“There is a tremendous need to improve the working together and the 
training given to professionals at the coal face doing that kind of work.  
In a way, once it is within the court system, it is relatively protected 
and there are controls but pre-court I think that is the biggest 
weakness within the system and we put so much effort and time and 
money into getting the court side right.  It is almost like the ‘Cinderella’ 
part of it is what happens on the ground when children turn up 
emaciated at school or injured in hospital and the signs are not seen.  
That pre-court stuff is the biggest vulnerability in the system to me.  
That is training for social workers, Police, health professionals, 
education and that is the biggest need”. (District Court Judge) 
 
  
7.2.3 Developing communication skills for working with children   
 
Skills in the area of communicating with children were highlighted by judges 
as important for all professionals involved in the system including judges.  
This area was seen by judges as very important in facilitating greater 
participation of children in their proceedings.  Judges highlighted in particular 
the poor child interviewing skills of the Police at times, and felt that this was 
an area that needed to improve to a significant degree, particularly in relation 
to asking appropriate and non-leading questions. 
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A county court judge in relation judges training needs in this area, highlight a 
real fear among judges: 
 
“I think for all Judges, if this was ever going to happen, how to speak 
to children, how to communicate with children, would be key.  That I 
think is the fear of many, particularly the more traditional Judges who 
haven’t within their career ever had to talk to children.  Even barristers 
will rarely have met a child.  We train advocates in how to examine 
children in court”.    “…. for Judges meeting children, for children being 
part of the process, for them hearing about what you are going to be 
doing, for them to hear maybe your decision afterwards.  I think all of 
those are things where we would need some training in how to 
communicate with children”. (County Court Judge) 
 
 
Another county court judge in looking positively to judicial practice in the 
future said: 
 
“I think children speaking to judges could properly become more 
common.  It would be a beneficial idea and therefore I think judicial 
training would be important in that regard”. (County Court Judge)  
 
A county court judge highlighted the need for training of lawyers in the 
sensitive questioning of children: 
  
“I think therefore, training to how best to speak to a child in short 
sensitive ways, which are not leading a child, but aren’t also 
implanting an answer would be a useful way of dealing with matters as 
well”. 
 
Although training in communication skills with children was considered by 
one district court judge to be desirable for judges, such training in itself would 
not make the system more child-centred: 
 
“Trying to fine tune Judges to be able to talk to children, that is 
desirable but it is pretty late in the day.  It is cream on the cake 
compared to trying to get the cake right, which is the harder and much 
more important job”. (District Court Judge) 
 
In relation to communication skills in the context of Police interviewing 
children, the following experience of two county court judges was less than 
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positive and also less than child-centred.  This is something that judges feel 
powerless in influencing or changing during the course of proceedings: 
 
“I think that they may have, in the Police, lost prominence in training 
and I think in social work maybe we are so bound up now with single 
Family Court, revised PLO (Public Law Outline), that sometimes it just 
needs a reminder of some features like that (delay in interviewing the 
child, not keeping case notes of important meetings).  You see that is 
children’s participation in court proceedings just as much as the child 
coming to court.  If you are watching a video of a child and that video 
evidence is tainted by the fact the Police Officers concerned haven’t 
been trained enough to do a proper interview or the parents being 
accused of abuse, that their barrister can make a lot of meal out of the 
failures of the professionals involved, then that child is being failed and 
there is nothing you as the Judge can do about it.  If it wasn’t done 
properly you can’t make it right.  I am not saying that is typical and it 
happens all the time, but it shouldn’t actually happen at all”. (County 
Court Judge) 
 
“I know that the Police have had a lot of training in how best to ask 
questions of children and I think the results are that more often than 
not, are still woeful.  The child interviews I have seen have not been 
well conducted and I think that there needs to be a lot better education 
as to how to go about talking to a child in a way that will provide 
evidence or information, which can then can be relied upon in court, 
which hasn’t been led out of the child, and hasn’t confused the child.  I 
have seen plenty of interviews where I failed to understand what the 
Police Officer was getting at, or I thought the child has got no chance.  
I think the general level of interview training or interviewing, is often 
quite poor in my experience”. (County Court Judge) 
 
 
7.2.4 Analysis and presentation of evidence 
  
This training needs area was viewed by Judges in this research as a priority, 
particularly in relation to social workers and children’s Guardians: 
 
“If there is anything that I would ask of social workers and indeed from 
Guardians, is more analysis and less chronological recounting of 
events.  That I am sure would apply to all my colleagues.  We do not 
need the vast reports that we have had in the past, which deal with 
each and every incident in huge detail.  There are certain significant 
incidents that may have to be explored in detail but by and large the 
remainder are not going to have any bearing on our decision at all, so 
why put them in front of us?” (District Court Judge) 
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“All of us have perhaps, particularly social workers, occasionally 
Guardians as well and Judges, need greater training in actually 
providing an analysis from facts rather than simply reciting the facts”. 
(County Court Judge) 
  
 
One county court judge was quite clear about what was needed from social 
workers in terms of analysis: 
   
“… what one can often get is a long chronology of all the problems 
that have been with this family, that forms the background, but what 
one wants now is the analysis of where you go with those problems.  
Do those problems mean that the parents can’t be assisted to parent? 
or if they were given that support, could they parent?” (County Court 
Judge) 
 
In relation to giving evidence in court, the following two extracts from two 
county court judges highlight a training need in this area: 
 
“They (social workers) need to learn how to give evidence and how to 
marshal that evidence and how to put a succinct summary of that 
evidence before a judge”. (County Court Judge) 
 
“They (social workers) need the practical experience and then from 
time to time when they do have to give evidence, that is an area of 
criticism, it is an area of attack and I sometimes feel that they could do 
with more sessions learning how to give evidence.  Too often the 
young social worker is reluctant to make a concession”. (County Court 
Judge) 
 
 
The next section of this chapter will look at ways to reduce the distance 
between the child and the system and particularly the distance between the 
child and the judge as the key decision-maker in determining the outcome of 
proceedings.  Hearing children’s views directly in proceedings and enabling 
children to become involved directly in their proceedings are the focus of the 
following section. 
 
7.3 Children’s choice of direct participation – being the norm rather 
      than the exception 
 
The first part of this section will look at the area of hearing children directly in 
proceeding.  In this research, judges acknowledged that they rarely see 
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children during the course of proceedings.  Howitt writing some 170 years 
earlier, expressed the following wish: 
  
“I have often wished that in books for children the writer would 
endeavour to enter more fully into the feelings and reasonings of the 
child; that he would look at things as it were from the child’s point of 
view rather than from his own”.602 
 
The above sentiments would not be out of place if uttered in relation to the 
current public child law system.  A child’s attendance at court is at the 
discretion of the judge under current legislation.603  Such legislation could be 
said to be in conflict with Article 6 of the ECHR.604   The Council of Europe’s 
guide605 on the application of Article 6 makes clear that there can be no  
justification for a restrictive interpretation of this Article and that the 
requirement of fairness applies to proceedings in their entirety.606  A 
restrictive interpretation of Article 6 is not consistent with the spirit of the 
Article.  The Council of Europe asserts that for a right to be effective a party 
needs to be able to present views that they regard as relevant to their case 
and have them duly considered by the trial court.607  The discretion given to 
judges under section 95 of the Children Act 1989 could be viewed as both 
restrictive and not proportionate in relation to the application of Article 6 
ECHR, as the full rights of a party (the child) to the proceedings can be 
denied. 
 
In this research, in relation to the direct participation of children in 
proceedings a county court judge felt there needs to be attitude change: 
 
‘For direct participation, the primary thing that would have to shift 
would be attitude.  We have to move, my perception is that lawyers 
and Judges would need to move away from; you have got to keep the 
kids as far away as possible, to; they ought actually to be involved 
                                            
602 M Howitt, The Children’s Year (Longman 1847) v. 
603 s 95 The Children Act 1989. 
604 Article 6 Right to a Fair Trial under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
605 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a 
    fair trial (Council of Europe 2013). 
606 European Court on Human Rights (n 4)15; Moreira de Azevedo v. Portugal – In relation to article 6, the Court’s 
     opinion in this case was that the right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that there  
     can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention restrictively para 66. 
607 European Court of Human Rights (n 604) 16. 
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because these decisions are about them and are going to affect them 
for years to come’. (County Court Judge) 
 
For another county court judge in relation to the involvement of children in 
their proceedings, the approach needs to be pro-active in nature: 
 
“We shouldn’t be waiting for children to say, they want to be involved, 
we should be asking them for reasons why they don’t want to be 
involved”. (County Court Judge) 
 
The International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates 
(IAYFJM) in their guidelines on children in contact with the justice system 
places importance on context and professional attitudes therein, in which 
children exercise their right to participate in proceedings, and see these 
elements as facilitating children’s participation in proceedings.608  The 
guidelines emphasises the need for the system to be enabling and 
encouraging, so that children are reassured that the responsible adults 
involved in proceedings  are genuinely willing to listen and seriously consider 
their views.  Reference is made within the guidance to paragraph 3 of 
General Comment 12 on Article 12 CRC, which views participation as a 
process of information sharing and dialogue between adults and children, 
‘…based on mutual respect, and in which children can learn how their views 
and those of adults are taken into account and shape the outcome of such 
processes’.609  The IAYFJM considers children’s right to be heard as a 
component of the right to participate.610  The guidelines state: ‘Adults must 
convey the message to children that their contribution to the proceedings is 
welcome and taken seriously. They must be made to feel that they are in a 
safe environment, respectful of their person.611  Such an approach very much 
accords with the model of child-centred decision-making proposed later in 
this chapter. 
 
                                            
608 International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates (IAYFJM), Guidelines on children in 
     contact with the justice system (IAYFJM 2017) 16. 
609 General Comment 12 (n 323) para 3. 
610 IAYFJM (n 607) 17. 
611 ibid. 
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In relation to children meeting judges, Hedley’s view is that the purpose of 
such meetings needs to be clear; to give evidence, express a view or to meet 
the person who is making the decision about their life.612  He states that: ‘No 
child can have a truly private conversation with the judge’613 in the interests 
of fairness to other parties, particularly parents.  Although he sees such 
meetings as somewhat of an artificial process, Hedley would favour such 
meetings, notwithstanding the required conditions of clear purpose and the 
judge being unable to promise confidentiality to the child, he makes a 
pertinent point in relation to the subject area of this research: ‘What is 
essential is that every child should feel that they have had the opportunity 
they want to influence the outcome’614 and goes on to make an important 
point in this regard: ‘They cannot dictate the outcome, but they should 
certainly have an opportunity to influence it’.615 
 
In contrast, a review of 30 recent child abduction cases by Hollingsworth and 
Stalford,616 found that the reliability of children’s views and objections as 
communicated to judges by the Cafcass officer were open to question.  
Although in a different area of law, the principles in terms of a children’s 
rights approach to cases has relevance in the context of this thesis.  Among 
their findings they found very limited time being spent with children by the 
Cafcass officer; on average one hour or less, while in other cases the 
Cafcass officer did not have enough time to review the child’s files.  These 
findings are concerning, given that the report by the Cafcass officer was 
relied on heavily by the judge.  Hollingsworth and Stalford concluded: ‘Such 
evidence is tantamount to not hearing the child at all’.617  
 
The experience of the following two judges in relation to the direct 
participation of children reflect for them the reality of current professional 
practice among social workers and children’s Guardians: 
                                            
612 Hedley (n 512) 87. 
613 ibid. 
614 ibid. 
615 ibid. 
616 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, Judging parental child abduction: What does it mean to adopt a children’s rights- 
     based approach? (Tribute Collection for Nigel Lowe, Forthcoming 2018). 
617 ibid. 
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“I am not sure that routinely the other professionals; the children’s 
lawyers, the Guardians, the social workers ask children, discuss with 
them whether they should have any direct participation.  They set out 
in a sentence what the child wants in a care plan”.  (District Judge) 
 
‘It surprises me how rare it is for social workers and indeed Guardians, 
to pursue this point themselves in terms of direct participation’. 
(County Court Judge) 
 
In relation to judges’ views in this research about the factors that need to be 
taken into consideration when deciding about hearing a child directly during 
the course of proceedings, one of their main concerns was that it would place 
a burden on the child who may feel responsible for the court’s decision. The 
following extracts from three judges highlight their concerns in this area:  
 
“First of all, because I think that even a child, let us assume a child of 
14 who very much knows his or her mind, it is a huge burden and 
responsibility to place on a child, to give them the impression that they 
are having to take the decision”. There is an element of protecting the 
child of placing upon that child the burden of taking a decision or 
giving the child the impression that it is them who is taking the 
decision about their future”. (County Court Judge) 
 
“I’m not adverse to it, but it does worry me that sometimes it could be 
misinterpreted by children as the responsibility for the decision being 
thrown back on them, when they express their views to the judge”. 
(District Court Judge) 
 
“I think the underlying reason is that we are very keen that children 
should not feel responsible for the outcome and as soon as you 
embark upon the discussion with a child of what their views are, there 
is the potential for the child to feel responsible for what happens ….” 
(County Court Judge) 
 
 
Judges also felt that the court process itself is very much an adult-centred 
culture that the child may find difficult to understand.  One County Court 
judge stated:  
 
“Courts are not seen as places for children to come, they are seen as 
places from which to keep children because they are adult places of 
dispute”. 
 
173 
 
One of the barriers judges identified in this area was around the issue of 
confidentiality in relation to what the child said to the judge.  Such information 
would need to be shared with the other parties in the proceedings in the 
interests of fairness and justice and, therefore, may act as a deterrent to the 
child expressing their true wishes and feelings. The following extracts from 
two District Court judges reflects this barrier: 
 
“I think the biggest problem about it is the fact that what they say to 
the judge has to be revealed to the other parties and that I think is 
something, which perhaps is a difficult concept for them to 
understand”. (District Court Judge) 
 
“They can be seen but obviously not in any confidential sense.  It has 
got to be shared and they have got to know that everything has got to 
be shared”. (District Court Judge) 
 
For judges in this research, it was important that there was a clear purpose 
for hearing the child directly and that such a meeting between the child and 
judge was not used for the gathering of evidence.618  The following extracts 
are from two High Court judges represent some of the challenges in this 
area: 
 
“However, you talk with a child, you have got to be very clear with 
them why you are having this conversation.  The child may want it, but 
still why are we, judge and child, having this conversation in whatever 
form”. (High Court Judge) 
 
“The problem is seeing children when the pressure is still on.  The real 
anxiety is being confident that the children know precisely why they 
are there.  You cannot take evidence of fact informally from them.  
That would be a breach of all ideas of fair trials.  You can of course 
take their wishes and feelings informally from them.  It seems to me, 
the key thing in seeing the child is for you and the child to be 
absolutely clear why it is happening.  The child doesn’t come thinking 
that they can tell you about what Daddy did to Mummy the night 
before last.  That is not on the agenda”. (High Court Judge) 
 
In hearing a child directly, judges felt that the welfare of the child needs to be 
taken into account in terms of the potential of the process itself creating 
anxiety for and further emotional harm to the child.  However, if such a 
                                            
618 Guidelines on Judges meeting children (n 308). 
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meeting between the child and the judge was deemed appropriate, judges 
felt it was important for the child to be prepared properly.  Judges saw this 
task as primarily the responsibility of the child’s Guardian and legal 
representative, who needs to ensure, as far as possible, that no undue 
pressure is being put on the child to meet the judge and the decision to meet 
is very much that of the child.619  For one High Court Judge: “If it is to me, 
then we have to have appropriate ways of recording it and of having an 
appropriate escort with the person, who isn’t going to influence the child’s 
views”. 
     
Judges in this study said they were willing to see children, but only if asked, 
mainly by the child’s Guardian and legal representative.  However, they 
acknowledged that they did not promote such practice as the norm in public 
child law proceedings.  The views of the following judges highlight a range of 
issues and barriers that have the potential, from the prospectives of judges in 
this research, to militate against hearing children directly in proceedings: 
 
“I think the barriers are that one is not asked to do so and I think the 
reason for that is, most Guardians now will discuss this matter with 
children and for the most part, children do not want to be involved.  
Some do, but for the most part they don’t, or they are not of an age to 
be able to be”. (High Court Judge) 
 
“The barriers are partly due to a general feeling I think that they are 
not properly engaged in decision-making at all.  There is this tension 
between adults should decide this for you and consulting you, we don’t 
want to involve you and put pressure on you …There is a natural wish 
to protect the child from emotional upset.  You can’t have a child 
sitting through a court hearing where usually at least the mother or the 
father is giving evidence.  You would not want to expose the child to 
that, it would be terribly distressing and pressured.  That is a good 
reason not to expose them unnecessarily”. (District Court Judge) 
 
“I think the difficulty is that as the process is intended to be largely 
protective, and one cannot expect the subject of the proceedings to 
understand the broad and detailed nature of the concerns about their 
parents and what implications those concerns may have for their well-
being.  It would be wrong to leave them with the impression that 
whatever they have said had been determinative of the issue”. 
(County Court Judge) 
 
                                            
619 Council of Europe – Child-friendly Justice Guidelines. 
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The view of one county court judge reflects a position in relation to the child 
following the decision of the court, rather than the child having direct input to 
the decision.  The judge has also a clear position on judges hearing children 
directly: 
 
“What has tended to be the case is that I have agreed to see children 
in circumstances where I think it will help them come to terms with the 
decision, to have seen the Court and have met the Judge, but to hear 
the views of the child is not something which I would particularly 
encourage as a Judge.  I believe that the best way of getting those 
views is by the careful basis of thought from the children’s Guardian in 
Public Law Proceedings.  They are the professionals, they know how 
to speak to children”. (County Court Judge) 
 
However, while acknowledging the issues emerging from this research in 
relation to the potential difficulties and barriers to hearing children directly in 
proceedings, the following perspectives of judges summarise these issues 
and barriers but move their thinking forward to a more child-involved system:  
 
“A combination of these things I think; the culture, the rules, the 
practice directions, the materials that come out from the Family Justice 
Council about interviewing children and so on.  Generally speaking, 
the thinking is, the mood behind all of that is that you don’t do it unless 
it is exceptional or different and there is a specific reason for doing it.  
The culture is deep seated in that you distance the children from the 
proceedings.  The rules are quite labyrinthine about the involvement of 
children within the proceedings, even where separately represented, 
whether they should attend the hearings and all the rest of it, raise all 
sorts of separate questions of their own.  It is because of that 
historical, cultural thing, which has fed into a regime and rules which, it 
is not a presumption but it has stuck.  Now when you look at the 
Family Justice Council’s papers on it, all hedged around with a 
considerable degree of cautionary thinking.  It is around wanting to 
protect children from the fall-out of the proceedings and crudely I think 
the thinking has been, the way of protecting them is to distance them 
from it.  I think there is a cogent case for saying that children should 
be much more closely involved with the proceedings, for their own 
benefit”. (County Court Judge) 
  
“There shouldn’t really be any barriers, there should be far more 
openness in my view toward seeing children and letting children feel 
they are being heard.  I think the barriers are a fear of children 
becoming embroiled in a process that they don’t understand and 
which could actually cause them damage and of course no judge 
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wants to involve a child in the proceedings by letting them attend if 
that actually is going to cause them emotional harm.  We as Judiciary 
have a fear of causing harm to children, from the best intentions and I 
have that fear as well.  Sometimes it is a fear of what am I going to do, 
will I be able to communicate with the person.  How will that young 
person feel?  We are moving far more to putting the child a little bit 
more central”. (County Court Judge)  
 
“It is empowering for the child.  It is a useful exercise for the Judge 
because no longer is this child or these children names on documents.  
You have got a picture of the child”. (District Court Judge) 
 
The above perspectives reflect a variance among the judges in this research, 
which includes a cautious and protective approach towards hearing children 
directly in contrast to an openness of moving forward to a more child-focused 
system, welcoming the direct involvement of children in their proceedings, as 
something that is empowering for the child and a recognition of their rights.620  
This research has shown that hearing children directly in proceedings is the 
exception rather than the norm, despite formal judicial guidance in this 
area.621  While judges are understandably cautious and protective of children 
involved in proceedings, such a cautious and protective approach has 
created a formidable array of issues and barriers that prevent the 
development of a system that really values the dignity of the person of the 
child.  While the judge and the system surrounds the child throughout 
proceedings, the child’s direct voice is absent and not considered a priority in 
the decision-making process.  The status of the child’s direct voice in 
proceedings has to give way to proxy representations by professionals, who 
are spending a very limited amount of time getting to know the child and their 
perspective of their lived experience.  Current legislation supports such 
practice, with the child’s wishes and feelings being only one factor in the 
welfare checklist622 and proxy representation of their views also enshrined in 
legislation623 and in formal guidance issued to judges meeting children.624  
                                            
620 Article 12 of UCRC Child’s right to express their views and Article 6 ECHR Right to a Fair 
    Trial 
621 Family Justice Council, Guidelines for Meeting Children who are Subject to Family Proceedings [2010] 2 FLR 
     1872. 
622 s 1(3) Children Act 1989. 
623 s 41 Children Act 1989. 
624 Family Justice Council, Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are subject to Family Proceedings (Ministry 
     of Justice 2010). 
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The potential weakness in this guidance from a children’s rights perspective, 
is that the judge relies heavily on the advice of the children’s Guardian and 
legal representative to enable him or her to make the decision as to whether 
it is in the best interests of the child that such a meeting take place,625 rather 
than the decision being based on the child’s right to express a view.  Such an 
approach could be viewed as inconsistent with the spirit of Article 12 UNCRC 
and with Article 6 ECHR.  
 
7.4 Facilitating Children’s Direct Participation 
 
The second part of this section now moves on to look at ways of enabling 
children to participate directly in their proceedings.  The Family Justice 
Review stated that it needed to provide, … ‘children, as well as adults, with 
an opportunity to have their voices heard in the decisions that will be 
made’.626  The Family Justice Review Panel were also of the view that 
children early on in proceedings should have opportunities to express their 
wishes and feelings and are enabled and supported to express them to the 
court,627 thereby including children from the outset of proceedings.  Placing 
the interests of children at the centre of the Family Justice System was 
considered a priority by the review panel.628  The review panel also 
considered different ways of communication and the physical locations in 
which proceedings take place.  They recommended that for routine hearings, 
greater use, where possible and appropriate, could be made of telephone 
and video technology and that the rooms where hearings are held need to be 
as ‘family friendly’ as possible.629  All of these measures go some way to 
creating a system that is more inclusive and empowering of children. 
 
Direct participation of children in proceedings for one county court judge 
requires a shift in attitude towards children: 
 
                                            
625 Family Justice Council (n 624) para 1(iii). 
626 Family Justice Review Panel, Family Justice Review: Final Report (The 
     Ministry of Justice, Department of Education and the Welsh Government 2011) 41. 
627 ibid 6.  
628 ibid 59. 
629 ibid 77. 
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“For direct participation, the primary thing that would have to shift 
would be attitude.  We have to move, my perception is that lawyers 
and Judges would need to move away from, you have got to keep the 
kids as far away as possible, to, they ought actually to be involved 
because these decisions are about them and are going to affect them 
for years to come.  Attitude is a matter of education.  There would 
need to be a process of enlightenment of persuading that there is 
something good in this process and of persuading that the investment 
is worth it in terms of outcome.  In other words, would children who 
have been involved in the process have better outcomes than children 
who have been kept at arms-length as we tend to do at the moment?  
That is not material I imagine you can find directly because we are not 
in the habit of involving children”. (County Court Judge) 
 
A district court judge questioned the level of commitment of social workers, 
Guardians and children’s lawyers, to encourage the direct participation of 
children: 
 
“I think training if it is to do with children’s direct participation, social 
workers in their final care plans pay just almost lip service to what the 
children themselves are saying.  You are lucky if you get a sentence in 
the final care plan about what the child actually wants.  You get it in 
the statement but not in the final care plan.  In my experience, the 
social worker’s final evidence doesn’t deal with the child’s direct 
participation in court proceedings.  If there is to be more participation 
of children in the actual proceedings, then I do think it is a social work 
training issue.  I am not sure that routinely the other professionals; the 
children’s lawyers, the Guardians ask children, discuss with them 
whether they should have any direct participation.  They set out in a 
sentence what the child wants in a care plan.  I would have thought if 
we were to look at how children are involved, there is a training need 
in terms of understanding why it might be good to involve children 
more directly and there is definitely a training need for lawyers.  It is 
not part of the judicial role as most people would traditionally see it.  If 
we were to branch out in seeing children I think people do need a lot 
of training.  Getting the difference between asking a child what they 
want to happen and telling a child what is going on are very different 
things”. (County Court Judge) 
  
While placing importance on the need for children to feel involved in their 
proceedings in a meaningful way (see Chapter 3 and section on Judicial 
Values and Child-centredness in Chapter 5), the following view of a county 
court judge highlights the potential of other factors that may get in the way of 
an inclusive approach:   
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“The things that you need to consider, putting aside your own 
preconceptions of what your kids and your friends’ kids are like and 
think about what it is like to be that child and the kind of fears and 
hopes and ambitions that that particular child may or may not be likely 
to have.  How to make them feel listened to, even though at the same 
time you have got to make it clear to them that not everything they say 
can be kept secret from their parents and not everything they say is 
necessarily going to be what you would do.  Nonetheless, making 
them feel that you listened. All of those things I think would be very a 
helpful addition to assist us with seeing children in a meaningful way”. 
(County Court Judge) 
  
    
Judges in this research felt that the court process can be quite intimidating 
and unfriendly for children, making it difficult for children to participate in 
proceedings and therefore does not facilitate seeing children in a meaningful 
way.  They also felt that systemic issues, such the court’s formal physical 
environment, the culture of proceedings being more adversarial than 
inquisitorial and the court’s procedures and rules do not facilitate children’s 
direct involvement in proceedings.  While the judicial value of justice must 
prevail in the system, the culture of proceedings historically has not 
considered the direct participation of children as a core element of justice. 
The 250 children who contributed to the Munro Review (see Chapter 4) did 
not feel they were at the centre of the child protection system and were clear 
about what they considered to be a child-centred approach that would meet 
their needs.  The practice guidance contained in ‘Working Together to 
Safeguard Children’ included their views about what they considered to be a 
child-centred safeguarding system.630  The elements put forward by the 
children who participated in Munro’s review of the child protection system are 
consistent with the elements of a child-friendly system outlined by the UN 
                                            
630  Working Together to Safeguard Children (n 6) 11. Vigilance: to have adults notice when things are troubling 
     them; Understanding and action - to understand what is happening; to be heard and understood and to have that 
     understanding acted upon; Stability - to be able to develop an on-going stable relationship of trust with those 
     helping them; Respect: to be treated with the expectation that they are competent rather than not; Information 
     and engagement - to be informed about and involved in procedures, decisions, concerns and plans; Explanation 
     - to be informed of the outcome of assessments and decisions and reasons when their views have not met with a 
     Positive response; Support - to be provided with support in their own right as well as a member of their family;  
     Advocacy – to be provided with advocacy to assist them in putting forward their views.  
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Committee on the Rights of the Child631 and the Council of Europe child-
friendly justice guidelines.632 
 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child asserts that, ‘The Convention 
requires that children, including the very  youngest children, be respected as 
persons in their own right.  Young children should be recognized as active 
members of  families, communities and societies, with their own concerns, 
interests and points of view”.633  However, a Council of Europe consultation 
with almost 4,000 children, which documented their views and experiences of 
justice systems, including the system in England and Wales, found that a fifth 
of the children who took part in this consultation would not tell those with 
responsibility for their safety and welfare if they were being neglected or 
abused, for fear of what might happen to their family.  They said they would 
prefer to handle it on their own.634  It is as if children are aware of their 
powerlessness in relation to a system that makes them feel uneasy and 
fearful and therefore inaccessible to them.635 
 
Regarding enabling children to become more involved in their proceedings, 
Judges felt that for this change of approach to take root, the child would need 
careful and proper preparation for direct involvement and that the necessary 
security precautions within the court environment are put in place throughout 
the proceedings, to enable the child feel free, safe and comfortable in 
contributing to the proceedings.  For one District Court judge, this requires a 
balancing of factors: 
 
“Cultural and social barriers, all of those do exist.  They exist in 
dealings with everybody that comes to court.  The only difference is, 
(a) it is a child and therefore more likely to be influenced by the 
situation that they are in and the unfamiliarity, particularly if they are 
from a different ethnic background, and (b) you are seeing the child at 
close quarters really even if you have got a children’s Guardian and 
                                            
631  Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No.12, 2009 The Right of the Child to be Heard para 
     134 (a)(i) The Committee put forward a list of elements they considered to be child-centred; transparent and 
      informative, voluntary, respectful, relevant, child-friendly, inclusive, safe and sensitive to risk and accountable. 
632  Council of Europe, 2010, ‘Elements of child-friendly justice’ – Transparent and Informative, Voluntary,  
      Respectful, Relevant to the child, Child-friendly, Inclusive, Accountable, Safe and sensitive to risk. 
633  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2005, General Comment No 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early 
      Childhood 3, para 5. 
634  U Kilkelly, Supporting Children’s Access to Justice (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014) 
     Retrieved on: 14th November 2014 www.fra.europa.eu 
635  Daly et al (n 417). 
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perhaps a court officer taking notes there, it is a very intimate setting.  
That is the way which it is normally done in my experience.  You don’t 
want to bring the child into the big courtroom even if it is empty 
because it is intimidating, so you come into a relatively small room; 
you have a relatively tight knit group of people there, taking the note 
and verifying what is said.  That can be quite difficult I think.  There is 
a balance to strike there between making it intimate but not making it 
too intimate”. 
 
 
A County Court judge places much emphasis on the need to prepare 
carefully for such meetings: 
  
“If you are going to talk to a child, it is not something you do by the 
seat of your pants, in a couple of spare minutes between two other 
things, it needs to be scheduled, you need to be prepared and you 
need to have the time to reflect on how you are going to talk to the 
child and time to spend with the child if the child raises issues with you 
that needs some of your time.  We are under huge pressure of work to 
get things done.  Providing that time, we have not made it a priority 
historically”. (County Court Judge)   
 
It is clear from the data in this research, in relation to enabling children to 
participate directly in their proceedings, that many issues and barriers remain 
within the current system that militate against children’s direct participation.  
While judges in this research were open to such a change in practice, there 
was also a high level of reluctance among judges, given the systemic and 
cultural barriers that exist and which have been acknowledged by judges.  A 
major shift in attitude is required by both judges and the system itself, to 
make the choice of children’s direct participation in their proceedings the 
norm, rather than the exception, which currently is the established practice 
and for mainly older children i.e. teenagers.  Munby P has stated that such 
practice and attitude needs to change, as it is no longer tenable.636  
 
7.5 A Model for Child-centred Decision-making (see Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic representation of the core building blocks and 
elements needed to move to a more child-centred model for decision-making 
in public child law proceedings.  At the centre of this model is the judge and 
                                            
636 Munby (n 584). 
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child, with the judge listening and taking on board the child’s perspective of 
their lived experience.  This would be the starting point of all proceedings and 
accepted as the norm in relation to judicial practice in this area.   
 
However, this approach would always be based on the child’s agreement to 
meet with the judge, but such an approach would be an integral part of the 
public child law system from the outset.  Currently, children who are subject 
to proceedings, rarely meet with the judge, with such meetings neither 
promoted or encouraged, due to respect for current professional practice 
boundaries and statutory roles, particularly in relation to children’s 
Guardians.637  These issues have been highlighted by judges in this 
research. 
 
7.5.1 Hearing children’s views throughout proceedings   
 
This model needs to be informed and guided by a number of factors (see 
Figure 2).  Public child law proceedings need to start, continue and end with 
ongoing feedback from the child, even from very young children (age 3 
upwards), who are more than able to express a view on their experience.638  
The child’s ongoing feedback needs to continually guide and inform the 
decision-making process and the decisions themselves, throughout the 
course of proceedings.  Such an approach does not exist in the current 
system, which gives a minimum amount of time to hearing children’s views639 
and gaining an in-depth understanding of their situation and 
circumstances.640  
  
                                            
637 s 41 The Children Act 1989. 
638 Willow (n 568). 
639 Cafcass (n 350). 
640 Pemberton (n 202). 
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Figure 2: A model for Child-centred Decision-making 
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7.5.2 Children’s vulnerability and rights  
 
While children’s vulnerability is a given reality in proceedings,641 given that 
they will have suffered a significant level of abuse and neglect prior to 
proceedings being initiated, it is not a justification for suspension of their 
rights.642  Children have full party status in proceedings643 and yet judges 
have the discretion under current legislation in relation to children being 
directly involved in their proceedings.644  This model proposes an 
amendment to s 95 of the Children Act 1989, which would limit such judicial 
discretion to those cases where there was clear evidence that such direct 
involvement of the child would cause them significant harm, otherwise, direct 
participation of children would be considered by judges to be the norm.  The 
balancing of a child’s vulnerability and their rights in law and international 
conventions, must not dilute the judicial values of equality, fairness, listening 
and justice.645 
 
7.5.3 Equality of focus between protection and the child’s dignity 
 
Although the child in public law proceedings is a victim of a significant level of 
abuse and or neglect, such a status should not diminish the child’s worth and 
dignity as a person.646  This child-centred model for decision-making places 
equal priority on the child’s need for protection and on the child as a person, 
with the right to be respected as a human being, with their dignity being 
accorded equal respect with that of adults.  The child’s fears, anxieties, 
worries and just not knowing how and if their world will change, needs to be 
embraced and understood by the whole public child law system, which needs 
to acknowledge this turmoil of the child’s inner world.  This means in practice 
giving the child the time and space they need to express their true feelings 
and wishes including if the child wishes, directly to the judge. 
 
                                            
641 s 31 Threshold of significant harm The Children Act 1989. 
642 UNCRC Article 12 Right to express a view and Article 13 Right to receive information from 
    a range of sources.  
643 FPR 2010 r 12.14(3). 
644 s 95 The Children Act 1989. 
645 ECHR Article 6 Right to a Fair Trial. 
646 Freeman (n 502). 
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7.5.4 Valuing children’s understanding of their world 
 
One of the major issues emerging from the judges’ responses in this 
research, is the decreasing amount of time professionals are able to spend 
listening to the children they are representing in proceedings, particularly 
children’s Guardians647 and Local Authority social workers.648  This issues is 
also highlighted in research.649  The lack of resources are often cited as the 
main contributory factor (see Chapters 4 and 6) as well as the tight timetable 
for the completion of proceedings.650  This proposed child-centred model 
places great value on the child’s understanding of their world and introduces 
a statutory requirement to ensure the professionals involved in proceedings 
are informed and guided by this factor in relation to their professional 
practice, throughout the proceedings.  Such a statutory requirement could be 
introduced as a separate section following s 1(3) Welfare Checklist in the 
Children Act 1989.  Including the child’s knowledge and understanding of 
their circumstances and lived experience, as a core element of decision 
making, would strengthen and enhance the much weaker factor of the child’s 
wishes and feelings as contained in the welfare checklist,651 which is viewed 
in practice a simply one factor to be considered and the importance given to 
this factor is often determined by the child’s age and capacity652 (see Chapter 
6). 
 
7.5.5 Valuing and respecting children’s rights in practice 
 
The model proposes that the public child law system and judicial decision-
making adopt a children’s rights approach653 in their work with children 
throughout proceedings.  Such an approach would be an integral part of 
professionals’ practice with children involved in proceedings and in judicial 
reasoning.  Empowerment of children, particularly by children’s Guardians 
and Local Authority social workers, would be seen as the norm from the 
                                            
647 Cafcass Operating Framework (n 350). 
648 Pemberton (n 202). 
649 Masson (n 349). 
650 Public Law Outline (PLO) 26-week rule Children and Families Act 2014. 
651 s 1(3) Welfare Checklist Children Act 1989. 
652 Stalford et al (n 428). 
653 Tobin (n 436). 
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outset of proceedings.  This would facilitate children gaining the knowledge 
and confidence to a gain access to the system and use their right to be heard 
and have their views taken seriously. 
 
7.5.6 Open and welcoming environment for children 
 
The core building blocks and elements of the proposed model needs to be 
facilitated by an environment that is open and welcoming to children.654  An 
environment where the child is allowed to choose who accompanies them to 
court, in addition to their family, Guardian, social worker and lawyer.  This 
could include people who the child feels are important in their life, particularly 
those who know what they have gone through and are going through in their 
lives.  It is important for professionals to be reminded that the child is not 
defined by their proceedings and have a life outside of these proceedings, 
having friends and significant others in their life, who they turn to for support 
and understanding.  Within this model, children need to feel part of the 
system that is making such significant decisions about their lives and those of 
their family.  The system under this model is accountable to the child for the 
decision it makes about their care and life and therefore needs to be 
transparent so that the child always knows and understands what is going on 
in their proceedings.  The issue of transparency has already been discussed 
earlier in this chapter.655 
 
This model sees the need for continuity of professionals including judges, 
involved with the child throughout the proceedings, as an essential element 
of child-centred decision-making.  The benefits of continuity have been 
highlighted by research.656  Children need to be able to form meaningful and 
trusting relationships with the professionals involved in their case.  This 
research has highlighted the issue of high turnover of social workers in cases 
during proceedings.  This will have the effect of disempowering and 
alienating the child and does not facilitate child-centred decision-making. 
 
                                            
654 Family Justice Review Panel (n 369). 
655 McFarlane (n 19). 
656 Masson (n 349). 
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The final section of this chapter presents an example of a case revisited by 
the researcher and re-imagined through the lens of a children’s rights 
perspective. 
 
7.6 Re-visiting P-S (Children) (Care proceedings: Oral evidence of  
      separately represented child) [2013] EWCA Civ 223, [2013] 1 WLR 
      3831 
 
 
It is one thing to criticise the judiciary for failing to support a child-centred 
approach; it’s another thing to demonstrate how it might actually be achieved 
in practice.  The researcher tried to achieve this through participation in a 
two-year academic project aimed at re-imagining judgments involving 
children, from a range of different jurisdictions and legal contexts.  The 
purpose of the project was to re-write these judgments adopting a children’s 
rights perspective.  The work of the project culminated in the publication of a 
book,657 bringing together the body of work on these wide-ranging re-written 
judgments, which were each accompanied and introduced by a commentary.  
The researcher co-worked with Jane Williams from the University of 
Swansea, who re-wrote the original judgment Re P-S (see copy of re-written 
judgement in Appendix 7) and contributed a commentary on Jane’s re-written 
judgment to the edited edition.658  An adapted version of this commentary is 
presented here to illustrate how a child-centred perspective can be achieved 
in public child law cases.   
 
7.6.1 Summary of the case background 
 
The subject of the proceedings in Re P-S659 was a 15 year-old boy M, who did 
not wish to remain in foster care but to return to live with his mother. The local 
authority’s view was that this would not be in M’s best interests since his mother 
had previously attempted to leave the country without making adequate care 
                                            
657 H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision 
     to New Practice (Hart 2017). 
658 D Lane, ‘Commentary on P-S (Children) Care Proceedings: Right to give evidence’ (2017) in H Stalford, K  
     Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments from Academic Vision to New 
     Practice (Hart 2017). 
659 Re P-S (Children) (Care Proceedings: Right to give evidence) [2013] EWCA Civ 223 [2013] 1 WLR 3831. 
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arrangements for her children. An application for a Care Order was made under 
section 31 of the Children Act 1989.  
 
M sought and was granted separate legal representation as he did not feel his 
guardian (whose role is to advise the court on a child’s best interests) was 
representing satisfactorily his true wishes and feelings. Initially, M did not wish to 
attend the ﬁnal hearing but did wish to meet the judge to express directly the 
strength of his feelings. M met with the trial judge in the presence of the 
guardian and his solicitor during the ﬁrst part of the ﬁnal hearing. However, the 
judge did not afford M an opportunity to express his wishes and feelings, and 
limited her communication with M to an explanation of the court process and 
task.  During the second part of the ﬁnal hearing M applied to give evidence via 
video link. His application was refused. The trial judge felt that the detriment to 
M, particularly in terms of him feeling responsible for the ﬁnal decision of the 
Court, outweighed the beneﬁt of his evidence to the Court.  A Care Order was 
made in respect of M.  The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge’s 
decisions both in respect of M ’s application to give evidence and in respect of 
the Care Order. In his judgment on the application to give evidence, Sir Alan 
Ward’s reasoning encompassed a wide range of statutory and non-statutory 
provisions and relevant case law pertinent to the application including section 
1(3) of the Children Act 1989,660 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998661 and Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.662  The main case law 
referred to was re W (Children) ( Abuse: Oral Evidence ).663  Whilst the party 
status of the child664 was acknowledged in Ward J ’s judgment, it was held that 
the relevant provisions did not give M the right to express directly his views to 
the Court. M ’s very strong views were already known to the Court and 
acknowledged by the trial judge. The current model of children being 
represented by a guardian and a specialist solicitor was seen as meeting the 
requirements under Article 12 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
                                            
660 The Children Act 1989, s 1(3) the welfare checklist, which includes the wishes and feelings of the child. 
661 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 right to a fair trial. 
662 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Article 12 child’s right to express a view. 
663 Re W (children) (abuse: oral evidence) [2010] 1 FCR 615 ,[2010] 2 All ER 418. 
664 The child is automatically a party to care proceedings under FRR 2010, r 12.3(1) of the Family Procedure 
     Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955 (FPR 2010). 
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Child (UNCRC).665  Sir Alan Ward agreed with the trial judge that the harm to M 
of giving evidence far outweighed the beneﬁt to the judge,666 as M would feel 
responsible for the ﬁnal decision. In relation to the Care Order application, based 
on the known history of parenting, his lordship also agreed that there was no 
realistic prospect of either of M ’s parents having the capacity to meet his needs. 
 
The original judgment highlights vividly the very real tensions that exist between 
the requirements of children’s welfare as contained in the welfare checklist of the 
Children Act 1989 and a children’s rights perspective. M’s story in his own words 
was considered to be of less value to the Court than those recorded in formal 
submissions and reports. Baroness Hale, writing extra-judicially, observes that in 
her experience children frequently have important things to say and she 
maintains that,‘ it is a big mistake to think that children’s views can be effectively 
communicated through the adult parties to any dispute’.667   Among the 
advantages of judges seeing children, she includes the need to see children as 
real people and not to just view them merely as subjects of proceedings and to 
ﬁnd out more about their wishes and feelings directly, rather than just relying on 
second or third hand information, which is the case currently in most public law 
cases.668  Raitt, in a research study with members of the Scottish judiciary, 
found it was possible for a judge to: ‘simply encourage a child to talk about their 
wishes and feelings without rehearsing the options or presenting stark 
choices’.669  Of course the starting point for considering what might be achieved 
when children are the subject of legal proceedings is the legal framework within 
which the child’s wishes and feelings are presented to the court, to which this 
commentary will now turn. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
665 Re W (n 663) para 26. 
666 ibid para 41. 
667 B Hale, ‘Can you Hear me Your Honour?’ [2012] Family Law 31. 
668 B Hale’s address to the Association of Lawyers for Children 2015 - Are we nearly there yet?’ 
669 FE Raitt, ‘Hearing Children in Family Law Proceedings: Can Judges make a Difference?’ (2007) 19 Child and 
     Family Law Quarterly 214. 
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7.6.2 The party status of the child 
 
In care proceedings, the child is automatically a party.  The Children Act 1989 
and the Family Proceedings Rules (FPR) provide how, in practice, effect is given 
to that party status, bearing in mind that a child may be a party from as early in 
life as the day of the child’s birth.  Section 41 of the Children Act 1989 requires 
the appointment of a Guardian, who in practice in England will be commissioned 
by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) and 
in Wales, will be a Welsh family proceedings ofﬁcer acting on behalf of the 
Welsh Ministers. The court may appoint a solicitor to represent the child. A child 
of sufﬁcient maturity and understanding may instruct a solicitor independently.  
Since the Children Act 1989 became law in October 1991 there has existed a 
presumption that children and young people who are subject to care and 
adoption proceedings do not attend court.670  As a consequence of this 
presumption, children are not routinely asked about their views on participating 
directly in proceedings, including meeting with the judge, because the child’s 
part in the proceedings for the most part is mediated through their guardian.   
 
Under section 95 of the Children Act 1989 the court may order the child 
concerned to attend as prescribed by rules of court.  FPR 12.14 provides that 
any party must attend the proceedings, but the proceedings or any part of them 
will take place in the absence of a child pursuant to FPR 12.14(3) if the court 
considers it in the interests of the child, having regard to the matters to be 
discussed or the evidence likely to be given, and the child is represented by a 
guardian or solicitor. 
 
7.6.3 What P-S could have looked like if drafted from a children’s rights 
         perspective 
 
The re-written judgment differs signiﬁcantly from the original judgment. It gives 
greater relevance to, and places more weight on, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and UNCRC, leading to a more young person-centred 
outcome, with Williams J allowing the appeal in respect of M’s application to give 
evidence and in respect of the care order application. The young person’s voice 
                                            
670 FPR 2010 r 12.14(3). 
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is placed at the centre of their proceedings.  M is 15 years old and has been 
considered capable of independently instructing his own legal representative. 
The judgment quite rightly highlights the consequence were any other party to 
these proceedings to be prevented from being heard in person.  As Lundy 
observes, ‘it is difﬁcult to imagine egregious breaches of children’s rights in 
situations where they have been fully and effectively involved in determining the  
issues which affect them’671 while Grifﬁths and Kandel make the point that, 
‘whether we recognise children’s agency or not has a profound effect on the 
kinds of legal narratives we expect to emerge when the child’s voice speaks 
directly or indirectly and is heard in a legal proceeding’.672  While the trial judge 
in this case followed the 2011 guidance,673 weighing up the relevant evidence 
and welfare considerations in relation to M, the spirit of the principles of justice 
and fairness contained in Article 6 of the ECHR674 were very much diluted, 
particularly in relation to M’s full party status.  It seems that all parties, except the 
child, are given the opportunity to express a view about whether the child should 
meet the judge.  Children meeting judges is almost wholly dependent on the 
judge receiving a request for such a meeting from the child’s guardian or their 
solicitor or the child’s Local Authority social worker.  The 2011 guidance is ﬁrmly 
entrenched in the protective mode of the welfare paradigm, in which adults’ 
views deter-mine the best interests of children.675  It is a paradigm where the 
rights of children are relegated to a status that is inferior to adults’ ‘superior’ 
knowledge and wisdom and are seen by the judicial system as being 
appropriately accommodated through proxy accounts.  The re-written judgment 
states that the child is entitled to a ‘fair and public hearing’ (para 28) and points 
out that a hearing would not be fair if the child’s case is not heard. The judgment 
reframes both the guidance on hearing children directly and the Court’s thinking 
in this case by focusing on the potential harm that M might suffer should he be 
prevented from expressing his views directly. There may already be some 
                                            
671 L Lundy, ‘Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in, to and through Education in a Society Emerging from Conﬂict’ in M  
     Freeman (ed), Children’s Rights: Progress and Perspectives: Essays from the International Journal of Children’s  
     Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2011). 
672 A Grifﬁths and RF Kandel, ‘Legislating for the Child’s Voice: Perspectives from Comparative Ethnography of  
     Proceedings Involving Children in M Maclean (ed),Making Law for Families (Hart Publishing 2000). 
673 Family Justice Council, Guidelines in relation to children giving evidence in family proceedings (2011) 1.16  
674 ECHR Article 6 right to a fair trial. 
675 J Fortin, ‘Children’s Rights: Are the Courts Now Taking them More Seriously?’ (2004) 15 King’s College Law  
     Journal 253,272. 
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indication of a similar judicial shift in thinking in a more recent case, Re R, in 
which Briggs LJ commented: 
 
“The risk of harm which the process may cause to this bright and 
articulate fourteen year old does not seem to me to be more substantial 
than the risk of long-term harm at being denied the opportunity to have 
her evidence properly weighed in the determination by a court of matters 
of the utmost importance to her”.676 
 
Re R was a case in which allegations of sexual abuse were made against the 
father of a 14 year-old girl, who wished to be heard directly in legal proceedings. 
She had not made any allegations against her father. The common element in 
M ’s case and in Re R is the strength of feeling expressed in relation to the 
young people’s need to express their views directly to the court, yet the 
outcomes were very different. 
 
7.6.4 The voice and dignity of the child 
 
The re-written judgment allows the appeal in respect of M giving oral evidence, 
giving real effect to Articles 3 (best interests) and 12 (right to express a view) of 
the UN Convention along with Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial) (para 
31).  This approach ameliorates the position, as identiﬁed by Michael Freeman, 
‘for too long [children] have been regarded as objects of concern (sometimes 
worse, as objects), rather than as persons, and even today they remain 
voiceless, even invisible, and it matters not that the dispute is about them’.677 
 
Carole Smart makes the point that having a voice and an environment where 
that voice is heard is considered in developed societies as a basic human 
right.678  Courts are not particularly welcoming of children and therefore it is 
difﬁcult to see a space within the current system where children can give 
expression to their true voice. This is particularly important when a child ’s views 
are at odds with their court appointed guardian. This space needs to be created 
within the legal process and the judicial system itself to enable children to speak 
                                            
676 Re R [2015] EWCA Civ 167 para 36. 
677 M Freeman, ‘The Value and Values of Children’s Rights’ (2011) in A Invernizzi and J Williams (eds), The Human 
     Rights of Children—From Visions to Implementation (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011). 
678 C Smart, ‘From Children’s Shoes to Children’s Voices’(2002) 40 Family Court Review 318. 
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if they wish, with conﬁdence. Being excluded or prevented from expressing 
strongly held views can only undermine a child ’s dignity and conﬁdence. Direct 
participation within the current system is often very much seen as consisting of a 
one-off brief meeting with the judge, lasting on average no more than 15 to 20 
minutes, yet in practice even such meetings are rare. As Tobin has argued, this 
reﬂects an incidental rights approach, wherein children’s rights are on the 
periphery of the judicial process.679   M ’s meeting with the trial judge did not 
enable him to express his strongly held views. This space is dominated by the 
children’s Guardian and legal representative (Children Act 1989, section 41) and 
the child ’s Local Authority social worker. According to Connolly and Morris, this 
can lead to risk aversion, where professionally driven rather than child-centred 
practices take priority and professional voices prevail and dominate proceedings 
to the exclusion of the child.680 
 
7.6.5 Formality, Rules and Procedures — are we forgetting the child as a person 
         with rights? 
 
The re-written judgment places much importance on the centrality of the young 
person’s position in these proceedings and on the application of both the letter 
and spirit of Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention and Article 6 of the ECHR. It 
highlights the narrow legal interpretation of M’s rights in the original trial and re-
focuses on justice and fairness for M throughout, as a person with full party 
status. According to the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, the 
ability to listen is considered one of the core judicial values.681  In contrast, the 
2010 Guidelines place emphasis on the judge having the opportunity to explain 
to the child what’s going on in the process, not on the child having an 
opportunity to speak and the judge to listen.682  In this case, the level of 
participation afforded to M is superﬁcial at best.  The re-written judgment asserts 
that the original trial placed insufﬁcient value on M’s dignity and integrity, in 
contrast to the UN Convention, particularly Articles 3 and 12, and Article 6 of 
ECHR.  Fortin maintains that courts are not familiar with organising the evidence 
                                            
679 J Tobin, ‘Courts and the Construction of Childhood: A New Way of Thinking’(2012) 14 Law and Childhood 
     Studies: Current Legal Issues 1 25. 
680 M Connolly and K Morris, Understanding Child and Family Welfare: Statutory Responses to Children at Risk  
     (Palgrave, 2012). 
681 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Judicial Ethics—Principles, Values and Qualities (Working 
     Group Judicial Ethics 2009–2010), www.encj.eu. 
682 Family Justice Council Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are subject to Family Proceedings (2010) 1. 
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within a rights based structure and states that, ‘although complicated, the 
advantage of such a strategy is that it might produce a deeper analysis of the 
child’s own position’,683 making the proceedings much more young person-
centred. 
 
In respect of the Care Order, the re-written judgment quite rightly allows the 
appeal. It reﬂects the consistent approach adopted in this judgment in relation to 
M’s right to express his views, having full party status within these proceedings. 
It is also consistent with the principles of fairness and justice, otherwise an 
assumption is being made that nothing M might say could change the decision. 
Such an assumption disrespects and pre-judges M’s views regarding this 
application.  For Smart, ‘being able to hear what children have to say does 
change things.  At the very least, we have to be able to stand in children’s shoes 
if we are going to be able to hear their voices’.684  It seems reasonable to 
suggest that judges who have so much power over children’s lives are very 
unlikely to be able to stand in their shoes without having had the opportunity of 
face-to-face meetings with the child. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
To move to a more child-centred decision-making process in public child law 
proceedings, this research suggests a practice model that addresses a 
number of the inadequacies and gaps in the current system.  It is a model 
that is based on the child being at the very centre of the system itself, rather 
than having the system and its requirements dictate and determine the 
priority it will give to the child’s position and their perspectives of their lived 
experience, based on the notion of system efficiency.685 
 
The proposed model includes ensuring that the child’s voice including their 
direct voice, is an integral and ongoing feature of proceedings, ensuring that 
the child’s perspectives of their world are given serious consideration 
                                            
683 J Fortin, ‘Accommodating Children’s Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era’ (2006) 69 The Modern Law Review 
     313. 
684 Smart (n 328). 
685 PLO 26-week rule (n 344). 
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throughout the course of the proceedings.  It is a model that gives equal 
priority to both the protection of the child and the child’s dignity as a person 
with rights, which need to be respected and valued.  The elements of this 
model require an environment that is open and welcoming of children and 
their world.  Transparency and accountability to children are essential 
elements of this model to ensure children are empowered to exercise their 
rights.  To give this model a legislative basis, a number of amendments to 
current legislation are proposed to reinforce the child’s voice in proceedings 
and to ensure a children’s rights approach is adopted as part of a child-
centred decision-making process. 
 
The current system favours mediation of children’s views through the Guardian 
and the child’s Local Authority social worker.  McFarlane LJ has observed that, 
‘The previous culture and practice of the family courts remains largely 
unchanged with the previous presumption against children giving evidence 
remaining intact’.686  However, the Family Justice Council has made it clear in 
their guidance on judges meeting children that the main purpose of such 
meetings is to ‘enable children to feel more involved and connected with 
proceedings in which important decisions are made in their lives and to give 
them an opportunity to satisfy themselves that the Judge has understood their 
wishes and feelings …’.687  The proposed practice model and the re-imagined 
case presented in this chapter are examples of how a child-centred perspective 
can be achieved in public child law proceedings.  
 
  
  
                                            
686 Re E [2016] EWCA Civ 473 paras 48,56, 28. 
687 Family Justice Council (n 682). 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The core aim of this research was to gain insight into judicial thinking in 
relation to what constitutes the core elements of child-centred decision-
making in the reality of public child law proceedings.  Judges in this research 
identified a range of factors; human, legal, cultural, systemic and structural, 
that present barriers to a transparent, child-friendly, child-accessible public 
child law system.  The research also explored with judges their views about 
the principles of public child law that may conflict or even collide with child-
centred decision-making. 
 
8.1 Expectations of the Public Child Law System 
 
The Children Act 1989 marked a significant change, at least theoretically, in 
the public child law system in relation to children’s position in the system and 
in relation to their representation in proceedings.  The Act also aimed to be 
compliant with the requirements of the UNCRC, particularly Articles 12 
(child’s right to express a view) and Article 3 (child’s best interests), although 
the UNCRC is still not part of domestic legislation.  The central position 
occupied by the principle of paramountcy688 in current legislation and formal 
guidance689 accords priority to the child’s welfare and best interests above all 
other matters in proceedings including the interests of adult parties.  All 
children involved in proceedings have a Guardian appointed by the court to 
represent their wishes and feelings and to advise the court on their best 
interests.690  Each child has also a legal representative appointed to 
advocate on their behalf.  The expectation from such developments in 
representation was to ensure the child’s true voice was heard and listened to 
throughout their proceedings.  The child was to be at the heart of the 
system.691  There has been a succession of Acts since the Children Act 
1989, each purporting a more child-centred approach (see Chapter 2).  
                                            
688 s 1(1) Children Act 1989. 
689 Working Together to Safeguard Children (n 344).  
690 s 41 Children Act 1989. 
691 Family Justice Review (n 369). 
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Paramountcy was and continues to be seen as the essence of child-
centredness including by the judges who participated in this research.  In 
public child law, it is the overarching guiding principle that guides all 
deliberations and decisions about a child’s welfare and development. 
 
8.2 Current reality of proceedings 
 
Proceedings are initiated to protect children from significant harm through 
abuse and neglect and therefore the court quite rightly sees this task within 
proceedings as a priority.  The decision-making process within the current 
public child law system is one that has the best interests of the child in mind, 
but it is a process that virtually excludes the in-depth perspective of the child.  
The child’s current position in proceedings is one where their voice gets 
fragmented and interrupted through proxy accounts, main through the child’s 
Guardian and Local Authority social worker, based at times on a superficial 
knowledge and understanding of the child’s situation and perspective.  
   
From the evidence692 available and from data in this research, representation 
of children’s wishes and feelings are much diluted due to a lack of 
resources,693 legal requirements694 and professional working practices.695  
Children find themselves on the periphery of a system that is driven by 
managerial efficiency (see Chapter 4).  While the system and those who work 
within it including, judges, aspire in their respective roles to child-centred 
practice, as envisaged under current legislation696 and formal guidance,697 
the system itself is driven by managerial efficiency698 masquerading under 
the principle of ‘no delay’ and the so called prudent spending of the public 
purse699 (see Chapter 4).  It is acknowledged that undue delay is damaging 
for children’s welfare and development.700  However, this important principle, 
                                            
692 Cafcass (n 350); Munro 2011b (n 293); Family Justice Review (n 369). 
693 Fortin (n 322); Masson (n 349). 
694 26-week rule Children and Families Act 2014. 
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both in the letter and in the spirit of current legislation701 and formal 
guidance702, does and should not relegate the person of the child to that of a 
passive and for the most part inactive and invisible recipient703 of the 
outcome of decisions made in their name.      
 
This research found a number of contradictions in the system in relation to 
the application of the paramountcy principle.  While judges in this research 
were deeply committed to ensuring they made the right and just decision for 
a child, the lack of in-depth information in respect of the child and useful 
analysis of this information provided by both the child’s Guardian and Local 
Authority social worker was highlighted as an issue.  A number of judges felt 
that the child’s Guardian did not spend enough time getting to know the child 
they were representing (see Chapters 6 and 7).  The combination of 
‘proportionate working’ by Guardians704 and the 26-week rule for the 
completion of proceedings705 does not facilitate the building of a trusting and 
meaningful relationship with a child and therefore makes it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain the child’s true perspective of their lived experience and 
circumstances.  This reality leaves judges without an in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of the child’s perspective of their situation and detracts 
significantly from child-centred decision-making.  The present system 
colludes with this situation, the collusion seemingly justified by viewing the 
child’s wishes and feelings as only one element of the welfare checklist,706 an 
element that in reality is given a low priority, both in practice and in current 
legislation.   
 
8.3 What would a more child-centred approach achieve? 
 
The Family Justice Review707 envisaged professionals, particularly children’s 
Guardians, entering the child’s world to gain an understanding of their 
perspectives on their lived experience and circumstances.  There is nothing 
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new about this approach, as it was and continues to be the spirit of s 41 of 
the Children Act 1989 in relation to the appointment of children’s Guardians.  
However, this approach needs to also apply to judges.  Currently, children 
remain the objects of a system708 rather than being seen as individuals with 
real rights and a first-hand knowledge of their history and circumstances.  It 
should not be assumed that their perspectives of their situation are the same 
as the professionals that protect and represent them709 and therefore the 
child’s ongoing feedback throughout proceedings to the Judge is necessary 
to guide and focus child-centred decisions.  However, valuing and respecting 
a child’s understanding their world and circumstances requires legislative 
support, given the lack of progress in this area.  A separate section under s 
1(3) would enhance and strengthen the much weaker element of the list, that 
of, the wishes and feelings of the child.  Gilmore’s710 research has relevance 
in this regard.  His research looked at 130 domestic family law cases in 
England and Wales reported in the Family Law Reports.  He analysed the 
various ways in which the CRC had been used in case law and found that the 
most frequently cited Articles were 3 (child best interests) and 12 (child’s right 
to express a view).  Gilmore concludes however that the use of CRC has 
limitations as it is often only used to underline current domestic legislation 
provisions, indicating a lack legal status and power within the current public 
child law system. 
 
A child’s perspective of their lived experience is far more than just their 
wishes and feelings, which prevailing practice records in a few sentences 
within a witness statement or report.  The child possesses valuable 
knowledge of and insight into their circumstances including, the abuse and 
neglect that they have suffered.711  They are in reality, experts on their 
experience and the impact such experience has had and is having on their 
lives.  An adult version only of what is in a child’s best interests in relation to 
their welfare and development, is an important and necessary requirement, 
                                            
708 E Butler-Sloss, Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987  (HMSO 1988) 
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710 S Gilmore, ‘Use of the UNCRC in Family Law Cases in England and Wales’ (2017) 25 International Journal of 
     Children’s Rights 504. 
711 Ofsted (n 461); Brandon et al (n 209); Smart (n 328); Munro (n 293). 
200 
 
but the child’s perspective of their well-being needs to be equally valued and 
respected by professionals.   Adoption of a children’s rights approach, not 
just a verbal recognition of rights, but real empowerment of children 
throughout their proceedings to exercise their rights.  For this to happen the 
current public child law system needs to change to accommodate and 
facilitate meaningful participation in their proceedings and in the decision-
making process including creating an open and welcoming court environment 
for children.  Children need to have the freedom to choose the significant 
people in their lives to accompany them to court, if they wish to attend part or 
all of the proceedings. 
 
The child’s voice needs to become an active and integral part of the judicial 
values of fairness and justice.  The requirements of current legislation and 
professional practice are weak in this area.  The child’s voice should be 
considered a core element of the principle of paramountcy in practice, 
supported and strengthened by legislation through amending s 95 of the 
Children Act 1989, limiting judicial discretion on hearing children directly, to 
those cases where there is clear evidence that the child will suffer significant 
harm by communicating their views directly to the judge (see model for child-
centred decision-making in Chapter 7).  Such an amendment will give a firm 
impetus for the child’s perspective of their welfare and be equally valued 
alongside those held by professionals involved in their proceedings.  There is 
a need for a radical move away from the current applied impersonal nature of 
paramountcy to a principle that really empowers the child to take their rightful 
and central position in proceedings, either indirectly and directly, determined 
by and in a manner of the child’s choosing. The reframing and re-focusing of 
the principle of paramountcy would facilitate the child’s place within the 
system becoming more visible in and impactful on their proceedings.  
Presently, the child is distant and invisible for most of their proceedings712 
with their voice being seen as an ‘add-on’ rather than a core element of the 
process.  The current public child law system is based on assumed respect 
and trust from children, who find themselves excluded from the heart of the 
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decision-making process.  Professionals need to earn the respect of the 
children they protect and represent and not assume it by virtue of their 
professional roles and status. 
 
The combination of child and adult perspectives will enhance and make for 
more qualitative and holistic child-centred decisions in proceedings.  The 
history of legislation (see Chapter 2) and the findings of serious case 
reviews713 are testament to the need to maintain a consistent and clear focus 
on the child’s experience and needs.  This need is as relevant today, as it 
has always been.  The current system and legislation needs to acknowledge 
and recognise this, both in legislation and professional practice.    
 
8.4 Resources, time and investment in the system 
 
The essence of the paramountcy principle714 is compromised significantly in 
the interests of what is considered to be an effective system in terms of 
managing and completing cases within a 26-week period.715  It is a system 
that is rapidly reaching its full capacity, if not beyond,716 where Guardians are 
only able to do the ‘safe minimum’717 amount of work with the child they 
represent and social workers are reaching the point of exhaustion due to high 
caseloads and a lack of services to support children and their families.718  
Judges in this research highlight a number of issues that have resulted from 
such professional practice, namely, a lack of depth and balance in evidence 
and information presented to the court.  They also commented on the need 
for training in this area (see Chapter 7).  Judges felt that they themselves 
needed more training in communicating directly with children.  Training needs 
in the area of working with children were identified in relation to the Police 
and lawyers.  Judges in this research were acutely aware that professional 
practice has suffered adversely due to the lack of time and resources 
available to professionals in carrying out their statutory duties in respect of 
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children.  In reality, the system has become recursive in its approach to 
cases in that it is delimiting itself from the child’s perspective of their world.719  
It has adapted to being satisfied with a limited knowledge of the child’s 
perspective of their situation and circumstances. 
 
The Tri-Borough Project in London is looked upon as an example of an 
effective way of working within the public child law system720 (see Chapter 4).  
However, even though this project had access to an exceptional level of 
resources compared to what is available nationally in England and Wales, in 
terms of services and personnel, the target of 26-weeks for the completion of 
proceedings was missed in some cases.  The reality of the system today is 
one that is far removed from such levels of resources.       
 
8.5 Judges adopting a more child-centred approach? 
 
Judges work within a system that has become dominated by an arbitrary 
timescale721 for the completion of proceedings.  In this research, judges 
generally had ambivalent feelings about the direct participation of children in 
proceedings.  In relation to the system becoming more child-centred, judges 
felt that such a development would necessitate a change of attitude among 
judges and professionals towards children having a more active and direct 
part in their proceedings, particularly the prevailing attitude that children need 
to be kept as far away as possible from courts.  While judges in this research 
made reference to the need for the court system to be more open and 
welcoming of children, their views ranged from openness without restriction 
to those hinged on a variety of parameters, to questioning the usefulness and 
value of children’s direct involvement in proceedings. 
  
All of the judges in this research did not actively promote such involvement.  
Meeting with children was the exception rather than the norm.  Their 
preference was to hear children’s views through their Guardian.  Their 
ambivalence is this area stemmed from their concern to avoid exposing 
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children to further emotional abuse and stress and from their identified need 
for further training in the area of communicating with children.  However, 
judges were very much committed to ensuring children receive high quality 
representation in proceedings, while at the same time acknowledging the 
limited time Guardians are able to spend getting to know the child they 
represent.  Judges placed the child’s welfare at the heart of their decision-
making, but the direct voice of the child for the most part remains silent in the 
process.  In this research, judges acknowledged that in some cases they did 
not receive adequate and useful information from professionals to enable 
them to make the best decision for the child.  This reality represents a 
dysfunction between what judges see as important in terms of their judicial 
values of fairness and justice and the central position of the principle of 
paramountcy in proceedings and what they are resigned to accept in terms of 
professional practice standards.  It also represents a system where 
procedural requirements722 and timescales723 have become the driving force 
of proceedings and which maintain a system that remains opaque to children.  
The current system does not accept that accountability and transparency is 
an integral part of the protection of children.724  
 
In their discussion on the importance of the judiciary advancing children’s 
rights, particularly in highly charged sensitive and emotional situations, 
Stalford and Hollingsworth725 state: ‘It is thus children’s invisibility and 
vulnerability within the law and their lack of political voice that gives even 
greater legitimacy to the explicit judicial adoption of a children’s rights 
perspective’.  However, they also make a very relevant and cautious 
observation in relation to having an expectation that the law will achieve a 
child-centred perspective, by acknowledging that while it is essential to 
embed children’s rights into the fabric of law and relevant policies, this of 
itself will not achieve a children’s rights or a child-centred perspective in 
terms of the application of law and policy.  The law, policies and procedures 
                                            
722 Guidelines on Judges Meeting Children (n 308). 
723 PLO (n 705). 
724 McFarlane (n 384). 
725 H Stalford and K Hollingsworth, ‘Judging Children’s Rights: Tendencies, Tensions, Constraints and 
     Opportunities’ in H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (eds) Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From  
     Academic Vision to New Practice (Hart 2017) 22. 
204 
 
are what makes children invisible in the reality of proceedings.726  Children 
need to take centre stage in the process, rather than waiting in the wings of 
ongoing proceedings. 
 
In her book Aoife Daly reframes the status of children where courts decide 
their best interests, arguing that the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
‘right to be heard’ is insufficient, and that children’s autonomy should instead 
be the focus.  Daly puts forward a new right, that of autonomy, save in 
situations where a child would be at risk of suffering significant harm.  In 
relation to hearing the voice of children in the current system she states: ‘ … 
it is determined by the adults involved, and by whether the system has 
created means to hear children at all. This demonstrates that we require a 
change of focus from ‘hearing’ children to recognising them as equals who 
may sometimes need paternalism. Otherwise it is quite possible that children 
will either never be offered the opportunity to be heard, or offered a version 
which is not suited to their needs’. 
 
8.6 Putting the child at the heart of the system 
 
The model put forward in this research (see Chapter 7, Figure 2) 
encompasses a holistic approach to establishing firmly the child’s place, 
presence, voice and rights within their proceedings, supported by necessary 
amendments and additions to current legislation.  This research has shown 
that there is a need to move to a more child-centred approach to decision-
making within the current public child law system.  This requires a radical 
shift not only in attitudes towards children’s active and direct participation in 
the process, but a re-positioning of children’s status, welfare and needs 
within the system, through the re-assigning of the current narrow and limiting 
managerial approach to the appropriate role of supporting, facilitating and 
promoting the central position of children in proceedings, rather than 
occupying the dominant and determining position it currently occupies.  Such 
a re-positioning of the current system is consistent with the spirit of the 
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Children Act 1989727 and accords with the principle of paramountcy728 and 
the spirit of rule 8 of the Family Proceedings Rules,729 which requires the 
system to move at the child’s pace and to focus on what is important for the 
child including their perspectives of their lived experience. 
 
The essential components of a child centred system must place the person of 
the child at the heart of the process.  Children are subject to public child law 
proceedings because they have suffered significant harm often over a period 
of years.  They come to the system for protection and for those with 
responsibility for their welfare and best interests to listen to their story.  The 
response of the current system is to distance itself from the child, through 
only spending the minimum amount of time working with the child and then 
within a 26-week period reach a life changing decision on the child’s life with 
less than adequate information on the child’s life from the perspectives of the 
child.  The child’s story is not heard and the impact and scars of significant 
harm remain with the child.  The expectation of the current system is for the 
child to tell their story of abuse and neglect to complete strangers in as short 
a time as possible to fit with a system that is driven and dominated by 
managerial efficiency masquerading under the principle of no delay. 
 
The model put forward by this research is one that reaches out to children in 
an inclusive and welcoming manner.  Children’s participation including direct 
participation if the child wishes, is an essential component of child-centred 
decision-making as is genuine respect for children’s rights under UNCRC, 
but of themselves, do not define a child-centred system.  The system itself, 
with its processes, structures, values, principles and professional practice 
need to embrace and value the child’s perspective of their situation.  This 
perspective needs to be given priority and embedded in the very core of the 
current system, supported by the proposed additions to the current law.  The 
child has a right to have their dignity respected and not trampled on by a 
system that views the child as an ‘add-on’ to the process.  The current 
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system has lost its way in both legislation and professional practice in relation 
to child-centred decision-making by relegating the person of the child to the 
status of a passive and distant object, while giving the system itself a pre-
eminent status in proceedings.  The proposed model for a more child-centred 
decision process, supported by additions to current legislation and changes 
in policy hopes to redress the balance, by having a system that is 
transparent, accessible and directly accountable to the child. 
   
8.7 Areas for future research 
 
This research study solely focused on judges’ perspectives, as they are the 
decision makers and therefore hold a pivotal role in public child law 
proceedings.  The scope of this research was limited to judicial perspectives 
in relation to child-centred decision-making.  There is a need for a larger and 
broader study of judges’ perspectives on public child law in the UK including 
judges from the Supreme Court.  This would allow comparisons to be made, 
for example, between male and female judges’ perspectives and between 
judges in other jurisdictions including Scotland and Northern Ireland.   
 
The perspectives of children who are the subjects of these proceedings are 
equally important.  An area for future research would be to explore with 
children their views on the impact of their experience of the current system 
had on their lives and the lives of their families and whether the decisions 
made in their case really took on board their perspectives of their lived 
experience and circumstances.  Another area for future research with 
children who have gone or are going through the system is whether they felt 
they had a trusting and meaningful relationship with their Guardian and social 
worker and were given adequate time and attention to discuss and explore 
their true views about the abuse and neglect they had suffered. 
 
The perspectives of children’s families are important.  Future research on 
their views of the proceedings and of the system overall would contribute 
valuable insights into how the process is being perceived and experienced by 
those whose lives are affected significantly by the decisions of the court. 
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There is also a need for research which explores the perspectives of the 
other professionals in relation to what they consider to be child-centred 
decision-making and in particular the perspectives of children’s Guardians, 
Local Authority social workers and lawyers, with a particular focus on 
whether they felt supported and adequately resourced to carry out their 
professional tasks to a high standard, as envisaged by the spirit of legislation 
and formal guidance. 
 
Given the significant role that information technology and social media play in 
children’s lives, it would be useful to carry out research on the influence of 
these areas in relation to how children communicate in their everyday lives, 
with a particular focus on children going through and children who have gone 
through public child law proceedings.  Such research could provide useful 
insights into children’s perspectives on wider and more innovative ways of 
involving children in their proceedings.  Research on these areas would 
increase our knowledge and understanding of the methods of 
communication, that children feel comfortable with and also feel empowered 
by, to take a much more active part in their proceedings.  This increased 
knowledge and understanding has the real potential for providing both 
professionals and judges with more in-depth information about the child’s 
world and circumstances, from the child’s perspective. 
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Interview Guide – Focus Areas 
 
(Interviews will be audio-recorded) 
 
Title of Research: 
 
Child-centredness in decision-making in Public Child Law Proceedings – 
Perspectives of the Judiciary 
 
 
Q.1 What values inform your judgements / decisions / directions? 
 
 - Personal values? 
 - Professional values? 
 - Conflict experienced between personal and professional values? 
 - In what ways do your personal and professional values 
             influence and inform your directions / decisions / judgements? 
 
Q.2 Do you hear the views of children involved in public child law 
 proceedings directly on a regular basis?  
 
 - If no, what are the issues preventing this happening? 
 - Barriers to children’s direct participation? 
 - Your professional / personal concerns? 
 - Interviewing children – worries / anxieties / fears? 
 
Q.3 Enabling children participate directly in public child law proceedings, 
what would you see as the main factors / issues? 
 
 - Practical issues e.g. court environment? 
 - Procedural issues? 
 - Legal issues? 
 - Cultural barriers / issues? 
 - Social barriers / issues? 
 - Human issues / difficulties? 
 - Systemic barriers / issues? 
- Training / preparation implications? 
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Q.4 What in your opinion characterises a child-centred public child law 
system? 
 
- Transparency within the system – how? 
 - Accountable to children – how? 
 - Informative – measures that need to be taken? 
 - Respectful – examples of how this could be seen in action? 
 - Child-friendly – practice examples / attitudes / values? 
 - Made relevant to and for children – how? 
 - Being inclusive – examples in everyday practices of the court  
 - Training / skills issues? 
 - Safe and sensitive to risk – within the system, achieved through? 
 
Q.5 Principles of public child law that may conflict / collide with child-
centred decision-making? 
 
 - No delay principle – timescales relevant / appropriate to children? 
 - No order principle – strengths and weaknesses? 
 - Working in partnership with families – conflict of interests 
             between children and adults? 
 - Paramountcy of child’s best interests – is this achievable? –  
             difficulties / barriers? 
 
Q.6 Training needs in relation to children’s direct participation in  court 
proceedings? 
  
 - For Judges - Core elements / areas of training? 
 - For Lawyers?    “ 
 - For Social Workers?   “ 
 - For Children’s Guardians?  “ 
 - For Police?    “ 
 - For Health Professionals?  “ 
 - For Education Professionals? “ 
 - For Expert Witnesses?  “ 
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Q.7 In your view, what would it take to create and build a public child law 
system that children felt was theirs and one that they felt was 
welcoming and child-friendly and that they felt very comfortable and at 
ease in participating in? 
 
 - Your vision of such a system? 
 - Core principles and values of such a system? 
 - Change in values required? 
 - Attitude change needed? 
 - Obstacles in the way? 
 - Training and development needs of professionals? 
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Participant Information Sheet  
 
 
 
Title of Study   
 
Child-centredness in decision-making in Public Child Law Proceedings 
– Perspectives of the Judiciary   
 
 
You are invited to take part in the above research study.  Before you decide 
whether you wish to participate, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information and feel free to ask for further information or clarification 
on any aspect of the research.  Contact details are included at the end of this 
information sheet. 
  
Purpose of the study 
 
The aim of the study is to identify from your perspective the core factors / 
elements of child-centredness in decisions made in public child law 
proceedings and to identify and explore with you any factors - human, legal, 
cultural, systemic and structural that present barriers to a transparent, child-
friendly, child-accessible public child law system.  This study forms part of the 
research for my PhD thesis, which I am completing in the School of Law and 
Social Justice in the University of Liverpool. 
 
Judges’ experience in and knowledge of the area of public child law 
proceedings are crucial to this research.  Whilst there exists some research 
in other jurisdictions, notably, Raitt730 in a study among members of the 
Scottish Judiciary, in the area of private law and Birnbaum and Bala731, 
where they compared the perspectives of American and Canadian Judges in 
relation to custody and access cases, there is a dearth of research on Public 
Child Law proceedings in England and Wales, with a specific focus on the 
child-centred nature of these proceedings from the perspectives of the 
judiciary.  Although there have been notable contributions to the literature in 
respect of this area of law from experienced members of the Judiciary 
                                            
730 Raitt, F. E., ‘Hearing children in family law proceedings: can judges make a difference?’ (2007) 19(2) Child and 
      Family Law Quarterly. 
731 Birnbaum, R. and Bala, N., ‘Judicial Interviews with Children in Custody and Access Cases: comparing  
      experiences in Ontario and Ohio’ (2010) 24(3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 300. 
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(Baroness Hale of Richmond732 and Crichton733), it remains an area where 
there exists a real gap in research.  This study endeavours to reduce this 
gap.   
 
 
Why have you been invited to take part in this research study? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this study because of your knowledge, 
expertise and experience in public child law proceedings.  In total, 20 judges 
from England and Wales (district, county and high court) will be taking part in 
this research. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No.  Participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at anytime 
without explanation. 
 
What is involved? 
 
A one-to-one interview lasting approximately one hour.  This will be audio-
recorded to ensure your responses are recorded accurately for the purposes 
of subsequent analysis.  A transcript of the interview will be forwarded to you 
for approval and for you to make any amendments / additions / deletions etc.  
The interview will take place on a date and at a time that is convenient for 
you, in a venue of your choice. 
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
 
If you are unhappy, or if a problem arises, please feel free to let either myself 
or my supervisor know and we will do our best to resolve the issue / concern.  
Our contact details are included at the end of this information sheet.  If you 
remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us 
with, you can contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 - 7948290 
(ethics@liv.ac.uk).  When contacting the Research Governance Officer, 
please provide details of the name or description of the study (so that it can 
be identified), the researcher involved, and the details of the complaint you 
wish to make. 
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
 
Yes.  All data collected will be stored securely and password protected.  Your 
responses will be anonymised and no identifying details will be disclosed.  
Access to the data collected will be restricted to myself and my supervisors.  
The data will be stored for one year following the completion of my PhD 
thesis.   
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
                                            
732 Hale, B., ‘Can you hear me Your Honour?’ (2012) January Family Law. 
733 Crichton, N., ‘Listening to children’ (2006) October Family Law October 849. 
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The results of the study will form part of the completed PhD thesis, a copy of 
which will be stored in the University library.  The results will also be used in 
future publications, but no identifying details will be disclosed.  Your 
responses will be kept in a secure place for one year following the completion 
of the PhD thesis, before being destroyed. 
 
What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
 
You can withdraw at anytime without explanation.  Results up to the period of 
withdrawal may be used, if you are happy for this to be done, otherwise you 
may request that they are destroyed and no further use will be made of them. 
 
If you have further questions or need clarification on any matter in relation to 
this research, please feel free to contact either myself or my supervisor.   
 
Contact details 
 
David Lane 
PhD Research Student 
School of Law and Social Justice 
Rendall Building 
University of Liverpool 
Tel. 07415 – 632093 
Email: dlane.cobh67@gmail.com 
 
Dr Helen Stalford 
Research Supervisor 
The School of Law and Social Justice 
Rendall Building 
University of Liverpool 
Liverpool  L69 7WW 
Tel. 0151 – 7942822 
Email: stalford@liverpool.ac.uk  
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CONSENT FORM  
 
 
          
                        Participant                                      Date                         Signature 
 
 
 
 
       
                             Researcher                                      Date                         Signature 
 
 
The contact details of the Researcher are: 
 
Address: The School of Law and Social Justice, Rendall Building  
                          University of Liverpool 
  Liverpool  L69 7WW 
Telephone:        07415 – 632093 
 
Email:  dlane.cobh67@gmail.com 
                                          
Title of Research: 
 
Child-centredness in decision-making in Public 
Child Law Proceedings – Perspectives of the 
Judiciary 
 
  
 
 
Please 
tick 
Researcher:  David Lane 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the Participant Information Sheet dated, 1st August 2012 
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. 
   
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving 
any reason, without my rights being affected.    
3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act 1998, I can at any time ask for access to the 
information I provide and I can also request the destruction of that information if I wish. 
 
 
4. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain 
confidential. 
 
 
 
5. I understand that the interview will be audio-recorded. 
 
 
6. I understand that parts of the interview may be used verbatim in future publications or presentations,    
but that such quotes will be anonymised. 
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From: McManus, Linda  
Sent: 21 May 2012 09:17 
To: Stalford, Helen 
Subject: FW: Ethics Application and Supporting Documents 
 
Dear Helen 
 
Can you please advise David that his ethics application has been approved, 
please see below email from Louise Hardwick. 
Best wishes 
Linda 
 
From: Ackers, Louise  
Sent: 14 May 2012 19:33 
To: Drywood, Eleanor; Mair, Michael 
Cc: McManus, Linda 
Subject: RE: Ethics Application and Supporting Documents 
 
 
Dear David, 
 
The Committee are happy to approve your ethics request but can you please 
ensure that you review existing material before you embark on new empirical 
work 
 
Louise  
 
Professor Louise Ackers  
Chair in European Socio-Legal Studies and Director 
European Law and Policy Research Group 
School of Law and Social Justice 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Liverpool 
L69 7ZS 
Fax 0151 794 2884 
Tel 0151 794 3679 
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PRESIDENT 
OF THE 
FAMILY 
DIVISION 
SIR JAMES MUNBY 
PRESIDENT OF THE FAMILY DIVISION AND HEAD OF FAMILY JUSTICE 
Mr David Lane 
University of Liverpool 
School of Law 
Rendall Building 
Liverpool 
L69 7WW 
 
23rd July 2013 
Thank you for the addendum to your application for judicial participation in 
your research project into Child-Centredness in Decision Making in Public 
Child Law Proceedings — Perspectives of the Judiciary, which you provided 
to this office on 25th June 2013. 
I have reconsidered your application in the light of the addendum document 
within which you set out the differences between your proposed project and 
the recent project carried out by Dr Debbie Cooper. I am now content for you 
to approach judges for interview, subject to the conditions for approval as set 
out in the Judicial Participation in Research Projects — Guidance for 
Researchers; in particular 
 Members of the judiciary will not be identified in any research reports; 
and 
• The researcher undertakes to provide the President of the Family 
Division and the members of the judiciary involved in the research, 
with a final draft copy of any report in order to give them an 
opportunity to comment upon it before a report is published. 
Please also note that the permission granted is also subject to the willingness 
of the judges to be interviewed, and there is no obligation on them to take 
part. 
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Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC'2A 2LL 
Telephone 020 7947 7054 Fax 020 7947 7274 Email Holly.Rodger@judiciary.gsi.gov.uk 
Website www.judiciary.gov.uk 
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Research Statistics - England 
 
 
 
Level of Court 
 
Male 
 
 
Female 
 
High Court 
 
2 
 
0 
 
County Court 
 
5 
 
8 
 
District Court 
 
4 
 
2 
 
Magistrates 
(FPC) 
 
0 
 
2 
 
Total: 
 
12 
 
11 
 
Total: 23 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Research Statistics - Wales 
 
 
 
Level of Court 
 
Male 
 
 
Female 
 
County Court 
 
2 
 
3 
 
District Court 
 
2 
 
0 
 
Total: 
 
4 
 
3 
 
Total: 7 
 
Table 2 
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Research Statistics - Summary 
 
 
Number of High Court Judges 
 
2 
 
Number of County Court 
Judges 
 
18 
 
Number of District Judges 
 
8 
 
Magistrates (FPC) 
 
2 
 
Total Sample: 30 
 
Table 3  
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) 
ON APPEAL FROM SWANSEA CIVIL JUSTICE CENTRE 
HER HONOUR JUDGE ISABEL PARRY 
SA10C01648 
 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 
 
Date: 21st March 2013 
 
 
Before: 
 
 
Jane Williams, with commentary by David Lane 
 
And 
 
Other Lords Justices 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Between:  P-S (Children)  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Mr David Blake (instructed by T. Lewellyn Jones) for the Appellant 
Miss Ruth Henke QC and Miss Clare Williams (instructed by Carmarthenshire 
County Council) for the 1st Respondent 
Mr Edmund Cofie (instructed by John Itsagwede & Co) for the 2nd Respondent 
Mr Matthew Rees (instructed by Cameron Jones Hussell & Howe) for the 4th 
Respondent 
 
Hearing date: 12th November 2012 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Judgment 
 
 
1. The appellant, M, was 15 years old when he applied through solicitors and counsel 
separately representing him for leave to attend court to give evidence in care 
proceedings to which he was a party. Other parties were the Local Authority, M’s 
younger half-brother A and their Mother. The   Local Authority sought care orders in 
respect of both boys. M wished to return to the care of his Mother and in his application 
stated that ‘he does not feel that the strength of his feelings [are] being sufficiently 
understood and wishes an opportunity to attend before the learned judge to express 
himself in person in his own words so that his case is fully advanced.’  On 21st 
November 2011 Her Honour Judge Parry sitting in the Swansea County Court 
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dismissed M’s application.  On 24th November 2011 she ordered that both boys be 
placed in care.  With permission granted by Thorpe LJ, M appeals against both the 
dismissal of his application to give evidence in the case and against the care order.    
 
2. Mr David Blake, M’s counsel, submits that ‘this case raises a novel point of principle 
as to whether a young person who has been afforded full independent party status 
should be heard orally as any other party would “fairly” expect to be and a general 
point of interest as to what is the right test for whether a child should be heard on 
questions of wishes, feelings and indeed future intentions when they are competent to 
express them.’ He goes further and submits that ‘M does have a “right” to give 
evidence or there is at least a presumption in favour.’  In the appeal against the care 
order ‘the general point … is essentially should the elements of the welfare checklist 
be weighted with a rebuttable presumption in favour of wishes and feelings being 
complied with, where the young person is fast approaching majority?’   
The background 
3. M was born on [a date in] 1996 in Romania of Romanian parents.  His Mother settled 
in the Republic of Ireland and was granted Irish citizenship.  M’s father played no part 
in the proceedings and there was no evidence about him. When in Eire Mother met Mr 
S, a Nigerian citizen.  A was born of this relationship on [a date in] 2011.   
 
4. The Mother, M and A came to Wales in September 2009, where they came to the 
attention of the Local Authority Social Services.  On 28th May 2010, while the 
children were in school, the Mother attempted to leave Wales for Eire without having 
made proper arrangements for the care of the children.  She was arrested and charged 
with neglect though eventually acquitted.  The children were received into care and 
placed with foster parents.  An application for a care order was issued on 24th June 
2010 and a guardian duly appointed to both M and A.  Contact ceased at the end of 
July 2010 because the Mother refused to agree to the Local Authority’s requirement 
that she would not discuss the case with the children. M then tried twice to run away 
to re-join his Mother, on the second occasion being removed by the police after they 
forced entry in to the Mother’s home. M’s initial foster placement with A broke down 
but M is reported to have settled well with new foster parents. 
 
5. In July 2011 M met his guardian and her solicitor and asked for separate 
representation. On 26th July 2011 the judge so ordered and appointed a solicitor to 
represent him.  In a position statement settled by his solicitor, dated 31 July 2011, M 
said, ‘I do not wish to remain where I am and I strongly desire to return home.’  He 
said he wished to meet with the judge to convey to her how he felt.  The Mother made 
an application for both M and A to give oral evidence. That application was dismissed. 
 
6. The final hearing commenced on 1st August 2011. M was represented by counsel.  At 
the end of the second day HHJ Parry saw M in her room in the presence of his solicitor 
and the guardian.  In her judgment of 21st November 2011, the judge explained that 
she did not use the meeting as an opportunity to ascertain M’s wishes and feelings, ‘ 
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… because those wishes and feelings were already perfectly obvious from formal 
reports that the Court had received from the Guardian and the fact that he now wished 
to have separate representation ...’ Instead, she explained to M the task of the Court in 
trying to achieve a welfare outcome for children that reflects their wishes and feelings, 
and that the Court has to look at the whole picture, all the evidence that is available 
about the child and about the people who are looking after him and who want to look 
after him. She did not ‘discuss any issues evidentially with him, such as the reasons 
why he does not see his mother and the reasons why he apparently absconded to her 
care in early December 2010’.  In taking this approach the judge applied the Guidelines 
issued by the Family Justice Council in 2010, which state that a meeting out of court 
between the judge and the child is not to be used for the gathering of evidence. 
However it is clear that the judge did, as a result of that meeting, form some impression 
of M, since she noted that M was reasonably subdued during the meeting, but became 
animated ‘when talking about matters that are far removed from the heavy emotional 
baggage which must constitute his day-to-day life and his feelings about his brother 
and mother’.  
 
7. The next day the hearing was adjourned for some three weeks to 26th August to hear 
the guardian and for closing submissions to be made.  On 26th August A’s father 
attended court and in view of his albeit belated interest the matter was further 
adjourned for a further three months, to 21st November 2011.  
  
8. On 16th November 2011 M applied for permission to attend to give evidence by video 
link ‘so that the strength of my feelings can be made clear to everyone’.  He explained 
that he would be ‘extremely distressed if told that I was to be forced to remain in foster 
care and I would struggle greatly to accept this outcome’.  He also said that ‘I have 
had thoughts of running away as sometimes I have felt that people are not taking me 
seriously.  These have occurred quite often, including quite recently, but in the last few 
weeks I have been a little more optimistic and hope that the court will grant my wishes.  
I would feel devastated if I were told I could not return.’  M’s application was heard 
on 21st November 2011. The Local Authority and guardian indicated that they did not 
wish to cross-examine M, and M’s Mother indicated that the only question she would 
be seeking to ask him through her counsel would be about the likelihood of him 
running away from his placement should a care order be made.   
 
9. The judge dismissed the application and continued to hear the care proceedings, in 
which A’s father offered himself as a carer for the children either jointly with Mother 
or in the alternative by himself.  The Mother seemed willing to care for the children 
jointly with A’s father but without any Local Authority intervention.  The Local 
Authority was successful in its application. 
The judgment on M’s giving evidence 
10. The judge based her dismissal of M’s application to give evidence as follows. First, 
the Mother had always displayed her own emotions openly in court whether 
represented or not and there was a severe risk she would make an extreme emotional 
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outburst which it would be impossible to control. M would be ‘available to Mother’ in 
the court precincts, with ‘real potential detriment to M in terms of his coming to give 
evidence’. Secondly, M would want to do what he thought right by his Mother and 
would want to put right matters over which he had no control and for which he was 
not responsible. He would ‘assume a responsibility for the outcome of this case’ which 
would be enormously harmful to him. If he felt he had failed, there was a prospect that 
his relationship with his carers and Guardian would be damaged. Thirdly, she doubted 
whether M would communicate anything that would assist her in the determination of 
the relevant issues: she had already accepted that M would be bitterly disappointed if 
he could not return to his mother. She concluded that ‘the additional benefit to the 
determination of the relevant issues of M giving evidence is significantly outweighed 
by the very real potential detriment’. M should not ‘be placed in the invidious position 
of giving evidence when the giving of that evidence may make matters significantly 
harder for him should the case go against his express wishes’. Any ‘short-term 
emotional harm’ resulting from the rejection of the case put on his behalf, was a 
reflection of the reality that ‘there is rarely a perfect outcome to proceedings involving 
children’. 
The judgment on the care application  
11. The judge accepted the evidence relating to the Mother’s inadequate parenting and 
neglect. As to the welfare stage, the judge held there was ‘simply no material’ 
permitting a conclusion that the children could be safe in the care of their Mother or 
that a repetition of the past problems could be avoided. A’s father, M’s step-father, 
had no real understanding of the difficulties nor had he been prepared to gain insight 
during the short period that he had been involved in the proceedings. Neither the 
mother and father/step-father jointly, or either of them solely, could provide the 
parenting that both A and M needed.  
 
12. Turning to M’s wishes and feelings, the judge accepted that ‘M has strong feelings’ 
and felt that the professionals misunderstood him and misinterpreted his apparent 
compliance with the arrangements made for his welfare.  She accepted that M had 
thought of running away and that what he had written was what he wanted the court to 
hear of his wishes and feelings.  However, she said that the court must ‘assess and 
interpret his wishes and feelings in the light of other welfare concerns’, specifically 
her conclusion about the capacity of the parents to meet ‘M’s global welfare needs’.  
She referred also to the evidence of a clinical and counselling psychologist which 
indicated that M’s anxiety about himself translated into anxiety about his Mother 
because of the role he had played in the family, that  in the psychologist’s view, M 
would not run away and that in the current foster placements there was ‘a degree of 
containment and flexibility’ in which M would feel safe albeit remaining concerned 
about his Mother. The judge concluded that the expert evidence gave rise to a 
suggestion that M’s expressed wishes and feelings could not outweigh her clear 
conclusion on the danger to M’s welfare if he returned to his mother – so his evidence 
could not, in her view, affect the outcome.  
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13. After the judge had concluded her ex tempore judgment Mr Blake made further 
submissions and asked the judge to amplify her reasons for refusing to adopt M’s 
wishes about his long term care.  She acknowledged the need to balance the expressed 
wishes and feelings of the child against circumstances likely to prevail if the child’s 
wishes are acted upon. There was no need to ‘place any gloss on the s. 1(3) ‘checklist’’. 
In this case, she said, ‘the risk of harm from Mother is overwhelming’.   
Discussion on the issue of M giving evidence 
14. In care proceedings, the child is automatically a party. The Children Act 1989 and the 
Family Proceedings Rules provide how, in practice, effect is given to that party status, 
bearing in mind a child may be a party from as early in life as the day of the child’s 
birth. Section 41 of the Children Act requires the appointment of a Guardian - who in 
practice in England will be commissioned by CAFCASS and in Wales, will be a Welsh 
family proceedings officer acting on behalf of the Welsh Ministers. A guardian need 
not be appointed if the court is satisfied that it is not necessary to do so in order to 
safeguard the child’s interest. The court may appoint a solicitor to represent the child. 
A child of sufficient maturity and understanding may instruct a solicitor independently. 
 
15. As for attendance, under s. 95 of the Children Act the court may order the child 
concerned to attend as prescribed by rules of court.  FPR 12.14 provides that any party 
must attend the proceedings, but the proceedings or any part of them will take place in 
the absence of a child pursuant to FPR 12.14(3) if the court considers it in the interests 
of the child having regard to the matters to be discussed or the evidence likely to be 
given and the child is represented by a guardian or solicitor. The rules thus reflect the 
norm in any legal proceedings that the parties will attend, but provide, where 
prescribed conditions apply and subject to procedural safeguards, for a child party not 
to attend.    
 
16. Section 96 of the Children Act makes special provision about children’s evidence. 
Subsection (1) has the effect that if a child understands the nature of the oath, the child 
can give evidence in the normal way. Subsection (2) provides that where the court is 
not satisfied that the child understands the nature of the oath, the child’s evidence may 
be heard if the judge considers that the child understands the duty to speak the truth 
and has sufficient understanding. Section 96 also provides for the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence. FPR 22.1 gives the court power to control evidence by giving 
directions as to the issues on which it requires evidence, the nature of that evidence 
and the way in which the evidence is to be placed before the court.  The general rule 
is that any fact which needs to be proved by the evidence of witnesses is to be proved 
at the final hearing by the oral evidence. 
 
17. That is the legislative framework.  As for its application, the leading authority is ON v 
W (Children) (Family Proceedings: Evidence) [2010] UKSC 12, [2010] 1 WLR 701, 
in which a fourteen year old girl was being called to give evidence about alleged abuse 
relevant to the threshold stage. There are significant differences between that case and 
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M’s, but the principles set out by Baroness Hale are still pertinent. She said that the 
object was to achieve a fair trial in the determination of the rights of all the people 
involved. When considering whether a child should be called to give evidence, the 
court had to weigh the advantages that will bring to the determination of the truth and 
the damage it may do to the welfare of that or any other child. The hearing, she said, 
cannot be fair to children unless their interests are given great weight. She set out 
various factors which the court would need to take into account when carrying out the 
balancing exercise. These included the child’s own feelings about giving evidence, the 
age and maturity of the child and ‘the general evidence of the harm which giving 
evidence may do to children, as well as any features which are particular to this child 
and this case’. (at para 26) The risk, and therefore the weight to be attached to the 
several factors, would vary from case to case. But she predicted that ‘the consequence 
of the balancing exercise will usually be that the additional benefits to the court’s task 
in calling the child do not outweigh the additional harm that it will do to the child.’ (at 
para. 30) 
 
18. The Court of Appeal in that case (hereafter, Re: W) [2010] EWCA Civ 57 had invited 
the President of the Family Division to consider the issue of children giving evidence 
in family proceedings. Lord Justice Thorpe’s working party of the Family Justice 
Council did so, and produced Guidelines in December 2011.  The resultant 2011 
Guidelines drew heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Re: W. The Guidelines 
state that there is no presumption or starting point against children giving evidence in 
family proceedings and that the court’s 'principal objective’ should be achieving a fair 
trial. The essential balancing exercise requires the court to weigh the possible 
advantages to the ‘determination of the truth’ against the possible damage to the child, 
having regard to a number of factors. Understandably, given the provenance of the 
Guidelines, the factors include many which have relevance only to the ‘proof of abuse’ 
cases. However some of the factors and the Guidance generally are helpful in dealing 
with the issue of whether the child should give evidence at the disposal stage when the 
question is what the welfare of the child demands. 
 
19. Thorpe LJ remarked in Re: H (Abuse: Oral Evidence) [2011] EWCA Civ 741, [2012] 
1 FLR 186 at [8], that Baroness Hale’s guidance in Re: W essentially requires a 
measured balance between the demands of justice and the needs of child welfare. That 
reduction should I think be seen in the context of the ‘proof of abuse’ cases, of which 
Re: H was another example. In those cases, ‘justice’ is a shorthand for fairness to an 
alleged abuser, and ‘child welfare’ is a shorthand for the risk of the child being 
traumatised by having to give evidence and be cross-examined about the alleged abuse. 
I would not accept, as a general proposition, that justice and child welfare are opposing 
aims, and I am sure that is not what Thorpe LJ intended to be understood.  
 
20. I turn now to the features which importantly distinguish M’s case from cases 
like Re: H and Re: W, where the child would be a witness of facts as to alleged 
past abuse and would face cross-examination in court on difficult and painful 
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issues. M’s evidence would be not about what had happened, but about what 
should happen. M, a child of relatively mature years, sought to address the 
court about his own welfare interest, on which he took a different view from 
the guardian and the Local Authority. Neither the Local Authority nor the 
guardian wished to challenge M’s evidence and on behalf of the Mother it had 
been indicated that questioning would be limited to one issue only, which was 
whether he might run away again. It would be wrong to assume that the 
‘general evidence of harm’ to children from giving evidence (para. 26 of 
Baroness Hale’s judgment above) has the same purchase in M’s situation. 
Furthermore, in M’s case and others like it, the ‘general evidence’ about the 
impact of direct participation must nowadays, in my view, include evidence 
about ensuring respect for the rights of children in proceedings which affect 
them.   
 
21. At about the time the Children Act 1989 was passed, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (‘the Convention’) was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly.  The Convention was ratified by the United Kingdom in 
1990 and is the most widely ratified human rights treaty ever. It contains some 
42 substantive articles containing requirements for States Parties to recognise 
a wide range of rights and to take actions. The Convention has not been made 
a part of English law but is subject to the general rule that where more than one 
interpretation is possible, the interpretation chosen should be that which better 
complies with international obligations. (Smith v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions and Another [2006] UKHL 35 per Baroness Hale at para.78.) 
 
22. This approach applies throughout England and Wales, but in Wales, where M’s 
case was heard, there is an additional aspect which, whilst not in force at the 
time, will apply in family proceedings from 1 May 2014, when the Rights of 
Children and Young Persons Measure (Wales) 2011 came fully into force. 
Section 1 of the Measure requires the Welsh Ministers, ‘when exercising any 
of their functions’ to have due regard to the requirements of Part 1 of the 
Convention and specified articles of the Optional Protocols which have been 
ratified by the UK Government. Welsh Ministers, not the courts, are subject to 
this duty of due regard, but in Wales, it is the function of Welsh Ministers, 
exercised in practice by the Welsh family proceedings officers, to exercise the 
‘CAFCASS’ functions in family proceedings. Accordingly this legal duty to 
have due regard to the Convention applies to the exercise of those functions in 
Wales. This will affect the court’s approach to evidence; especially when 
considering any argument that due regard has not been given to the 
requirements of the Convention. Had the 2011 Measure been in force at the 
time of the hearing in M’s case, this would have been an additional argument 
at his disposal, upon which the court would have had to adjudicate. 
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23. Even at the time of M’s case, the Convention had already been recognised as 
having effects on the exercise of judicial discretion in family proceedings: see 
Thorpe LJ in Mabon v Mabon [2005] EWCA Civ 634, [2005] Fam 366, at para. 
32. Certain of the Convention’s requirements have been identified by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘the UN Committee’) as being of 
particular and general importance. These include Article 3, para. 1 of which 
requires that in all actions concerning children undertaken by courts of law 
(and other institutions), ‘the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration’, and Article 12, which requires States Parties to ‘assure to the 
child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given 
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.  The UN 
Committee has made it clear that Articles 3 and 12 are interdependent. A best 
interests determination which fails to respect the child’s Article 12 rights would 
be incompatible with the Convention, however well-intended and attentive to 
the child’s other needs.  Equally, a mechanism for ‘hearing the child’ which 
failed adequately to protect the child’s best interests would be non-compliant.  
 
24. Apart from these requirements of the Convention, there is the well-established 
right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR and enforceable 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. No person, however young, is excluded 
from its protection. Furthermore, as pointed out by Munby J. in CF v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 111 (Fam) at para. 158, the 
child, as well as the parent, has the right to respect for private and family life 
under Article 8 ECHR, including the procedural aspects recognised in W v 
United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR and McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) 
20 EHRR 205. Section 3 of the HRA 1998 requires the court ‘so far as possible’ 
to interpret legislation compatibly with the ECHR Convention rights, and the 
common law requires that if more than one interpretation is possible, the more 
UN Convention-compliant interpretation should be preferred. This points 
inescapably to the conclusion that in proceedings which may result in 
interference with a child’s private and family life, the child has the right to be 
heard, express views and have due weight attached to them in accordance with 
the child’s age and understanding.   
 
25. Still, this does not answer the question of how the child’s views will be heard. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 12 contemplates that this may be ‘either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with 
the procedural rules of national law’, so the representative participation 
supplied by the ‘tandem’ model appears on the face of it compatible with the 
Convention. This is the view taken by many commentators, for example 
Professor Jane Fortin, (Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, Chapter 7). 
Plainly, however, this can only be the case if those exercising discretion – 
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judicially, professionally or administratively – act in a manner which is 
compatible with the holistic interpretation required by the Convention. 
 
26. The General Comment on Article 12 at [43] prefers the child being heard under 
conditions of confidentiality, not in open court – a preference that would of 
course be satisfied by the closed character of care proceedings, from which the 
public are excluded.  Further, it is clear that it may be enough that an 
intermediary hears the child’s views and reports them the judge: it does not 
seem essential that the judge must hear directly from the child.  But the 
question in this case is what approach must be taken by a court where the child 
party’s views are at odds with those of the court-appointed intermediary and 
the child party, being of sufficient age and understanding to instruct a solicitor 
independently, wants to participate directly and give evidence in the case. Mr 
Blake argues that in this situation, the child has a right to give evidence. To 
this, the Local Authority replied that no-one has ‘the right to give evidence’ in 
family proceedings, the question of what evidence is required to determine the 
case being under the control and direction of the court. Quite so, but that is not 
the point: the point is how the court should exercise that power. 
 
27. As in most cases involving the exercise of discretion, there is a balance to be 
struck between the benefits and the burdens.  That is what the judge sought to 
do, but in my view she erred: as to the relevance of one factor, as to the weight 
to be attached to others, and in omitting relevant factors. Her view that M 
would not be able to convey anything she did not already know was not a 
relevant consideration. Whether or not, technically, anyone has a ‘right to give 
evidence’ in family proceedings, it is inconceivable that an adult party would 
be prevented from doing so simply because the court already knows the 
position that party wishes to convey. There is no justification for distinguishing 
between adult and child parties in this regard except by reference to the child’s 
best interests. As to that, the judge erred when she preferred Dr Street’s opinion 
and the ‘general evidence’ of harm to children from giving evidence to what 
M himself might tell her directly. She erred in finding that the impact on M of 
an outburst from his mother would be uncontrollable, since M had requested 
the use of a video link rather than being physically present in court. Crucially, 
she did not consider the potential harm to M from not being allowed to give his 
evidence. This was the final hearing which would determine whether he could, 
in the immediate future, live with this mother. He was 15, had been granted the 
facility of separate representation and had clear views which he wanted to 
convey directly, not through intermediaries. It seems to me curious that when 
we recognise that adult parties, excluded from a private meeting between the 
judge and child, may feel an injustice has been done to them, we should fail to 
recognise that children may also feel an injustice has been done to them if they 
are excluded from the process. I note that social research on this issue (for 
example, Masson and Winn-Oakley Out of Hearing: Representing Children in 
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Court) suggests that such feelings of injustice are in practice often experienced 
by children in family proceedings. 
 
28. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal on this point. Where a party, of any age, 
to family proceedings is competent and wishes to give evidence, the effect of 
Articles 6 and 8 ECHR, and additionally in the case of a child, Articles 3 and 
12 of the UNCRC, is that in practice they do enjoy that right. The judge must 
still control the proceedings, but judicial discretion must, as Thorpe LJ 
recognised in Mabon v Mabon quoted above, be exercised in such a way as to 
give effect to these fundamental human rights requirements.  
 
Discussion of the issue of weight to be attached to the mature child’s views 
29. I have concluded that M had, effectively, the right to give evidence, and in light 
of that conclusion I cannot assume that his evidence would have made no 
difference to the court’s decision on the welfare test. To do so would be to fall 
in to the same error as the trial judge. Accordingly, the appeal against the care 
order must also be allowed. In the event that the case comes again before the 
court of first instance, there is then the question of the weight to be attached to 
M’s views. Mr Blake argues that there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of 
a mature child’s preferred outcome at the welfare stage. There is merit in this 
argument, since, as with the question of direct participation in the proceedings, 
we have to recognise that the law is on the move in terms of recognition of the 
capacity and agency of the child.  As I have already explained, this affects our 
interpretation of the rules and the exercise of discretion in family proceedings. 
 
30. On balance, however, I decline to take that further step. The weight to be given 
to the wishes, feelings and views of the child will vary from case to case.  It 
may be the determinative factor in a particular case but s. 1(3) Children Act 
1989 cannot be construed so as to read into it a hierarchy of weight amongst 
the factors there listed. Each and all of the factors should also be interpreted in 
light of the fundamental human rights requirements to which I have referred.  
But as to the weight to be attached to them, each case is fact sensitive.   
Other Lord Justices:   
We agree.  
 
  
